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Participatory forest management and participatory conservation in general represent a 
process of traditionally upper level, government forest conservation agencies engaging 
local populations, and their complex forms of local governance, social institutions, and 
livelihoods, in the official management of natural resources. In practice participatory 
conservation entails many different means to this end. Participatory projects include 
community-based conservation, joint forest management, co-management, protected area 
outreach, and others. Across these approaches are a diversity o f perspectives on elements 
of participation that are critical to the successfulness o f different types o f projects. This 
thesis explores the elements of participation that impede and facilitate the successfiilness 
of participatory conservation initiatives through a case study of three participatory forest 
management projects in the Ghana-Togo Highlands of West Africa. These three cases 
represent different organizational strategies, which reflect different underlying 
assumptions: protected area outreach, co-management, and community conservation. 
They also involve three primary project activities: reforestation, ecotourism, and 
alternative income development. Through a combination of interviews, participant 
observation, and document reviews, this thesis argues that these initiatives presented site 
specific problems due to conflicts present in three themes: narrow initiation of 
participation through limited definitions o f ‘conservation’ and ‘participation’; low 
representation of local interests through different forms of local management committees; 
and non-negotiated values and inequitable benefits of conservation. Rather than viewing 
any of the specific elements of these themes as barriers to successfulness, I conclude that 
the contextual problems are due to the similar lack of conflict resolution and adaptation 
processes present for different reasons in each case. To improve this I recommend that 
local actors, project leaders, external facilitators, and particularly non-authority level 
actors, engage in dialogue focused on broadening all participants’ knowledge of a 
continuum of participatory conservation approaches that then can be discussed to 
negotiate conservation approaches that better fit local conditions.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Research Goals and Objectives
This thesis is concerned with factors of participation that facilitate the 
successfiilness o f participatory conservation strategies. Participatory conservation, 
generally, may be defined as conservation initiatives that in some capacity include 
resident populations. I address this topic through an assessment of three participatory 
forest management projects in the Ghana-Togo Highlands of West Africa. The 
organizers of each of the three initiatives (combinations of central and regional 
government agencies, non-government organizations, and traditional authorities) aim to 
achieve particular goals o f forest conservation through different types of local 
participation. The project areas have many geographic and socio-economic similarities; 
however each is situated in its own web of conservation history, social institutions, 
interest groups and local politics. The three initiatives attempt to complement these 
different characteristics with different management structures, objectives, and activities. 
One of the challenges of this analysis is comparing strategies at different scales to inform 
broader project contexts beyond the unique, site specific project characteristics. The 
other main challenge of this study is determining criteria for and analyzing factors o f 
participation relevant to the successfulness o f participatory conservation, because 
participatory conservation has such a broad and malleable definition. As such, the two 
overall research goals were:
1. Identify factors within participatory conservation strategies that influence
their successfiilness.
2. Help refine and further the development of a framework for analyzing and 
critically evaluating participatory conservation initiatives at the local scale.
The first goal identifies factors locally, within the participatory strategy or the 
setting, while the second goal explores local factors as they relate to differences among 
the diverse array of participatory conservation models. In this way the two goals allow 
me to approach the issue from multiple scales. To achieve these overarching goals I 
created three sub-objectives, which were:
1. Define categories of participation factors that contribute to the 
successfiilness o f participatory conservation fi*om varying perspectives in 
the existing literature and organize the factors along a continuum to serve as 
a working definition of participatory conservation.
2. Describe the characteristics the three initiatives studied based on detailed 
information of the initiatives, project areas, populations, and participatory 
measures obtained from interviews and observations of a diverse group of 
actors in the study area.
3. Assess the influence of different factors of participation on the 
successfulness o f the initiatives by comparing factors within and between 
each initiative in the context of the continuum organized in sub-objective 
number one.
My first objective was to summarize existing literature on participatory 
conservation, highlighting factors of participation that affect the successfiilness of 
participatory conservation initiatives into what I see as a useful analytical framework. 
The factors come fi*om multiple perspectives of participatory conservation, including
protected area management, co-managed areas, community conserved areas, 
decentralization of forest management, and participatory development. From these 
perspectives I organized what I see as. elements of participation contributing to the 
successfiilness of initiatives into the following three themes:
1. Participation initiation: how, by whom, and why
2. Representation, capacity, and empowerment of local actors and institutions
3. Values o f forests and the benefits o f participation
These themes are used in the subsequent chapters to analyze and compare the influence 
different factors of participation on the initiatives. The discussion of the factors from the 
differing perspectives on participatory conservation and the organization of the analytical 
framework for this thesis are presented in Chapter 2.
My second objective was to uncover the elements of participation most relevant to 
the successfulness of each specific initiative. To achieve this objective, I created the 
following general questions to guide my interactions with actors in the study area:
1. What are the backgrounds of the project areas (i.e. historic use, ownership, 
classification, management, etc...)?
2. What are the management structures o f each initiative?
3. What are the goals of the projects and how did they develop?
4. Who are the relevant local actors and how do they view forest conservation?
5. How do local actors participate and what are their benefits?
These initial questions expanded into more specific interview guides and worksheets 
designed to target different actors. The discussion of the methodological framework, 
particular methods, sampling, and data analysis occurs in Chapter 3.
The third objective was to assess the relative importance of differences in 
participation to the successfiilness of each project. In chapter 4 1 describe the study areas 
and introduce the three initiatives. In chapters 5, 6, and 7 I discuss the results o f the 
study, which are organized into the three categories defined by the analytical framework. 
Based on these three chapters, I draw conclusions and make recommendations in Chapter 
8 concerning what factors of participation can make participatory conservation initiatives 
more successful.
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Analytical Framework
This chapter reviews literature on participatory forest management within the 
larger scheme of conservation. Following this, it highlights five perspectives of 
conservation and development related to participatory conservation from the literature: 
protected area management, community conservation, co-management, decentralization, 
and participatory development (Figure 1). The authors o f these perspectives come from a 
range of disciplinary and practical backgrounds, and identify and describe elements o f 
participation that they perceive as critical for achieving successful participatory 
conservation. On the surface many of these elements appear similar. However, each 
perspective on participatory conservation incorporates specific assumptions regarding 
what the goals o f conservation projects should be, how local and external people should 
participate in conservation, who should participate and when. This review of 
participatory conservation literature explains that there are diverse definitions of 
successful participatory conservation and of the elements o f participation that are critical 
to facilitating them, which differ depending on the perspective from which they are 
defined. Therefore, in the scheme of the research questions underlying this thesis, I 
emphasize in this literature review that determining the perspective of participatory 
conservation an initiative is based on is a necessary first step to understanding the 
elements of participation that facilitate or impede its success.
For this reason, I use this review of elements o f participation that different 
perspectives on participatory conservation consider critical to success, to identify factors 
and organize them into a framework with which I will analyze the three case studies. The 
overall framework is represented by Figure 1. To create this framework I will highlight
elements relative to participation that make projects more successful from each different 
perspective individually (the outer circles in figure 1, also displayed individually in 
Figures 3-7) by reviewing the literature. Following this I combine the factors from each 
perspective into a list of factors that I see as ranging across the different perspectives 
(Figure 8). Finally, I organize the factors from this list into three overarching themes 
(Figure 9) that correspond with the presentation o f the results and analysis chapters in this 
thesis.
1. Participation Initiation
2. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity
3. Values and Benefits
Figure 1. Literature Review and Analytical Framework Overview
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The circles in the core area of Figure 1 represent the three overarching themes o f the 
analytical framework that are made up of factors from each of the five outlying 
perspectives on participatory conservation. I selected the factors of participation critical
to the successfiilness of initiatives based on my review o f literature describing each 
perspective (Figures 3-7) and subsequently determined the organization of the factors 
across perspectives which I present in Figures 8 and 9 in this chapter. Therefore, I 
created all figures presented in this chapter, other than Figure 2, based on my review of 
participatory conservation literature to create this analytical framework (Figure 1).
What is Participatory Forest Management?
Participatory forest management initiatives are a subset of the types of 
environments, resources, and conservation programs involving local peoples that can be 
more generally termed ‘participatory conservation’. Participatory conservation is a way 
of approaching conservation issues through building relationships between local peoples 
and conservation initiatives, which has emerged along with participatory approaches to 
development since the 1970’s (Wells et al. 1992). From the 1890’s until the 1970’s 
conservation was promoted throughout the world using exclusionary means to preserve 
landscapes from human use, like national park or wilderness models from State-led, 
bureaucratic, technocratic or expert driven approaches (Western and Wright, 1994, 
Brechin et al 2002). These models remain common, but have lost popularity for 
numerous reasons, particularly among non-biologists, for their lack o f success excluding 
local residents (often lower class and ethnic minorities) and protecting resources within 
their boundaries, as well as their inflicting negative social impacts on local populations’ 
dependent on those resources (Brandon and Wells 1992, West and Brechin, 1991). 
Reconsidering the role o f resident peoples in conservation is part of a greater transition 
toward what theorists call ‘new conservation’. These include interdisciplinary
approaches to conservation that incorporate multiple scales o f ecological, social, political, 
and economic concerns (Berkes 2004, Hulme and Murphree 1999, Scoones 1999).
The strategies and activities at work in participatory conservation initiatives are 
diverse and applied in many conservation approaches, including protected area outreach 
programs (PAOP), co-management; joint forest management (JFM); community-based 
conservation (CBC), natural resource management (CBNRM), and wildlife management 
(CBWM); integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP); biospheres; 
resource reserves; sacred groves; working landscapes; and various other nuanced titles. 
Participatory conservation strategies have become so pervasive, particularly among 
governmental and non-govemmental conservation and development organizations 
(NGOs) in tropical developing countries, that it is wrong to assume that parks are 
necessarily exclusionary, or that community-based techniques are necessarily 
participatory because there are examples of both parks that include vast local 
participation and community areas that exclude all use (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). 
There can be both shallow (e.g., involvement in a limited set of activities such as revenue 
sharing) and deep (e.g., involvement in initiative definition, goals setting, and critical 
program evaluation throughout all stages) participation strategies at work in both cases. 
Therefore, participatory conservation cannot be understood in terms o f a particular 
strategy, policy, or management activity that can be chosen and implemented. Rather, it 
is a process of decision making and negotiation required to involve the governance 
structures and livelihoods of local residents, which are made up o f complicated political, 
social, and economic issues (Infield and Namara 2001, Brechin et al. 2002, Michaelidou 
et al. 2002). Whether a participation strategy is characterized as shallow or deep depends
on the qualities o f decision making and negotiation, particularly in their inclusiveness of 
multiple parties and interests. Why and how issues related to decision making and 
negotiation, such as authority, power, and knowledge, are incorporated into conservation 
initiatives vary according to strategies applied at particular sites in practice, which stem 
from the project organizers’ perspective of the role of resident peoples in conservation. 
Therefore, this review will now delve further into these different perspectives.
The diverse perspectives and practical approaches that have evolved over the past 
thirty years in participatory conservation present many design strategies and techniques 
with different elements of participation, which in turn are focused on achieving different 
types of success relative to the perspectives and approaches. The literature of 
participatory conservation from the past ten years is full o f multidisciplinary critiques, 
competing narratives, and backlashes against the range o f perspectives and approaches to 
be presented in this literature review (Barrow and Murphree 2001, Brechin et al. 2002). 
More recently authors have attempted to categorize elements o f success from different 
perspectives of participatory conservation in various participatory conservation 
continuums (Adams and Hulme 2001a, Barrow and Murphree 2001). The continuum 
displayed in Figure 2, adopted from Borrini-F eyerabend et al. (2004), displays a number 
o f the key factors associated with the decision making and negotiation processes of 
participatory conservation from across different perspectives.
Figure 2. Role of Participation in Conservation Continuum
(Borrini-F eyerabend et al. 2004)
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For the purposes of this literature review, the continuum in Figure 2 represents the 
different depths o f participation from perspectives and approaches to participatory 
conservation. The three categories of management organizations on the top-side o f the 
continuum represent three of the five perspectives highlighted in this review o f the 
literature. In addition to the three listed in Figure 2 ,1 also include decentralization and 
participatory development in this review as two additional perspectives, which in relation 
to the continuum could be positioned to the left o f government managed protected areas 
and to the right of community conserved areas respectively. However, the locations and 
titles of these perspectives, as ‘perspectives’, ‘jframeworks’, or ‘approaches’, in relation 
to each other are not critically important. One should not get the impression, for instance, 
that decentralization is the polar opposite of participatory development simply because 
they are being positioned at extreme ends of this continuum.
For example, the perspectives of decentralization and participatory development 
could theoretically result in two identical projects. The difference between the two is
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their process; as decentralization is generally controlled by, and would not occur in the 
absence of the central government, through a process o f devolution of power. 
Participatory development, on the other hand, is generally a process that is initiated and 
dictated entirely by local decision making. As a simple example, through 
decentralization, the State could decide to vest a large amount o f forest management 
power in locals’ hands to decrease management costs and increase efficiency. Likewise, 
via participatory development, a community could decide to legally classify a portion of 
communal forest lands with the State in order to gain access to other State benefits. In 
other words, these could result in similar management strategies, through two different 
processes. However, from this superficial example nothing can be known about the 
actual depth of participation between the two perspectives since this lies in the 
characteristics o f the participatory processes, i.e. who is included, decision making and 
negotiations. What the continuum can shed light on is the importance of understanding 
the motivation for participation and definitions of successful participation from different 
perspectives to understand the differences in the depth o f their processes.
The top-side of the continuum also labels certain regions as protected or 
conserved areas distinguishing how the different perspectives relate the goals of 
participatory conservation initiatives to different values, like biodiversity and local 
livelihoods. Finally, the upper half of the continuum links different degrees of authority 
and responsibility with different management bodies, including full authority with a 
protected area agency or concerned community, versus shared authority between the two. 
This implies that elements related to authority and responsibility, such as decision 
making, can be concentrated in one party or shared in any number of ways between vast
11
interest groups. Again, the terms ‘agency’ and ‘community’ are loaded with assumptions 
and positioned as opposite extremes by the authors of the continuum. I am merely 
referring to them to exemplify the breadth of variability o f participatory conservation 
with respect to how a project is designed and implemented by and for external or local 
interests. On the bottom side of the continuum the authors more explicitly align elements 
from different perspectives that correspond with different factors of participation, such as 
the element ‘ignore’ describing one possible interaction between management bodies; 
‘agreement’ as a type of decision making; and ‘recognize’ as the extent of power sharing 
common with the processes of different perspectives.
However, the continuum in Figure 2 is only one possible approach to 
characterizing different approaches to participatory conservation. For this reason it is an 
example, but not the product o f this literature review and analytical framework. The 
authors o f the continuum (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004) admit that the bottom of the 
continuum could be reversed to describe whether a community would ignore or recognize 
the government, like my comparison between decentralization and participatory 
development processes. This reversibility, the ability to see participation from different 
perspectives, is a crucial characteristic o f the continuum and to the working definition of 
participatory conservation as a process of decision making and negotiation in this thesis. 
Therefore, as a working definition, I describe the types o f participation throughout this 
review as shallow or deep in the sense of their inclusiveness of multiple parties and 
perspectives in their decision making and negotiation processes.
This particular continuum (Figure 2) assumes many linkages of different elements 
that do not necessarily have clear boundaries, like at what point a protected area outreach
12
becomes co-management. A more detailed continuum would include a vertical axis to 
complement the horizontal gradient to illustrate that within each section of the continuum 
there may be perspectives varying from shallow to deep participation. The most 
significant factor that the continuum demonstrates is that there are a range of possible 
organizational and participatory strategies for project actors to choose from, which it 
illustrates through the interactions o f the government, or other external ‘experts’, and 
communities.
Despite the appearance of a large middle ground inherent in a continuum Adams 
and Hulme (2001a) argue that most participatory conservation projects in practice are 
near the poles of this continuum, either protected areas with primary biodiversity 
preservation goals and secondary economic benefits for local people, or community- 
based natural resource management strategies that focus on local economic development 
with biodiversity as a secondary goal. Following this assertion, the discussion of the five 
previously stated perspectives presented below begins with the poles of the continuum, 
protected area management and community conservation, followed by the co-managed 
middle ground, and then revisits the range of variation through the less grounded 
perspectives of decentralization and participatory development. By examining the 
assertions of authors who advocate for each of these perspectives I aim to highlight 
elements relevant to participation that these authors believe are necessary for achieving 
successful participatory conservation and then converge elements from the five 
perspectives into an analytical framework.
13
Protected Area Management Perspectives
The first element of success relative to participation fi*om the protected area 
perspective is clear biodiversity goals (Figure 3). Authors fi'om the protected area, or 
pro-parks, viewpoint define success in terms of the goal of biodiversity conservation 
(Brandon et al. 1998, Kramer et al. 1997, Oates 1999, Terborgh et al. 2002). They argue 
that the theory of integrating conservation and local development is flawed because it 
shifts the goal away from biodiversity conservation (Terborgh et al. 2002, Oates 1999). 
Therefore, from this perspective, any inclusion o f local residents in management goals, 
activities, benefits, and use, should be done only as a means to achieve better 
management for biodiversity.
However, Terborgh (2002) argues that one o f the main reasons the definition of 
conservation has broadened to ‘integrated conservation and development’, has been to 
harness large development ftmds. Protected area proponents tend to see local 
development as a threat to the goal of biodiversity conservation because of links they 
perceive between development and extraction, and extraction and decreased biodiversity 
(Oates 2002, Terborgh 2002, Brandon 2002). These authors argue that broadening the 
goal o f conservation has resulted in the majority o f conservation efforts shifting from 
trying to effectively manage protected areas within themselves, to managing rural 
development projects in surrounding areas, which, collectively result in the degradation 
of the interior o f the protected areas. Rather than alleviate the threats to protected areas, 
Brandon (2002) says that stimulating the local economy through development initiatives 
tends to increase migration to frontier areas and increase local capacity to extract more
14
resources. Therefore, this perspective also considers greater focus within park 
boundaries a key element (Figure 3).
The second and third elements relevant to successful participation from this 
perspective are greater monitoring and enforcement o f park boundaries to exclude use in 
conjunction with locally targeted environmental education and awareness programs 
(Figure 3). Several collaborative pro-parks books - Making Parks Work (Terborgh et al.
2002), Requiem fo r  Nature (Terborgh 1999), Myth and Reality in the Rainforest (Oates 
1999), Parks in Peril (Brandon et a l 1998), and Last Stand (Kramer et a l 1997) - 
provide protected area outreach perspectives on practical criteria necessary for parks to 
succeed, under these authors’ goals and views. These include measures like strict 
enforcement of exclusion through higher paid guards, clear biodiversity objectives, 
monitoring, and scientific research (Brandon et al. 1999, Oates 1999, Terborgh et al. 
2002, Kramer et al. 199%). Their objectives to achieve these keys to successful 
conservation, i.e. exclusion of use by local residents, are different than the goals o f how 
these authors propose to include local participation, which are to convince local residents 
o f the value biodiversity and so they will accept the appropriateness of exclusion and 
science-based management. For this, Oates (1999) suggests key elements like greater 
environmental education and awareness activities, training for the next generation of park 
management, and activities directly related to conservation. This is consistent with this 
perspective that nature and humans should be separate, that “Parks are simply not the 
right forum for poverty alleviation” (Terborgh and van Schaik 2002: 7).
The fourth critical element relevant to participation from this perspective is the 
need for increased investment in protected area management (Figure 3.) Proponents of
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the parks model contend that the failures o f parks is greatly due to the lack o f investment 
in them and say that to abandon the idea of parks because of this in favor o f integrated 
conservation and development is, “speculation or wishful thinking”, a “defeatist attitude”, 
and “utopian ideal” (Terborgh and van Schaik. 2002). From this perspective, integrated 
conservation and development projects are defined as ways to support park management, 
or “differ in degrees they aim to protect biodiversity” as the main goal (Brandon 2002; 
444). This is in contrast to viewing the integration of conservation and development as 
legitimate means of conservation in its own right within which parks play a role (van 
Schaik and Rijksen 2002).
Rather than linking investment to development, advocates o f this perspective link 
greater investment to more reliance on scientific research (Figure 3). Perhaps even more 
than their considerations related to the design and implementation of projects, Brandon 
(2003) stresses the importance of appropriate site selection, fit between park size and 
social boundaries, and the timing of park activities. These are more examples o f factors 
aimed at biological success that are analyzed by non-local managers based on biological 
and socioeconomic criteria used to analyze sites prior to implementation. Protected area 
outreach proponents accept that parks are but one element o f biodiversity conservation in 
different circumstances, but stress that properly managed parks have the greatest potential 
for success (Terborgh and van Schaik. 2002).
The final element of success related to participation in protected area outreach is 
centralized, government agency or NGO, decision making (Figure 3). Since biodiversity 
conservation is the key goal in this perspective, protected area outreach programs 
encourage the role of environmental NGOs to take the place of corrupt and ineffective
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governments (Brandon 2003). The biodiversity conservation imperative is described by 
Terborgh (2003) as a “race against time,” thus waiting for governments to develop 
capacity or capacity building through participatory conservation are not in the best 
interest of parks. Instead protected area outreach proponents presume that environmental 
NGOs have greater management capacity. Oates (1999) suggests creating trust funds for 
parks that will assure support for biodiversity even through political and economic crises 
in unstable developing countries. The long-term benefits and popular national and 
international support of biodiversity preservation through parks are championed as being 
worth the short term costs to local populations and governance (Terborgh 2003).
Collectively, these elements o f successful participation from the protected area 
outreach perspective are limited to shallow participation, such as revenue sharing shown 
under this category in Figure 2. As previously described, this is primarily because this 
perspective only intends to be inclusive of residents in substantial decision making and 
negotiation processes to the extent that it assists in achieving predetermined biodiversity 
conservation goals. Therefore, only in the exceptional case in which the elements listed 
in Figure 3 are local desires rather than the results external decisions or methods of 
coercion would protected area outreach projects qualify as participatory conservation.
Figure 3. Protected Area Outreach Elements Relevant to Participation
■ Clear Biodiversity Goals and Indicators o f Success
■ Greater Enforcement, Exclusion, and Monitoring
■ Outreach for Education, Awareness, and Resource Protection Training
■ International Funds and Scientific Research
■ Higher Management Investments Within Park Boundaries
■ Government or NGO Decision Making Power
■ Popular Support at the National and International Levels
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Community Conservation Perspectives
The opposite end of the continuum is community conserved areas where local 
populations, which could be defined in many ways, have full authority and management 
responsibility. The first two elements of success relevant to participation from the 
community conservation perspective are goals based on livelihood needs and ecological 
services (Figure 4). The authors of the continuum titled this ‘conserved’ areas rather than 
‘protected’ because they represent areas where conservation occurs through livelihood 
activities that are governed by traditional authorities or local institutions (Borrini- 
Feyerabend et al. 2004). Unlike the protected area management goal of biodiversity 
preservation, community conservation goals are more often expressed as community 
needs like water and ecological services, economic security, preserving cultural 
traditions, intrinsic values, and sustainable use, which maintain natural processes (Barrow 
and Murphree 2001, Michaelidou et al. 2002). Pro-community conservation authors 
believe this makes participation stronger and more effective because is tied to the local 
way of life, woven into the social institutions, traditions, and economic forces (Berkes
2003).
The third critical elements related to participation (Figure 4) stated by proponents 
of community conservation is local autonomy and ownership (Campbell and Vainio 
2003, Agrawal and Gibson 2001). Ribot (2004) describes these as elements of 
participation where local actors not only take part in conservation activities, but exercise 
their authority to decide if  and when activities should occur. Proponents o f community 
conservation believe it results in greater personal investment o f local participants in 
project activities (Gibson et al. 2000). However, community conservation authors also
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describe lesser types of participation with various terms including: passive, information 
giving, consultative, and functional depending on how projects are implemented (Barrow 
and Murphree 2001). Cornwall and Gaverta (2001) encourage interactive and self­
motivated participation because they argue these types tend to lead to local actor self- 
reliance and project ownership rather than greater dependence, the tendency in designs 
that incorporate lesser extents o f participation.
One reason community conservation authors argue for greater inclusion of local 
participation is based on the assumption that many communities have a long-term history 
of harvesting renewable resources from the landscape (Figure 4) which they desire to 
continue, and that their local knowledge is the most appropriate means of maintaining the 
function of that system (Berkes 2003, Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Such community 
conserved areas have evolved over centuries of traditional government, migration and 
settlement, and gradual cultural change (Ghimire and Pimbert 1997). However, other 
community conservation systems may be recent post-colonial organizations, such as 
traditional leaders that have been co-opted to play a role in a developing country’s 
budding locally representative government body (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).
Barrow and Murphee (2001) describe the elements necessary for community 
conservation as: cohesion, demarcation, legitimacy, and resilience listed in Figure 4. 
Cohesion is the social bonds and boundaries, such as land tenure and use rights, that 
correspond to the geographic areas o f demarcation. In community conservation areas 
tenure can include State owned lands with use rights, complex individual rights, and 
communal ownership. For community conserved areas to succeed these forms of tenure 
must coincide with each other to create shared goals and control access. Legitimacy is
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the ability to enforce or have authority. Even if cohesion exists there must be a
management body with the capacity to act (Barrow and Murphree 2001). Proponents of
community conservation consider this element critical because it affects the extent o f
local representation and decision making processes:
The entire community may be involved in decision-making, or a smaller set o f 
representatives may be assigned this responsibility; those responsible may be 
mixed gender groups, or groups consisting only o f women or men; they may be 
mostly youth or mostly elders; there may be religious or spiritual groups, or 
completely secular ones. (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004: page #)
Finally, authors describe local resilience as a critical element because it is the final test of
time to endure social changes (Barrow and Murphree 2001).
Therefore, community conservation demonstrates deeper participation with
elements dependent on strong local inclusiveness. However, as the views of different
authors described, the wide range of implementation strategies of elements from this
perspective result in a wide range of depth of participation. For example, a shallow
community conservation initiative where local actors merely go through the motions of
participation dictated by an external party would be less participatory than a co-managed
initiative (discussed in detail below) where the shared power held by residents represents
a decision making and representation process determined and upheld by them.
Figure 4. Community Conserved Areas Elements Relevant to Participation
■ Goals Expressed as Community Needs, Ecological Services, Economic 
Security, Cultural and Intrinsic Values 
Conservation through Livelihood Activities 
Management Based on Local Ownership and Autonomy 
Local Knowledge Based on Long-Term History of Sustainable Use 
Cohesive Social Group Corresponding to Geographic Boundaries 
Locally Legitimate Representation, Decision Making, and Authority
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Co-management Viewpoints
The middle section of the upper continuum may involve joint or co-managed 
protected areas. The first criteria of success in this perspective (Figure 5) is co-managed 
areas are defined as multiple parties, generally local populations and the States, engaged 
in negotiation around a management plan that is “part o f a broader agreement, including 
complementary initiatives, by-laws, incentives and compensations” (Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2004). Typically access to resources that are important for local livelihoods is 
legally established through the negotiation process, which assigns different management 
roles to local bodies (Barrow and Murphree 2001). There are examples o f many types of 
parties participating in co-management, like village committees, business groups 
(tourism, safari hunting), NGOs, government agencies, and private landowners.
Broader goals including joint decision making authority, shared resource 
management, and conservation of biodiversity as well as livelihood resources are crucial 
elements related to participation in co-managed initiatives (Figure 5). Authors describe 
these goals as results of including multiple parties, complementary initiatives, and 
incentives as defined above. Because co-management rests in the middle section of the 
continuum, it provides the most variability in the extents of sharing authority and possible 
combinations of factors of participation. Infield and Adams (1999) differentiate co­
management from protected area outreach as the point when park management is not 
only ‘reaching out’, but neighboring populations are ‘reaching’ in to have a greater say in 
the process of how resources are managed. From that gray boundary on the left end of 
co-management, this perspective stretches to the right hand border with community 
conserved areas. At this point co-management can be defined by what Borrini-
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Feyerabend et al. (2004) describe as the reversal o f the continuum, where communities 
seek government involvement in the management, or official government protected area 
status for communal lands. For this reason it is difficult to identify elements o f success 
that are specific to co-management because they are usually trade-offs between the poles.
Another o f the defining critical elements o f co-management is the collaboration of 
government agencies or NGOs with local organizations (Figure 5). Authors describe 
most co-management arrangements as forming when local peoples gain legitimate access 
to previously established government managed protected areas (Barrow and Murphree
2001). However, co-management can also be the result o f the government agency 
negotiating their role in communal or private lands, or renegotiating their role in a 
protected area as is the case in certain forms of decentralization (Ribot 2004). Co­
management perspectives say that a key to collaboration among joint authority 
organizations is including multiple parties with diverse interests (Ribot 2001). Kellert et 
al. (1999) and Leach et al. (1999) propose building upon pre-existing institutions (Figure 
4) as a successful way to bring together multiple interests because their local legitimacy 
reduces conflict. However, authors warn that it is critical to consider the capacity 
institutions have to regulate resource use and represent local populations equitably (Ribot 
2001, Agrawal and Gibson 1998, Brosious 1999).
Types o f power sharing common in co-management arrangements vary between 
consultations and benefit sharing, to fully shared decision making authority as part o f a 
co-management body. Consultation is defined as soliciting local comments on 
management proposals but not actual decisions (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Having 
shared authority means being party to decisions or having meaningful processes to object
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to management decisions (Ribot 1999). Methods of joint decision making in co­
management can vary from autocratic, hierarchical, majority, and consensus decisions 
(Ribot 2004). Proponents of co-management advocate consensus decision making 
(Figure 5) to promote more thoroughly negotiated goals and analysis o f management 
implications (Borrini-Feyerband et al. 2004).
Authors describe the access to management information and knowledge by 
decision makers in co-managed arrangements as a final key to power sharing and joint 
decision making (Figure 5). Berkes (2003) says creating accessibility to information by 
all participants requires the use of situated knowledge, information relevant to the types 
o f knowledge and understanding that local actors have o f the environment and 
conservation. Campbell and Vainio (2003) state that situated knowledge create more 
flexible and adaptive management processes rather than fixed management plans because 
of the greater weight given to experience.
Given that a foundational goal of this perspective is negotiating agreements 
between multiple parties, strict adherence to biodiversity conservation or local 
livelihoods from the previous two perspectives would be problematic. Therefore, 
elements that promote flexibility are crucial for co-management success. As such, this 
perspective, more than the previous two represents the potential for either shallow or 
deep levels of participation. In general, co-management tends to result in deeper forms of 
participation than protected area management, but less deep participation than 
community conservation because of its deliberate goals o f shared power between the 
State and actors at the community level.
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Figure 5. Co-management Elements Relevant to Participation
■ Multiple Parties Engaged in Negotiation
■ Broader Goals and Initiatives for both Biodiversity and Livelihoods
■ Management Power and Roles Shared between Government and Local Bodies
■ Local Bodies Built on Pre-existing Institutions
■ Majority or Consensus, Joint Decision Making
■ Situated Management Knowledge Accessible by All Management Parties
Decentralization Perspective
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) define decentralization as the devolution of decision 
making and rule making powers from the central government to a local level o f authority 
(Figure 6). The particular type of institution that is empowered defines how 
decentralization relates to the continuum o f previous perspectives. For example, Ribot 
(1999) defines protected area outreach projects as déconcentration, the devolution of 
powers from central government to lower government branches, which typically 
increases local participation, but most of the decision making power remains with the 
State because of low downward accountability. On the other end of the continuum lies 
what authors from this perspective would define as democratic decentralization that 
includes, most importantly, high downward accountability through local representation 
and discretionary powers (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Ribot 2004, Shackelton et al. 2002). 
Ribot (2004) says that elections are the standard indicator o f downward accountability, 
which is flawed because in frequently unstable developing countries elections can 
indicate both low and high degrees of accountability based on how openly the elections 
are conducted. Other mechanisms that can also increase downward accountability 
including: public reporting requirements for management bodies, embeddedness of 
managers in the community, third party monitoring by NGOs or media, evaluations.
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threats o f unrest, performance awards and others (Ribot 2004, Wycoff-Baird et al. 1999). 
Therefore, the level o f downward accountability is another critical element of 
decentralization (Figure 6), which determines the degree to which management bodies 
that are devolved have the authority to make decisions speak in the interest of local 
populations.
A third element o f decentralization relevant to participation is discretionary power 
(Figure 6), which describes the authority to choose management options. Ribot (2003) 
encourages the implementation of minimum standards approaches to decentralized 
management rather than elaborate management planning because minimum standards 
facilitate the local use of discretionary powers (by local this could be local government, 
joint management, or local citizen organization). Proponents of minimum standards 
argue that central government agencies commonly require excessively detailed, micro­
management o f resources through scientific management plans for local management to 
become legally recognized (Gretzinger 1997, Ribot 2003). These exclude local level 
organizations regardless o f their actual ability to sustainably manage the resource. Ribot 
(2003) suggests a minimum standards approach be applied until local managers choose to 
engage in activities that require detailed management plans.
Authors fi*om this perspective also mention that the sequence of decentralization 
activities is important (Figure 6). Ribot (2004) argues that discretionary powers should 
be transferred to the local level before management responsibilities and capacity building 
occurs because discretion is a necessary ingredient for local management bodies to be 
respected and gamer participation for the democratic process. Supporters o f this 
perspective state that without discretionary power and responsibilities, local authorities
25
do not gain experience to build capacity, or have means to demonstrate their capacity has 
increased (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).
Finally, decentralization proponents describe its process as a means o f generating 
greater participation in the local democratic governance (Larson 2004). Graham et al. 
(2003) define governance as the process that gives citizens a voice in decisions of public 
concern. For example, Ribot (1995) argues that non representative and non participatory 
governing structures conflict with the idea of decentralized governance, which can exist 
at both the central agency and local traditional government levels. Good governance is a 
key element to democratic decentralization which supports human rights based principles 
to conservation including equality, equity, performance, and accountability (Graham et 
al. 2003). Democratic governance is also an advantage of garnering both local and 
international support for decentralization.
Similar to co-management, decentralization has the potential to result in many 
levels of participation. As described in this section, decentralization aims at gradually 
transferring power from the central government to the local level to increase local 
control. This may or may not necessarily be an improvement in inclusiveness depending 
on how the local implementation process occurs, i.e. if  local decision makers provide 
greater representation than distant decision makers. In other words, decentralization of 
conservation can result in shallow, or non-participation when top-down power relations 
between the State and local actors are simply moved to the local level, and deep 
participation similar to community conservation when local actors are empowered, like 
the latter elements in Figure 6 suggest. However, deep participation is also difficult to
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achieve through decentralization because it depends on decisions made and actions taken 
by the government.
Figure 6. Decentralization Elements Relevant to Participation
■ Devolution of Management Power from Central Government to Local Level
■ Downward Accountable Representation through Elections of Other Measures
■ Local Discretionary Power to Choose Management Options and Processes
■ Minimum Standards Management Approach
■ Devolution of Power Before Responsibility and Capacity Building
■ Increased Public Participation in Democratic Process
Participatory Development Perspectives
In many ways participatory conservation, particularly community conservation 
approaches, build on over thirty years o f participatory development approaches (Western 
and Wright 1994), However, authors from the participatory development perspective 
draw a clear line between their perspective of participatory conservation and those that 
see participation as a means to achieve pre-determined conservation strategies. Campbell 
and Vainio-Mattila (2003) define participatory development as a process with 
participation as an end (Figure 7) that, when achieved, will result in perpetual 
engagement o f local actors in solution finding. This process is linked to conservation by 
the assumption that conservation will be part of the result o f greater local control over 
decision making because local populations rely on natural resources and environmental 
services (Brown 2003).
The second key element relevant to participation from the participatory 
development perspective is the role of praxis (Figure 7). Brechin et al. (2002) describes 
praxis as the combination of context, experience, and adaptation. While authors from 
both participatory development and community conservation perspectives strive to be
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place based and build upon local institutions, other participatory conservation strategies 
have a reputation for being blueprint models, which fall short of this with activities such 
as ecotourism and alternative income strategies (Belsky 1999, Brosious 1999).
Allowing all participants access to knowledge, or situating knowledge, is another 
tenet highlighted by participatory conservation proponents (Figure 7). Authors from this 
perspective have advanced participatory techniques such as community mapping, 
seasonal calendars, and analytical diagramming to collect local knowledge through 
participatory rural appraisal and participatory action research (Chambers 1994a, 
Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003, Berkes 2004). A result o f practicing these inquiry 
techniques is the change the relationship between external agents and local peoples. 
Chambers (1994b) argues that when outside facilitators use such visual participatory 
methods, they catalyze local empowerment by including local actors in analysis 
processes. Like building upon pre-existing institutions, these techniques can increase 
local legitimacy and reduce conflict. However, participatory development proponents 
emphasize their value o f increased equity and giving voice to otherwise marginalized 
interests (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003).
High local ownership of conservation projects is seen by adherents to this 
perspective as a final critical element relevant to participation (Figure 7). The concept of 
local ownership has replaced the idea of stakeholders because critics believe the later 
assumes that all interests with a stake in an initiative hold equal power. On the other 
hand, according to Campbell and Vainio-Mattila (2003) ownership indicates the 
relationships among stakeholders with differing power concerning who actually has 
influence in decision making processes. Ownership is high when there is transparency
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and mutual accountability between stakeholders and representatives (Campbell and 
Vainio-Mattila 2003).
These elements make participatory development the deepest perspective of 
participation among those I have described. However, unlike the previous perspectives 
its application is not limited to conservation initiatives, rather it is a process designed at 
identifying development activities in general. Therefore, the definition of success o f 
participatory development is significantly different from the previous perspectives that 
relate specifically to conservation.
Figure 7. Participatory Development Elements Relevant to Participation
■ Participation as an End Goal
■ Perpetual Engagement of Local Actors
■ Management Based on Context, Experience, and Adaptation
■ Built on Local Knowledge Collected through Participatory Techniques
■ Local Ownership based on Accountable Decision Making
Summary of Factors of Participatory Conservation
The previous perspectives on participatory conservation provided specific lists of 
elements critical to each perspective relevant to participation (Figures 2-7). However, 
some authors have urged a departure from the cyclically competing perspectives that 
community conservation has been stuck in (Salafsky and Margoluis 2002, Brechin et al.
2002). Salafsky and Margoluis (2002: 411) state, “We need to stop looking at 
generalities and instead focus on developing our understanding of the specific conditions 
under which a protected area strategy works, does not work, and why”. For this reason, I 
have created a list o f factors that cut across previous five perspectives without 
presupposing advantages or disadvantages particular elements, or combinations of
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elements may exhibit in practice (Figure 8). In other words, the purpose o f these factors 
is to guide, but not limit the scope of the place based analyses o f the three cases in this 
thesis. Participatory conservation has been described as a toolbox rather than a tool. 
Therefore, perhaps the best fits under particular conditions are a number o f elements from 
different perspectives in combination with a number of definitions of success.
Figure 8. Summary of Factors of Participatory Conservation Success
■ Knowledge ■ Actors
■ Values ■ Activities
■ Representation ■ Incentives
■ Accountability ■ Capacity
■ Ownership ■ Governance
■ Goals ■ Legitimacy
■ Organization ■ Cohesiveness
■ Discretion ■ Participation
■ Tenure ■ Site History
■ Adaptation ■ Timing
O verarching Themes
To make the lengthy previous list o f factors more manageable for discussion and 
analysis, I have regrouped them into three overarching themes (Figure 9):
1. Participation Initiation,
2. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity, and
3. Values and Benefits.
As portrayed in Figure 1 these themes overlap, which allowed me to organize the factors 
according to their relationships to each other in different initiative phases.
The first theme. Participation Initiation, incorporates factors related to the history 
and instigation of initiatives. These factors answer the questions of who initiated
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participation, for what reasons, and with what authority. Building upon this foundation, 
the theme explores the management structure, positioning o f actors and roles, types of 
knowledge, and means of engaging the local population. The means of engagement 
transitions from the foundational factors presented by this theme into the more complex 
and abstract factors in the second and third themes.
The second theme. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity, collectively 
describe initiative processes. These factors respond to who and what interests are 
represented, who implements management activities, how these roles relate to social and 
geographic boundaries, who monitors activities and with what authority, and how 
changes are made. Ultimately the successfulness of the combination of these factors 
reflects on the first theme and determines the third theme.
Finally, the third theme. Competing Values and Benefits, discusses initiative 
results. These factors describe the diverse ecological, social, economic, and political 
values held by interest groups. This theme discusses the distribution and types of 
benefits created by the initiatives vis-à-vis these diverse values. Lastly, these factors 
explore processes of conflict resolution and the ability to sustain project activities and 
benefits. Together these themes provide a perspective to analyze success according to 
different phases of factors in the three participatory initiatives presented in this thesis.
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Figure 9. Overarching Themes
1. ParticiDation Initiation:
■ History and present conditions
■ Goals of conservation and development
■ Funding source
■ Management organization
■ Roles o f external agents and local participants
■ Types o f knowledge and access to information
■ Means of engaging local population
2. Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity:
■ Cohesiveness of multiple stakeholders
■ Organization of local management bodies
■ Goals of local governance
■ Legitimacy of actor roles
■ Type of decision making
■ Measures of accountability
■ Discretionary power
■ Institution building
■ Adaptive management
3. Comoetine Values and Benefits:
■ Use vs. non-use values
■ Traditional ecological knowledge
■ Activities and incentives
■ Adjudication process
■ Sustainability
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Chapter 3 Methodology
Research Goals and Objectives:
This study has been designed to describe and analyze the elements o f participation 
influencing the success of three participatory forest management initiatives on the West 
African border between Ghana and Togo. The first objective was to develop categories 
of participation factors influencing success from numerous perspectives through a review 
of the literature of participatory conservation to frame my discussion of the initiatives, 
which was presented in the previous chapter. The second objective was to describe and 
compare the three initiatives according to these categories. My third objective was to 
analyze the initiatives in relation to different perspectives of participatory conservation. 
This chapter describes the methodology I designed to accomplish the latter two 
objectives. I begin by situating the process o f research design and data collection in the 
context o f my service as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Following this, I state my decisions of 
research design, and describe my sample and data collection techniques. Finally, I 
describe how data were recorded and analyzed.
Voiunteer-Researcher Context:
My role as a Peace Corps Volunteer influenced the different versions o f reality I 
was able to acquire through the type of constructivist-activist interviewing and 
observation techniques I used in this study. As a Peace Corps Natural Resource 
Management Volunteer, living in the study area for two years allowed me to build 
relationships with residents of the study area with diverse interests. The ambiguous, 
grassroots nature o f my natural resource management program created a particularly 
fruitful environment for this type of engagement.
33
I arrived at the study area in September 2002 without a clear view of what my role 
in the community would be. The natural resource management program my training 
group was recruited for began in 1988 with a small number o f environmental volunteers 
specializing in reforestation. Since then it had readopted many of the activities of past 
agriculture programs and branched out into agroforestry, environmental education, 
animal husbandry, food preservation and transformation techniques, and biointensive 
gardening. Therefore, the title ‘Natural Resource Management’ was more of a 
euphemistic catch-all for combining environmentally oriented projects and rural 
livelihoods.
During an eleven week training period before heading to our posts we participated 
in classroom and field sessions on a dazing number of topics from these fields, with our 
trainers acknowledging that what we would apply during our service would depend 
greatly on the climate o f our site and the desire o f the populations we worked with. For 
this last part we were also trained briefly from a handbook on Participatory Analysis fo r  
Community Action. Through this we learned a process we could use to determine 
community resources, problems, needs, and appropriate places to act. These included 
eliciting information at community meetings, conducting gender analyses, developing 
village and farm maps, seasonal calendars, and detailing problem analysis ‘trees’. Our 
assignment during the first three months of our service after training was to use these 
techniques to conduct site studies, etudes d*mileux, and hopefully find something to do at 
our posts reminiscent of something from our grab bag of training activities.
The result o f this type of training, and Volunteers from diverse academic and 
personal backgrounds was a dynamic natural resource management corps. For example.
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Volunteers from my program structured an ecotourism project, trained farmers to raise 
bushrats, taught English and environmental education in middle and high schools, built a 
urban recreation league, implemented animal traction techniques for mechanized land 
cultivation, organized garbage collection, demonstrated erosion control farming and 
many other types o f projects; not exactly a cohesive program. This affected all o f us at 
the individual level when we arrived at our sites; to find work many o f us became 
involved in diverse activities with broad members of our communities.
Since I was assigned to one of the remaining forested posts in the country, I 
sought work by building relationships with residents engaged in forest use activities. 
These included farmers growing many cash and subsistence crops in secondary forests, 
such as coffee, cacao, banana, taro, kola, avocado, citrus and other fruits, as well as 
people that hunted in the forests and collected non-timber forest products, like bamboo, 
vines, fuel wood, spices, and mat making materials. I learned about the three 
participatory initiatives and study areas through working with these groups. Hunters and 
farmers from Kuma villages introduced me to areas they used in and around the Missahoe 
and Afadjato forests, while a farmer from an agribusiness group thought I would like to 
see the forest and waterfall at Agumatsa. Unfortunately, in a region dominated by dense 
forest one generation ago, these three areas are now the only places to find forests. 
Approximately one year into my service I started making conscious efforts to learn as 
much as I could about the three projects and develop a research strategy.
Entrance Into Study Areas: As I learned more about the Foret Classee de
Missahoe through conversations with farmers, local committee leaders, and employees at 
the Ministry o f Forests, I considered myself as an indirect actor in the participatory
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initiative because my work in the project area as a Volunteer overlapped with both 
project actors and activities. My ‘expertise’ included beekeeping, coffee roasting 
business, and agroforestry, which coincided with the other activities functioning in the 
Missahoe participatory project. The activities I worked on as a volunteer influenced 
village life in similar ways as the Missahoe project (encouraging alternative income and 
agroforestry activities to conserve forest by increasing their economic value), but were 
not formally incorporated within the Missahoe project in any way other than participant 
and geographic overlap. This informal overlap between private, locally based projects I 
worked on, and the Missahoe initiative meant there were no additional barriers to gaining 
access to the project. Since I was already integrated into village life with a role similar to 
that o f the Missahoe initiative, my interest in the initiative was not questioned. People 
were used to working independently from the Missahoe project to prioritize diverse 
livelihood activities in their schedule according to what benefited them the most. 
Individuals felt that it was their decision to participate in whatever interested them and 
were not bound to one project if something more interesting came along, like the projects 
I was initiating independently. Therefore, all participants from this project area were 
open to discuss the Missahoe participatory project with me, as well as their lives and 
other possible project ideas, because that was my role in the community.
This role in the Missahoe project was quite different from my role in the two 
Ghanaian initiatives. It took longer for me to establish myself as an insider in the 
Afadjato and Agumatsa project villages. This was partially because these initiatives 
deliberately reached out to capture broader interests of their community, creating 
umbrellas of project activity formally incorporated within the project. For example, the
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two Ghanaian projects hired tourism guides within the projects, which excluded other 
residents from being guides. In the Missahoe case guiding was an independent livelihood 
activity. Therefore, guides felt free to discuss their role in the Missahoe initiative with 
me. However, since I was not a volunteer researcher within the official project umbrellas 
of the two Ghanaian cases, I was an outsider. The perception of my role as an outsider 
was embellished by the perception that I was not ‘their’ volunteer in Ghana. Both the 
Ghanaian project areas had hosted Peace Corps volunteers in the past. This made a 
difference in villager’s perceived benefit o f my activity in their projects even though my 
volunteer-research role included the same techniques in all areas, i.e. farm visits, 
interviews, observing meetings, facilitating and giving advice. Therefore, I had to spend 
more time in these villages building trust and formally being accepted into their 
initiatives. Most farmers, hunters, charcoal makers and tourist guides in these projects 
accepted me after spending time discussing our projects, eating, speaking Ewe, and 
socializing together. Village leaders and project managers in both Wli and Gbledi were 
more skeptical and demanded specific questions and documentation about my research 
intentions, which I satisfied.
The more I learned about the projects, the more I thought a comparative case 
study involving all three would be more beneficial. This was particularly because o f the 
different type of organization strategies each displayed and distinct activities they applied 
to accomplishing similar goals o f forest conservation and local benefits. Learning about 
the three projects and their populations was a serious undertaking. Soon I had to make a 
division between Peace Corps work and research when I became more intensively 
involved in site visits because I needed to reserve enough time to continue working with
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projects I began earlier. From February through August 20041 spent a week and a half in 
Kuma working on Peace Corps projects and Missahoe research, followed by a week in 
Wli and Gbledi conducting research, before returning to Kuma. Blocking out periods of 
time in each area helped me develop relationships and living routines in each area as a 
volunteer-researcher. I gradually became involved in diverse activities in Ghana besides 
research and my role in all three areas seemed to have no particular purpose, i.e. people 
became accustomed to me as who I was, not merely what I was officially doing.
Building Trust: Being a Peace Corps volunteer created certain stereotypes
that sometimes aided and hindered conducting research. The two most blatant 
misconceptions were that I was aligned with the Ministry of Forestry, and therefore pro­
preservation, anti-hunting and exploitation because I was a natural resource management 
volunteer (I was technically invited to Togo by the Ministry o f Agriculture, Husbandry 
and Fisheries), or that I had lots o f money to fund research and Peace Corps projects. I 
knew that these perceptions of me were only allowing me to observe certain village 
realities, meet particular villagers, and discuss only ‘conservation’ issues. On the other 
extreme, one hunter initially misunderstood my interest in his hunting as me placing a 
bounty on a crocodile he told me about. I overcame these stereotypes in many different 
ways that coincided with becoming integrated into the community, like making deep 
friendships and working relationships, and living the village lifestyle. On the latter point, 
I cleared and cultivated my own farm, bought all my food in the village market, ate 
bushmeat, and gathered forest products.
Although I was well integrated into my working and living community, my 
amount of contact with different interests within and between villages varied. In general.
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I spent more time building trust with hunters, charcoal makers, and tenant farmers within 
villages because I targeted them for my Peace Corps work. This was partially to 
compensate for the absence of these actors in project activities that I immediately 
observed, and also because these groups are the most actively engaged in resource use the 
projects were trying to restrict. I also spent large amounts o f time building trust with 
village women while shopping and socializing in the markets and learning how to 
transform produce for sale.
These are in contrast to the smaller amounts of time I spent with traditional 
authorities, other than during ceremonies or specific meetings I organized to ask for their 
permission and inform them of my ideas for work. Traditional authorities played a large 
role in the study, but our relationships were organized by formalities and expectations 
that were unavoidable, so building trust was less my responsibility. These differences 
between myself and different participants displays my role as a Peace Corps volunteer- 
researcher as both powerful and powerless depending on the context just as other 
participants. This had a positive impact on data collection because of the empathetic 
relationships I formed with non-actors, which allowed them to play a larger part in the 
study.
Research Design: I collected data for this study while working with other
village-based conservation and development projects through research methodologies 
grounded in participation. Therefore, my role as “the researcher” in the study o f these 
three participatory forest conservation projects was defined by my role as “the 
volunteer”. As a Peace Corps Volunteer my work in the project area was as a facilitator 
and activist for conservation and development activities, assisting farmers to form
39
cooperatives to assess their problems and resources, and research and apply alternatives 
in an adaptive management type process. This work revolved around the four tenants of 
action research: relationships, communication, participation, and inclusion (Stringer 
1999) and utilized the methods of participatory rural appraisal such as village mapping, 
analytical diagramming, seasonal calendars, and feasibility studies (Chambers 1994a). 
During my research I discussed the existence or absence of the tenets of action research 
and participatory rural appraisal with study participants regarding the participatory forest 
management initiatives and local social institutions to “reveal the different truths and 
realities.. .develop a context in which individuals with divergent perceptions can 
formulate a construction of their situation that makes sense to them all” (Stinger 1999). 
Thus, although this research project would not qualify as action research because the 
motivation for the inquiry came from me and were carried out by me, my research design 
was based on action research tenants.
Action research and participatory rural appraisal differ from traditional research in 
both the methods o f data collection as well as the perception o f research. They are 
“based on the assumption that the mere recording of events and formulation of 
explanations by an uninvolved researcher is inadequate in and o f itself’ (Stinger 1999). 
These participatory research techniques engage actors as subjects and participants in the 
research process, rather than objects o f inquiry. They also base research goals on 
experience and adaptation rather than metatheory, or the means rather than the end 
(Chambers 1994b). An important idea of action research is researchers and participants 
alike, seeing individuals as multiple personalities, being both oppressed and oppressors in 
different levels o f their social environment. This creates an empathetic mindset that
40
allows new forms of knowledge, relationships, and negotiation of social roles to occur. 
Therefore, as a volunteer-researcher I was not only collecting data on projects’ structures, 
objectives, actors, and activities, I was encouraging the reassessment o f them and trying 
to motivate actors to recreate them by sharing knowledge and empowering local actors to 
use their local knowledge to shape their conservation initiatives.
To achieve total action research there needs to be a group of participants who 
agree to pursue an inquiry together, through action and reflection. This is time 
consuming and goes against the tradition of research in rural areas and developing 
countries where people are accustomed to research being imported and conducted by 
‘experts’ (Stringer 1999). In my case, many of the actors and interests relevant to the 
forest initiatives were not willing or able to commit to an action research project. This 
was mostly because of time constraints, but also due to their historical perceptions that 
their participation should be decided by experts. Those who could participate freely in 
participatory action research, such as frequent meetings and discussions, were those in 
traditional authority or management committee roles, with different pre-existing forms of 
power that gave them more free time and ability to participate. To compensate for this 
and gain more broad participation in the study, I used action research methods in small 
groups, such as tenant farmers or youth groups, or discussions with individuals to collect 
data and promote the value of fully realizing action research. At the end o f the data 
collection period I coordinated an action research-like conference with actors o f differing 
power levels from each of the projects meeting for two days to discuss their project 
histories and futures.
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Sampling:
My sampling sought to represent the population by capturing the range o f actors 
directly involved and relative to the projects including government managers, local 
management committees, traditional authorities, guides, landowners and others, as well 
as non-actors, or those not directly involved in project activities or benefits, like tenant 
farmers, hunters, charcoal makers and others. To assess the range of actors and non­
actors in each project area I collected background information on each project, villages 
involved, and populations in the project areas for six months. During this stage I 
accessed information through counterparts from Peace Corps work and snowballed from 
them to more actors and non-actors until I had built structural frameworks (Figure 10) for 
the three projects. These outlined the project’s management hierarchies, funding sources, 
local stakeholder or interest groups, and individual actors.
Figure 10: Initial M apping of Project Actor Groups
Missahoe
Ministry o f Forests 
Regional Forestry Technicians 
Local Management Committees 
Tourism Guides Landowners 
Hunters Tenant Farmers
Agumatsa
Ghana Wildlife Commission 
District Assembly 
Tourism Management Team 
Landowners Tourism Guides 
Bat Hunters Charcoal Makers
Local Hunters and Cutters 
Tourism Guides Village Enterprise Groups 
Project Management Committee 
Ghana Wildlife Society 
Dutch Embassy 
Afadjato
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From these frameworks, I selected participants o f different ethnicity, gender, age, 
and class to represent as broad a range of viewpoints as possible. However, many 
positions within the formal institutions like traditional authorities, government 
employees, and local management committees are homogeneously made up o f older 
males from the middle to upper class of the dominant Ewe ethnic group. To avoid 
limiting the initiative descriptions to this group of actors, I sampled tenant farmers and 
hunters from the minority Kabye ethnic group, women charcoal makers, lower class 
farmers and hunters, male and female small business owners, and male and female tourist 
guides. The samples from each project are displayed in the figures 11, 12, and 13.
Figure 11. Afadjato Sample______
N=23*
Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity
Ewe
Kabye
Class
Low
Middle
Upper
Age
<30
30<n>50
>50
Farmers
Non-
Project
Business*
Project
Small
Business*
Tourist
Guides Landowners
Project
Management
Committee*
Village
Chiefs*
Ghana
Wildlife
Society
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Figure 12. Agumatsa Sample
N=18*
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>50
Figure 13. Missahoe Sample
N=23*
Gender
Male
Female
Charcoal
Makers*
Tenant
Farmers* Hunters
Tourist
Guides Landowners
Village
Conunittee
Members*
Village
Chiefs* Forester
Ethnicity
Ewe
Kabye
Class
Low
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<30
30<n>50
>50
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The asterisks in Figures 11, 12, and 13 represent actor groups where data were collected 
through group interviews and observations. In these cases the characteristics o f the 
sample (gender, ethnicity, class, and age) represent the characteristics o f the majority of 
the group members the data came from. I stratified the sample according to age, and 
particularly class based on approximations. Several o f the interviewees whose age I did 
directly ask did not know how old they were, so I approximated age. I used household 
and farming characteristics of interviewees as rough indicators o f class, such as cooking 
goods, building materials, and clothing, as well as if  the family or individual owned land 
or tenant farmed, and if  they did own land did they hire laborers or tenants.
Data Collection Methods:
I collected qualitative data due to the inherent qualitative nature o f the different 
roles o f project actors and non-actors in social institutions such as traditional authority, 
land tenure, and illegal activities that conflict with conservation initiatives. To collect 
this data I used multiple techniques including participant and direct observation, informal 
and structured interviews, group interviews, group workshop activities, photography and 
document reviews. In most cases, several techniques were employed with each 
participant. For example, to collect data on hunters I visited hunting sites with 
individuals to make observations and conduct informal interviews. I also interviewed 
groups of hunters during shared meals where I often took photographs of hunters, prey, 
and methods of cooking and eating wild game. Photos often sparked conversation when I 
gave them copies as well. Finally, hunters were included in the cross project workshop 
where they collaborated with other actors from their project to respond to worksheets and
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presented their project to members of the other two projects. Similarly, I used multiple 
methods with other non-project actors like charcoal producers, and project actors such as 
tourism guides, managers, traditional authorities, and small scale enterprise actors. 
Through these combinations of methods I sought to understand the following three topics 
about each participant:
1. Background person information, family, and seasonal and daily livelihood 
activities.
2. Role in the participatory projects or description o f the participatory projects in 
relation to their resource use activities.
3. Future or possible role in participatory management and their view of where 
the projects are heading.
Usually informal, open-ended interviews occurred within the context o f other 
conversation in the market, field, other workplace, or home o f participants. I purposely 
avoided leading questions that specifically asked about their initiatives’ success or 
failure. Instead, I used questions such as those in the worksheet used as an interview 
guide for project managers (Appendix A), which asked questions about how the project 
started, boundaries, activities, and benefits. I wanted to allow their discussions o f 
experiences from the initiative to guide the conversation and see if they constructed them 
as successes or failures (Rubin and Rubin 1995). In some cases single questions were 
used, such as asking a farmer “How did you work with the project?” Subsequent 
questions would depend on their response and the conversation created by our 
interaction. Only after several conversations or at the end o f a semi-structured interview 
would I ask what they thought were the problems with the initiative, or how they view it 
changing in the future.
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I collected data on managers, traditional authorities, project management 
committees, and landowners through more organized, semi-structured interviews. 
Because of the formal positions and responsibilities of these actors they viewed 
unstructured interviews without a list o f questions as insulting or not worthy o f chiefdom, 
or office meetings. In these cases I created interview guides with questions on a broad 
number o f topics (Appendix A). These barriers limited the amount o f personal 
information I collected during meetings with chiefs and managers. Therefore, data on 
these actors were also collected from observations of community meetings and 
interactions among committees, government, and NGO managers. Participant and direct 
observation with these and other actors involved my emersion in project activities, 
particularly meetings, followed by time apart from project actors each day to write and 
reflect on my observations (Taylor and Booden 1998, Marshall and Rossman 1999).
Near the end o f data collection I organized a two day conference for participants 
from each initiative to share information about the organization and activities o f each 
project with the other projects. During the conference each initiative team worked on 
two worksheets I created to assist them in creating presentations of their initiative. One 
worksheet was the same list o f questions used as a general interview guide with project 
directors (Appendix A). The second worksheet was specific to positive and negative 
issues from their initiative that I determined were important from previous data 
collection. Group presentations and observations made during the conference were 
recorded as well as written documents and maps created by the participants.
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Analysis and Use of Data;
All data collected, besides lengthy documents like management plans and funding 
proposals, were recorded in notebooks specific to each management initiative in the form 
of field notes and short quotations. Due to the active nature and rugged locations, such as 
farm visits, or the personal contexts o f sharing meals I always recorded observation and 
informal interview data after the fact, instead of tape recording. During the semi­
structured interviews with traditional authorities and managers I was able to write notes 
during the conversations. In either case, most of the data collected is in my own words, 
describing my thoughts and reactions to things participants said and did. The rigor o f 
some qualitative analysis comes from individual quotes as are found in transcribed data. 
In contrast to this, the strength of my analysis is found in the number and diversity o f 
individuals that relate to the results, which can be seen in Figures 6, 7, and 8 as well as 
throughout the text of the results chapters.
I used an hermeneutic approach to analyzing this data. The types of data acquired 
by this project are background information on the participatory initiatives, actors’ and 
non-project actors’ livelihood and initiative activities, and conflicts between social 
institutions and the initiatives. According to Patterson and Williams (1998) the process 
of organizing this type of data into themes that represent the social issues present between 
actors and management factors is the analysis, while the final organizational system is the 
result of the analysis. Because the research question of this thesis deals with the elements 
of success at the level of the initiative, my analysis o f data focused on the across 
individual theme level. However, in order to organize the data at this level, analysis 
began at the individual interviewee, or participant level.
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The individual level o f analysis allowed me to summarize the perspectives o f each 
participant from their livelihood activities, roles in social institutions relevant to the 
projects, and their relationship to the forest management initiative. This is consistent 
with what Brydon-Miller (2004) call analyzing participants’ ‘near environments’. In this 
phase I analyzed all interviews, observation, and other data from each participant to 
create biographical sketches for them. Each sketch included a summary o f the actor’s 
overall position, a combination of personal information and their relations to project and 
non-project issues, and approximately a one page bulleted list of main points from their 
data supporting their position. A summary o f these sketches and excerpts o f data on 
individual interviewees are presented in Appendix B, which can be referenced as a check 
on my interpretation, or organization of the data.
Following the individual level of analysis I organized individual viewpoints from 
each project into themes at the across individual level. This required me to combine 
viewpoints from different actors describing similar issues with different causes, as well as 
actors describing different issues resulting from the same cause. To do this I organized 
actors with similar overall positions from their biographical sketches and created lists o f 
the main points from their sketches related to their similarity. This involved many steps 
o f reorganisation of lists of related viewpoints and figures that represented the 
relationships o f viewpoints to each other. During this phase in particular my committee 
Chair also analyzed a, subset of the individual level data that I had organized into themes 
to confirm the validity o f my organization into themes. Eventually the themes solidified 
and I returned to the individual biographies to collect data to represent the individual
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viewpoints that, in relation to other individual viewpoints, that collectively describe the 
themes.
Finally, after the across individual, place based analysis of each project according 
to the three themes, I analyzed each theme in itself across the projects to look deeper at 
the meanings of the different factors o f participation that influenced success. Since 
success is relative to the perspective o f participatory conservation, this analysis was to 
identify elements of participation common to the projects that influenced success in a 
general sense. This analysis expanded upon my interpretation o f the individual and 
thematic data o f each project and incorporated my review of theories and examples from 
participatory conservation literature.
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Chapter 4 Study Areas and Participatory Forest Management
Initiatives
Figure 14. Maps of Ghana, Togo and the study area.
Togo HighiandsÆ astem Ghana Coastal Region
m
CbamM
The three participatory forest management initiatives I studied are located in 
portions of Ghana and Togo (Figure 14):
1. Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area, Ghana
2. Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary, Ghana
3. Foret Classee de Missahoe, Togo
Geozraphy: The darker shaded region in the right hand map from Conservation
International ranks the study area as extremely high forest conservation priority (Cl 
website 2002). In vegetative terms, the study area is the eastern most component of the 
Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem, in the elevated range known as the Ghana-Togo 
Highlands, Akwapim-Togo Range, Atakora-Togo Range, or Voltaic-Togo Highlands, an 
area with humid semi-deciduous forests type (Rodel and Agyei 2001). The section of the 
Highlands in the study area, known locally as the Agumatsa Range and Fetish Range, rises
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1000 meters above the drier lowland deciduous forest and savanna woodland vegetations 
in both countries (Rodel and Agyei 2001). Conservation International hosted a 
conservation priority setting workshop in 1999, where scientists working in the Upper 
Guinea Forest Ecosystem declared the Ghana-Togo Highlands one of the most important 
areas for conservation of biodiversity, partially due to how little research has been 
conducted on the area, mounting political and socioeconomic threats, and rapid rate o f 
conversion to agriculture (Cl website 2002).
Political Boundaries: The western peaks o f the Highlands that run through the center of 
the study area has defined the international border between the Anglophone and 
Francophone colonies since the division of German Togoland in 1914, and countries 
since independence in 1959 (Ghana) and 1960 (Togo). This divides the study site in 
numerous social, economic, and political ways including: currency (Cedis and CFA), 
national languages (English and French), education systems (British and French), 
infrastructure developments, international alliances and donor investment, to name a few 
of the larger differences. Two of the projects, Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary and Afadjato 
Community Forest Conservation Area, are found on the eastern border of Ghana’s Volta 
Region, one of Ghana’s ten regions, which are divided into various numbers o f districts. 
Each district is governed by a partially elected District Assembly. Both of these projects 
are located in the Hohoe South District. Below the district level, the projects are within 
traditional government jurisdictions, called traditional areas. Afadjato lies in the Gbledi 
and Fodome Traditional Areas, while Agumatsa rests in the Wli Traditional Area.
The third project is on the western border o f Togo’s Prefecture de Kioto, one of 
Togo’s twenty-one prefectures, the smallest form o f national government, each under the
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appointed leadership of a Prefet. Below the prefecture level in Togo are Cantons, the 
equivalent o f Traditional Areas in Ghana. The Missahoe project falls in three Cantons: 
Kuma, Agome, and Hanyiba.
Local Similarities: At the Traditional Area and village level the international
boundary is an imaginary line running through a culturally uniform area. Similarities in 
way of life across the three project areas are numerous including: local language (Ewe), 
subsistence and cash cropping activities and seasons, division of labor and income within 
the household, market goods and prices, mixture o f traditional and Christian religions, 
funeral celebrations, and traditional leadership.
From a cultural perspective, this part of West Africa has been settled by the Ewe 
ethnic group since the 1600s. Every villager in the study area is involved in daily 
farming and forest product production through cultivation, harvest, transportation, 
transformation, sale, purchase, or trade. These labor and time intensive activities occupy 
the daily schedules for most residents in the study areas and create tightly knit seasonal 
behavior patterns which limit the additional activities they can engage in. These tasks are 
strongly divided between age and gender within family units composed o f multiple 
immediate families connected by siblings, often sisters, living in one compound.
Men are responsible for clearing parcels o f land, planting, and weeding crops o f 
grains, tubers, and vegetables for family consumption and sale, and make the majority of 
land use decisions including when and where to grow food and cash crops. Men also 
hunt, fish, trap, and collect building materials from the forest. The profits from men’s 
economies are used to pay for children’s school fees and supplies, larger household
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expenses like construction materials, and invested in future income sources like cash 
crops and animals.
Women play a larger role in harvesting, transporting, transforming, cooking and 
selling crops as well as collecting fiiel wood, water, and taking care o f the household. 
Women’s forest activities include charcoal making for sale, fuel wood gathering for 
home use, and collecting certain tree leaves for weaving and wrapping food. Income 
from produce and goods sold by women are used to buy household items for immediate 
use, invested in future income generating activities, or saved in women’s tontines. The 
lines of gender division were stronger in the past, but due to economic constraints men 
have become more involved in harvesting and transformation o f crops, while women 
have also become more involved in planting and weeding. Children represent labor in 
the study area and work in most aspects of field work, fuel wood collection, 
transportation, and water collection.
Family units are grouped into clans that are usually a cluster o f compounds 
constructed adjacent to each other in a distinct section o f the village. Each clan is 
represented by a clan head, generally the oldest man descending from the clan founder. 
A new clan can be created any time a portion of a clan no longer feels represented by 
their clan head. According to traditional Ewe governance, land ownership occurs at the 
clan level. All lands used by family units and individuals must have the consent of the 
clan head. Land use and tenure is quite complicated because clan heads can also sell, 
trade, and sharecrop their lands. Once use rights have been attained, except for tenant 
farmers, they are usually indefinite and impose no restrictions on the individual. Tenant 
farmers are part o f specific land use and harvest or profit sharing agreements between
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themselves and an individual with previously obtained lands or the clan head directly.
All tenant farmers in the study areas are from northern ethnic groups generally lumped 
together in the study areas as Kabye.
The villages in the study area consist o f 3-6 clans depending on the village size 
and history. Clan heads are village elders, or sub-chiefs to the village and paramount 
chiefs. Similar to clans, a new village is created when a group of clans no longer feels 
represented by the village chief and branches off to settle an unoccupied part of the 
traditional area. The traditional governments in the three study areas are identical; all 
villages belonging to the Ewe ethnic group whose traditional areas are governed by a 
paramount chief and elders whose chiefdom includes all the villages and lands in the 
traditional area. The position o f village chief rotates between clans in a village. The 
village chief and elders are responsible for making judicial and development decisions in 
the village. These typically occur in village wide meeting where opinions and arguments 
are publicly voiced. Afterwards the village chief and elders withdraw themselves to 
decide guilt and punishment.
A group of villages descending from the same founding village make up a 
traditional area. All the villages in a traditional area have two part names made up o f the 
traditional area followed by the village. Thus within the Kuma Traditional Area, Kuma- 
Konda is simply called Konda. A traditional area or canton is the highest extent of 
traditional government system. Several hundred years before the peaks of the highlands 
in the study area became the French and British colonial boundaries they were recognized 
as the portions of the limits of the traditional areas where the participants in this study 
reside.
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Figure 15. Participatory Forest M anagem ent Protected Areas (shaded), Study 
Villages (stars), Traditional Area boundaries (dotted), and international boundary 
(dashed).
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Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Project, Ghana
This initiative includes four villages from two Traditional Areas in Ghana, Gbledi 
and Fodome. This study focused on the village of Gbledi-Gbogame where the project 
office and trailhead are located as well as many of the small-scale enterprise projects. 
This project was co-managed by the Gbledi Community Project Management Committee 
and the Ghana Wildlife Society, a national environmental non-government organization. 
At the beginning of the project in 1998, village landowners donated portions o f their 
forested lands to create a forest reserve o f approximately 12km^ to preserve wildlife, 
forest habitat, and environmental services from the mountainside on the East side o f their 
villages. The Ghana Wildlife Society initiated community conducted biological surveys 
and trap sweeps within the reserve, and tourism for hiking to the summit o f Mt. Afadjato, 
the highest peak in Ghana at 2095 feet. In addition to preservation and tourism, the
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initiative designed a revolving fimd for small-scale enterprise development to benefit the 
local community.
Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary, Ghana
This protected area is located entirely in the Wli Traditional Area, including its 
three main villages of Wli, and a group of outlying homes lumped into a fourth village 
category. This study focused on the two physically connected villages Amegafe and 
Agorieve that were closest to the Sanctuary office. Agumatsa was created in 1973 by the 
predecessor to the Ghana Wildlife Division, a sector o f the Ghana Forestry Commission. 
Its goals were to protect the unique wildlife habitat known for its butterfly and finit bat 
populations in the forests surrounding Wli Falls, the largest waterfall in West Afiica at 
approximately 400 meters. It was not originally managed for tourism, but over the past 
two decades has become one of Ghana’s most popular attractions with an estimated 
16,000 national and international visitors annually. The Wildlife Division managed the 
sanctuary without local involvement until 1998 when a group of village representatives 
formed a Tourism Management Team and demanded local control. Through negotiations 
legally facilitated by the Hohoe District Assembly a three party co-management strategy 
was created between the Wildlife Division, Tourism Management Team, and District 
Assembly including shared tourism revenue and management duties between the three 
bodies.
Foret Classee de Missahoe, Togo
This protected area covers 11 km^ of forest lands belonging to eleven villages 
from three cantons in Togo: Agome, Hanyiba, and Kuma. Two Kuma villages were 
focused on by this study. Missahoe was originally classified as a protected area in 1953
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during the French colonial rule of Togoland to preserve its sensitive forested slopes from 
erosion, produce fuel wood, and timber. Before the French colonial period, Missahoe 
was a German botanical preserve used to experiment with and promote agroforestry 
systems. Because of this landowners from the three Cantons retained tenure rights and 
were encouraged to cultivate perennial crops such as coffee and cocoa in the under story 
and enhance forest stands in Missahoe with other income generating trees like kola, 
avocado, citrus, mango and other fruits. Since independence in 1960 the area has been 
under the authority of different divisions of the Ministry of the Environment (Ministère 
des Forets et Eaux, Direction de la Protection et Control de Exploitation de Flore - 
Ministry). During political instability surrounding Togo’s transition to democratic 
government in the 1990s, open access and looting of resources in the country’s parks, 
faunal, and forest reserves was common, including Missahoe. In 1999 the Ministry 
created the participatory initiative reforest and protect degraded areas of Missahoe by 
engaging the local population in management activities.
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Chapter 5 Participation Initiation: How, by whom, and what for?
Initiation of participation in the three initiatives was influenced by pressures 
originating from villagers and village leaders, local governments, management agencies, 
national and international NGOs, and international donors. The processes o f initiating 
local participation in these cases represent three different types of models: 1) Creating 
participation as the basis of a community initiative led by a national NGO (Afadjato); 2) 
Initiating participation from the top-down to replace an ineffective exclusionary protected 
area management scheme (Missahoe); and 3) Increasing participation by localizing 
management roles, while maintaining the original management strategy (Agumatsa). 
Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Project
Project Initiation: There was no protected area in place when the Afadjato
Community Forest Conservation Project was initiated. In the past their farming economy 
was more balanced between cash crops, primarily cocoa and coffee, and food crops than 
it is today. When this balance existed, they said there was less pressure on the forested 
mountainside because their food and cash crops grown in the lowlands adjacent to the 
forest satisfied their needs (Togbega, Sasa). This changed after a bushfire burned most of 
the village’s cash crops in 1983. Landowners said that they did not have the means to 
replant cash crop fields because of their lack of access to credit (Monty, Amiga IV). The 
Gbledi Paramount Chief said that since then the economy has also been worse for cash 
crops while the prices o f commonly purchased goods have risen (Togbega). Together 
these changes increased the pressure to cultivate more annual food crops on lands that 
were previously a border o f perennial tree crops between the village and the forest 
mountainside. Villagers began to rely more heavily on forest products like animals.
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charcoal, and lumber as income sources. Elders also said the village lost many youth 
who migrated to urban areas because of the lack of economic opportunities in Gbledi 
(Amiga IV, Mancredo). These issues were seen as problems especially by villagers who 
had spent time away from the village in Ghana’s capitol and internationally because they 
had seen alternative development strategies like ecotourism and microfinance projects 
occurring in other places and wanted to initiate something in the Wli community to help 
their relatives (Mancredo).
During the 1990s groups of ornithologists, such as Birdlife International, toured 
Ghana to catalog Globally Important Bird Areas. Groups associated with the Ghana 
Wildlife Society, an Accra based environmental NGO, visited forests in the Wli 
traditional area numerous times. Through interactions with the birders and Wildlife 
Society, the elders and village elites approached the Wildlife Society in 1996 with their 
desire to help the village develop a revenue generating project focused on their forests, 
particularly Mt. Afadjato, the highest peak in Ghana. One of the village elders and a 
guide employed by the project both said that the village targeted Wildlife Society because 
it was an NGO and they knew, “The government has no money to give to communities 
without connections (i.e. revenue sharing conditions)” (William). In 1998 the Ghana 
Wildlife Society wrote a plan for the initiative. Mount Afadjato Community Forest 
Conservation Project, which outlined their objectives, activities, and proposed outputs. 
The Netherlands embassy to Ghana accepted the project to be funded for five years, until 
2003.
The plan proposed a spectrum of outputs including: to identify problems using 
surveys and participatory assessments, establish the Mt. Afadjato Community Nature
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Reserve, prepare and implement a business plan integrating ecological management and
socio-economic development, increase awareness o f the value o f conservation and
natural resource management, monitor and evaluate the project. Participation was stated
as the key to achieving all of these outputs, particularly the implementation o f the
integrated business plan:
The business plan will be developed as an overall and integrated development 
strategy for biodiversity conservation, development of tourism, and development 
o f alternative income sources.. .It will not be defining isolated investments.. .(and) 
cannot be developed in a single effort by a consultant, but will require continued 
inputs from the entire project team.
A major assumption (of this initiative) is that the management plans will be 
implemented by local communities and partners. Involvement of stakeholders in 
the planning process should ensure this. (Ghana Wildlife Society) should be most 
careful to support and facilitate the existing well developed self-help spirit in the 
community by playing a catalytic role instead of disrupting it by creating a 
dependency on the project funds. (Ghana Wildlife Society) should avoid giving 
even the slightest impression of favourtism and become a cause of conflict among 
the different village groups and committees, traditional and administrative 
leadership, men and women, members o f the village elite and other villagers. 
(Ghana Wildlife Society plan)
Local Participation in the Initiative: Local participation occurred in three main
areas, land donation by clans for the nature reserve; representation by the Project
Management Committee; and conservation, ecotourism and small scale enterprise
activities. During the initial social and ecological assessments the Ghana Wildlife
Society managers negotiated the amounts o f lands to be donated by each of the village
clans for the nature reserve. One of the managers remarked that “landowners bought into
the project mostly for the tourism and small business development (benefits)...they
would say ‘yes’ to the conservation benefits, but they say, ‘but what am I going to eat
today?”’ (Edem) The village-project liaison, one of the principal Afadjato project
instigators, described his position during this phase as convincing the Ghana Wildlife
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Society that the community was willing to donate land, while simultaneously convincing 
the clan heads to donate lands because the Wildlife Society project would bring the 
village benefits (Mancredo). Donation of lands and creation o f the reserve was a 
requirement of the Wildlife Society. Land donations for the reserve were a one time 
contribution or decision made not requiring ongoing active participation.
The second means o f local participation in the initiative was through the Project 
Management Committee. The Ghana Wildlife Society plan required that the Project 
Management Committee be a representative management body of all interests in the 
project area, and that the Project Management Committee would make all management 
decisions. The Project Management Committee formed based on the traditional 
government system and included chiefs from the involved villages, project-village 
liaison. Wildlife Society project manager, and representatives for village youth, women, 
Accra youth, village health and sanitation, the Ahor Steering Committee (a separate 
development committee from the village Ahor), and the District Assembly. Villagers 
discussed the importance of the by-laws created for the project by the Project 
Management Committee, “the by-laws of Afadjato were not implanted by the Wildlife 
Society” (Isaac). The by-laws were the desires o f the Gbledi community, or individuals 
within the community, formed based on their ideas and supported and enforced by the 
village traditional system. The Ghana Wildlife Society plan stated that it was essential 
for the initiative to build the capacity of the Project Management Committee to sustain 
management activities.
Conservation activities, ecotourism, and small-scale enterprises were the third 
way villagers participated in the initiative. Villagers fulfilled the labor requirements of
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the project for tree planting, cutting fire breaks, and environmental surveys. The project 
employed eight guides ifrom the villages that lead tourists on hikes through the forest and 
monitor the forest for illegal activities. The Ghana Wildlife Society plan initiated small- 
scale enterprise activities, especially targeting women, as alternative income sources, 
which included beekeeping, animal husbandry, transformation of agriculture products, 
soap making, and crafiwork. Villagers formed small-scale enterprise groups that were 
trained by the Ghana Wildlife Society on bookkeeping, cost-benefit analysis, group 
management, and technical skills related to their specific activities. Initially, the 
initiative fiinded twenty small-scale enterprise groups with a rotational loan system. One 
village leader speculated that the eighty percent o f village youth are involved in these 
groups (Marseilles).
Despite the initiatives participation focused priorities, the Ghana Wildlife Society
maintained control fi*om the beginning. The Ghana Wildlife Society project plan stated:
The Ghana Wildlife Society will be the managing organization. It will select and 
recruit staff, procure equipment and manage and monitor the project technically 
and fiscally.
The project will avoid becoming involved in a too wide range of micro­
investments, losing track of its mandate of conservation and deriving benefits 
from conservation. (Ghana Wildlife Society plan)
Villagers also voiced their awareness of the Ghana Wildlife Society control of the
initiative. It was commonly referred to as “Their” project. One landowner said, “The
key is obeying their (Ghana Wildlife Society) bylaws or they will pack up and leave us,
and we won’t get anything” (Aprepsu). This demonstrates a different view of the
ownership of the initiative fi*om the perspective of landowners than that previously stated
by the guides. However, Project Management Committee and small-scale enterprise
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members also supported the Ghana Wildlife Society control o f the project because it 
decreased their responsibilities.
Foret Classee de Missahoe
Project Initiation: Unlike the Afadjato project, the Missahoe protected area existed
prior to the initiation of the participatory management initiative. The previous two 
decades leading up to the participatory forest management initiative in the Foret Classee 
de Missahoe (Missahoe) showed significant encroachment o f farms within the forest 
boundaries and forest clearing for different economic activities. A report o f the condition 
of the Missahoe fi-om 2000 stated, “The vast majority o f the areas of natural forest cover, 
in particular the large trees of high commercial value, have disappeared” (Egli 2000). 
Even before the uncontrolled harvesting of trees for timber and charcoal production and 
hunting during the political and economic crisis during the 1990s, the Missahoe had 
changed in character. Landowners had progressively reestablished their use of lands in 
Missahoe, “(landowners) sent more and more tenants into the forest to cultivate their 
land... (because) the State did not have the means to properly manage them” (Egli 2000). 
Forestry managers and villagers alike agreed that this has been due to the lack of fertile 
lands to cultivate outside Missahoe and economic alternatives. As previously stated, 
landowners never lost agroforestry use rights when the forest was protected in 1953. 
However, over-harvesting due to the increased pressure on Missahoe lands has limited 
the forests’ ability to protect the fi*agile mountain slopes, and regenerate to provide a 
timber and fuel wood resource, which were its original goals (Kokou 2003).
When the Department of Protection and Control o f Forest Exploitation (Ministry) 
a branch of the Ministry of the Environment and Forest Resources, began to reestablish
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management o f Missahoe at the end of the 1990s, they decided that a new management 
strategy was needed to accomplish the protection and production Missahoe goals. 
Planners for the new Missahoe strategy incorporated members o f the Ministry national 
office in Lome, international consultants fi*om the Organisation International de Bois 
Tropical (OIBT), a Swiss NGO, and professors from the Université de Lome. Under 
their guidance the Ministry conducted several studies in 1998 to determine the most 
ecologically appropriate methods of sylviculture to apply to restore degraded areas o f the 
forest. However, it did not know how to incorporate the surrounding population into a 
new reforestation and protection strategy.
Based on these studies, the collaborators decided that the Missahoe case brought 
together many elements that would facilitate a participatory management approach. (Egli 
2000) They sited the creation o f a voluntary farm by principal actors fi-om villages 
surrounding Missahoe for testing proposed management techniques, and the immediate 
consensus among principal actors of the proposed forest use zones presented by the 
Ministry as examples of the appropriateness o f using a participatory approach (Egli 
2000). The principle actors noted in their plans were a small number of traditional 
authorities (village or traditional area chiefs) or other privileged village members selected 
by the Ministry to attend planning meetings.
The participatory project plan (Amenegement Durable et Particiatif des 
Ressources Naturelles de la Foret Classee de Missahoe) was written by the OIBT 
consultant and funded by the Bali Partnership Fund, a fund established after the 1983 
World Congress on National Parks in Bali, Indonesia for the support of communities 
surrounding parks. The plan emphasized the values of participatory techniques in forest
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management by describing the failures of protected areas whose environmental goals 
supersede social and economic interests, which have resulted in encroachment, illegal 
cutting, poaching, and contested use rights (Egli 2000). The project was budgeted for 
two years and began its two phased approach in 2000. The initial phase was for the 
OIBT consultant to train the Ministry staff, specifically the Technical Team of Missahoe 
foresters, about participatory management. The second phase was the implementation of 
the initiative, to carry out the actual reforestation and enforcement of Missahoe with the 
surrounding villages. These two phases occurred back and forth; the consultant 
facilitated the training workshops for the Ministry team who would then implement those 
parts o f the initiative and then return for more training and evaluation; the key being 
when the consultant did and did not participate. During the training phase four members 
of initiative, including Ministry and village representatives, were taken to Burkina Faso 
and Mali to visit numerous protected forests and natural resource management areas. 
Finally, the plan suggested that, as the first attempt at participatory management in Togo, 
participatory management of Missahoe could serve as a model o f forest management to 
be replicated throughout the region and nationally. The purpose o f the two phase 
approach was to increase capacity of Ministry to implement participatory methods.
The OIBT consultant facilitated the initial Ministry training workshops. He 
guided small and large group sessions to discuss the theoretical foundations of 
participatory forest management using case studies from Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
and Madagascar. The consultant also presented how the initiative will be organized and 
financed, and led a field trip to nearby village with an exemplary water pump system 
managed by a village committee. The OIBT consultant used participatory activities, like
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group mapping, worksheets, and presentations, to explain the rationale for the OIBT plan
and demonstrate participatory techniques, rather than to gather information from the
Ministry team and local representatives to construct the management plan. In reference
to questions about how the initiative was designed, the Regional Ministry Chief who was
a member of the technical team during the workshops said,
I can’t respond to those questions. The coordinator (of the project) is no longer 
here, the director is in Lome. I can’t respond to the budget, creation, planning any 
better than the villagers. We all had our parts o f the project. I was monitoring... 
the Chief of Kusuntu (president o f the Union of village committees), the other 
villagers, they are the ones who did the work of the project. (Efako)
In addition, less than one third o f the participants in the workshop were villagers from the
populations surrounding Missahoe. The majority o f the participants were the Ministry
technical team and representatives of regional NGOs. The six villagers that were in
attendance were each sole representatives of their village, leaving five villages (the
remaining number out of the eleven) unrepresented during the training and planning
phase.
Local Participation in the Initiative: Once the management decisions were
discussed in the workshop it was the responsibility of the DCPEF to implement them in 
the villages. This was primarily an exercise of organizing local management committees 
(CLGPM, or comites locaux de gestion et protection de Missahoe). Members o f the 
Ministry technical team met with village and traditional area chiefs to create local 
committees in eleven villages bordering Missahoe to inform them of the reforestation and 
protection objectives, which would be their responsibilities. The technician for 
protection and surveillance said that they “installed” committees and “educated” them 
(Efako). The technical team also held ceremonies in the villages with the regional
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governor, Prefet, to give the local committees the confidence and authority to guide their 
village and enforce the initiative’s goals.
Each CLGPM wrote a constitution and by-laws governing their organization and 
participation (Paulin). Like most group documents in development committees, these 
were vaguely written as a requirement to be officially recognized, rather than a true 
foundation o f the group (observations of group projects). For example, the local 
committees’ constitutions outlined the need to have an executive committee, but not what 
the roles of the specific committee members are (Adame CLGPM). The by-laws were 
more precise on how they would manage their funds to organize work groups for the tree 
nurseries, transplanting and maintenance of trees, trails and firebreaks, and boundary 
monitoring. Representatives of each local committee regrouped into a seven member 
Local Committee Union (UCLGPM) that served as a decision making body for all local 
committees and facilitated communication between Ministry and the local committees 
(Paulin). The Union members represented the villagers in the initial workshops.
Local participation was limited to roles that achieved predetermined goals, 
primarily in the form of labor. Local committees participated in the project included 
producing seedlings in village tree nurseries, site preparation, transplanting, and 
maintenance of seedlings in Missahoe, border monument building and signage, and road, 
trail, and firebreak construction. The Ministry also trained the local committees in two 
non-production or protection activities: mushroom and tooth-pick (cure-dent) tree 
cultivation as alternative income sources.
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Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary
Project Initiation: The Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary was created by the Ghana Game
Commission, the predecessor of the Ghana Wildlife Division, in 1975. The current 
Wildlife Division head officer at the sanctuary said that the sanctuary was seized from the 
traditional area, “When gazetted in the ‘70s it was not quite real because they (Game 
Commission) did not have the judicial powers.. .they did not buy the land” (Anthony).
As a wildlife sanctuary, all harvesting of fuel wood, animals, and forest products were 
prohibited (Anthony). Landowners were not compensated for the lost use rights o f the 
forest lands. Those that had coffee and cocoa farms within the boundaries were allowed 
to maintain them but no new farms could be established (Alfonse).
In the beginning, the Wildlife Division staff included twelve officers, all non­
residents assigned to the sanctuary. There was little if  any revenue to speak o f during this 
time and no revenue sharing with the village. However, the boundaries o f the sanctuary 
and its protection were considered by villagers and managers to be secure and effective 
exclusion. Many rare forest bird and mammal species were present in the sanctuary, 
including the endangered golden cat, bongo, forest antelope, and species restricted or 
endemic to the highland forest ecosystem. Over time the sanctuary became a popular 
research site and tourist attraction, known as West Afi*ica’s largest waterfall with 
combined drops o f 400 meters. Another Wildlife Officer remarked, “Gradually the 
people (tourists) started coming, money started coming, and the community saw we were 
making money from under them” (Felix). During the following two decades o f its 
management the number of wildlife officers decreased fi*om the original twelve to three 
when the current Head Officer arrived in 1999. By this time the Wildlife Division had
69
begun sharing twenty five percent of tourism revenues with the Wli community as an 
attempt to increase local support and respect of its protected area regulations. But, from 
the community leader’s standpoint this was not enough due to the decrease in workforce 
and effectiveness o f the Wildlife Division.
Local Participation in the Initiative: With the help of three Peace Corps
Volunteers from 1996-99 the village organized a Tourism Management Team (TMT) to 
represent residents of the three Wli villages. The TMT grew out of a tree nursery and 
reforestation project group initiated by villagers of Wli, Peace Corps Volunteer, a 
Ghanaian environmental NGO (NCRC), and funded by the Japanese Embassy to Ghana 
(Emanuel). The nursery was located at the boundary of the sanctuary along the main 
trail. The nursery project established the capacity and credibility of villagers in 
environmental protection activities, which created space for the TMT to enter the 
sanctuary management.
In 1998 the TMT delivered an ultimatum to the Wildlife Division that they would 
take over control and management o f the sanctuary within a matter of months. This 
prompted a meeting between regional Wildlife Division staff, the TMT, and the District 
Assembly. The ultimatum, as the TMT proposed to assume full control, would have 
meant handing over power from a national government agency to village authority. 
Ghana’s central government, including the Forestry Commission, has led African 
governments in decentralization efforts by moving powers to the district level, primarily 
to decrease government bureaucracy, spending, and increase international investment 
from aid donors (Brown ). However, the District Assembly was brought into the picture 
because it is the level of regional government vested with decentralized judicial authority
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over village matters. Because of this decentralization effort the District Assembly was
required to be a judicial and development sponsoring role for the project. During this
meeting the roles of the Wildlife Division and TMT were also negotiated; the Wildlife
Division would facilitate the handing over o f management responsibilities to the TMT,
and the TMT would transition into the prominent management role by writing a formal
constitution and by-laws to govern their institution and the sanctuary. Since this
decision, revenue from the project has been divided as follows: 57% TMT, 23% Wildlife
Division, and 20% District Assembly.
The responsibilities of the TMT written in the constitution included the
establishment o f guidelines for the operation of the TMT; development o f long-term
targets that ensure the objectives of the TMT are accomplished; protection of the
Sanctuary particularly for the community youth; and management of all financial aspects
o f tourism and the Sanctuary (Constitution). The preamble to the constitution and bylaws
states the following:
We the People o f Wli Traditional area have assembled to mobilize our own 
capacities, to be social actors, rather than passive subjects, to manage, protect and 
conserve the Sanctuary and resources of the area, to make decisions regarding 
tourism and the Sanctuary, to control the actives that effect tourism, the Sanctuary 
and our lives, and above all the Management Team will continue to bring UNITY 
among the traditional area o f Wli to enhance total and enviable development in 
tourism and Wli traditional area. (Constitution)
The written objectives of the TMT are to “provide Wli with direction in growth of
tourism, the Sanctuary and development. We are laying the foundation for conserving
our resources and planning for the future” (Constitution). Specifically the objectives
listed were: uniting the Wli community as one body towards development, creating
sustainable tourism, spreading the benefits o f tourism to local communities, providing
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affordable natural tourism for domestic tourists, building facilities to enhance the site, 
and creating employment opportunities.
The constitution stated that TMT members “shall be elected by their community 
to up hold the views of their community.” (Constitution) Each of the three main villages 
of the Wli traditional area has three members on the TMT, plus one representative o f a 
smaller outlying village. One of these three members must be a village chief. These 
members hold a term of office for four years with the opportunity for re-election. In 
addition to members, the constitution stated that a landowner representative also has a 
vote in TMT decisions, and numerous technical advisors from the Peace Corps, Wildlife 
Division, and District Assembly have non-voting status.
The TMT internally elected an executive committee, finance committee, and 
protection committee. The executive committee includes a Chairperson, Secretary, and 
Treasurer, each from a different main village. TMT meetings were stipulated in the 
constitution to be held at least twice a month, plus additional executive committee 
meetings, and extraordinary meetings as necessary. The finance committee oversees 
tourism revenues, investments, and project budgeting. The protection committee “shall 
be responsible for the preservation of the Sanctuary and how to enhance the Sanctuary for 
generations to come.. .technical support shall be given by the Wildlife Officers.” 
(Constitution) The responsibilities of these committees clearly state the intentions o f the 
TMT to control all aspects of the sanctuary. The authority o f decision made by the TMT 
“shall be respected by the Wli Traditional Area and upheld by the Wli Traditional 
Leadership and Hohoe District Assembly.” (Constitution)
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The Wildlife Division and District Assembly fulfill roles not negotiated for by the 
TMT. The Wildlife Division officers remain the technical conservation specialists for 
AWS. They maintain the Sanctuary boundary and patrol to control illegal hunting, 
cutting, farming and burning. The three officers live in the village and divide their duties 
between the field and office. One officer is usually at the office assisting with 
bookkeeping and revenue collection. “Only when the revenue collector is not here, we 
have to be here (the office)” (Felix).
The District Assembly is a local government development body that assesses the 
grassroots need for services and decides where to fund projects when development funds 
are available. Most infrastructure, health, and education projects that are funded by 
donor aid are directed by the District Assembly to local communities or government 
agencies to carry out the work where they are needed the most. The District’s role in the 
co-management is to provide judicial support in two ways. It upholds the Sanctuary laws 
concerning illegal activities within the sanctuary. It also supports the TMT Constitution 
by holding both the Wildlife Division and TMT to their co-management decision.
Because o f this second role, the District exercises revenue distribution authority. At the 
end of every month a District appointed revenue collector, a resident o f Wli, balances the 
tourism receipt books, with the help of the Wildlife Officers and TMT, and delivers all 
revenues to the District Assembly in Hohoe. The District deposits the percentages into 
TMT and Wildlife Division accounts. Previously all revenue collection and distribution 
was done by the Wildlife Division regional office in Ho.
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Summary and Discussion
These cases demonstrate three types o f participation initiation. The Afadjato 
initiative is an example o f building a participatory management system where nothing 
previously existed. It is an NGO created and implemented approach to integrate 
development and conservation goals by prioritizing local representation, capacity 
building, and ownership of the project. Missahoe is an example of initiating participation 
through top-down governmental decision making and training to change an ineffective 
exclusionary management design through the installation o f local management 
committees. The Agumatsa initiative demonstrates participation initiation from the 
bottom-up by a village management team that demanded full participation in all 
management aspects by legally establishing themselves as a co-management body.
The goals, and therefore success, o f these projects differs because o f their 
initiation. The success of Afadjato depends on the continuous ability o f the Ghana 
Wildlife Society to share the burdens of activity design and implementation with the 
other members o f the Project Management Committee. It tests if delegating authority to 
create local participation while simultaneously building capacity will result in effective 
conservation and development. The success o f the Missahoe initiative depends on if  its 
government defined amounts o f benefit and goal sharing will result in local management 
sufficient to change or control forest use activities. The success of the type of 
participation in Agumatsa hinges on the ability of the TMT to accomplish the same 
management as the GWD through local control and benefits. It tests if  local 
representation, labor, and use o f revenues are more effective than the State agency.
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Throughout these cases, the amounts o f local control and their effects on the types 
of participation were not consistent with who initiated them. The Missahoe and Afadjato 
cases represent initiation of participation defined from above, but for different reasons 
and with different approaches. The Ministry narrowly defined participation o f local 
committees, while the Ghana Wildlife Society wanted villagers to participate more fully 
in the Project Management Committee than they were willing. With the opportunity of 
greater local control, the Project Management Committee in Afadjato decided to give 
more authority and responsibilities back to the Ghana Wildlife Society. In contrast to this 
the TMT in the Agumatsa case showed a large increase in local control through the 
creation of their management team, but then also did not change the goals of the project.
These results show that village groups and external management agencies act in 
different ways for different reasons in different projects. Therefore, the criteria for 
success in each case are relative as well. However, participation initiation is linked to 
other characteristics o f each initiative that further evolve during their implementation, 
such as representation, capacity, and empowerment o f different actors, and competing 
values and benefits among actors. These are presented in the following chapters.
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Chapter 6 Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity
The previous chapter described that each of the initiatives formed local 
management committees to represent the local populations. This chapter explores the 
combination of representation, empowerment, and capacity that collectively play a 
significant role in determining the effectiveness of interest groups in the local 
management committees. In this introductory section, I provide an overview o f the 
framework that I developed to organize and present the analysis. In the subsequent 
sections, I apply this framework to describe the combined effects of representation, 
empowerment, and capacity, in each of the three cases.
The first dimension of this framework explores unequal representation o f interest 
groups within the local management committees. In the context of this analysis 
representation includes two dimensions: the actors that participate in decision making 
bodies, and the interests that are incorporated by the initiative. The level of this analysis 
focuses on interest groups, which are defined as actors with shared livelihood or 
sociocultural roles. Based on whether an interest group is represented on either or both of 
the two dimensions o f representation, they are classified in one o f the following three 
categories in the analysis below:
Self
Representation
Members of the interest group participate in some forms o f decision 
making, planning, or management and livelihood or sociocultural 
role are directly incorporated by the initiative.
Non-self
Representation
The interest group is recognized by decision makers, but participates 
only in non-decision making roles not linked to their livelihood or 
sociocultural role.
Non
Representation
The interest is not recognized or considered relevant to the initiative 
by decision makers and the livelihood or sociocultural role o f the 
interest groups is not incorporated in other ways.
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The following is an example of how this framework of representation is used in 
this chapter. In the Missahoe case, the local management committee structure created by 
the Ministry o f Forestry was designed to serve agroforestry interests. This structure 
appointed landowners to decision making roles on the management committees. This 
privileged the landowner interest group whose livelihood and social role centers on 
agroforestry. Thus landowners were self-represented. In contrast, village youth did not 
play decision making roles on the Missahoe local management committees. The 
livelihood and social role of village youth focuses on tourism, but they were incorporated 
into the initiative as labor to grow and plant trees. Therefore, youth were non-self 
represented. Finally, hunters and charcoal makers that use Missahoe forest resources 
illegally were neither included in decision making, nor represented by project activities. 
Thus, these interest groups were non represented. Figure 17 presents a summary of the 
classification of interest groups in each of the three cases.
Self Reoresented (*): Non-self Represented: Non Represented:
Missahoe:
Ministry o f Forests (c) Youth (C) Hunters (c)
Landowners (c) Tenant Farmers (C) Charcoal Makers (c)
Chiefs (c)
Agumatsa:
GWD (c) Tourism Guides (c) Bat Hunters (c)
District Assembly (C!) Landowners (c) Charcoal Makers (c)
TMT/Chiefs (C!) Village Youth (c)
Youth Association (C)
Afadjato:
Wildlife Society (C!) Tourism Guides (c) Forest Users (c)
Chiefs (C!) Small Scale Enterprises (c) Private Business (C)
Liaison (C!) Landowners (C)
Youth (c)
* By definition only this category can be empowered, (E) Empowered groups, (C) High 
pre-existing capacity, (c) Low pre-existing capacity, (C!) Empowered and High Capacity.
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Unequal representation reflected across the three categories limited the 
empowerment o f certain interest groups. I am defining empowerment as increased control 
over one’s livelihood activities. By using this definition only self-represented interest 
groups can be empowered. Therefore, since youth representation in the Missahoe case 
was different from their interest, they could not be empowered. However, self­
representation by itself does not guarantee empowerment if decision making and 
management roles are compromised by higher authority. Landowners on the Missahoe 
management committees were self represented, but their decisions and activities were 
limited by the predetermined structure and goals o f the committees by the Ministry. Thus 
landowners were also not empowered. There are also shades o f gray between different 
states of empowerment and representation classes. Therefore, in the analysis, they are 
discussed in relative terms. For example, in Missahoe landowners and chiefs were both 
self represented, but because chiefs did not actively participate in the management 
committees as the landowners did they were relatively less self represented. Therefore, 
the contribution of the chief’s livelihood role was less significant in the project and they 
were less near empowerment than landowners. This type of difference is important when 
considering how privileging one interest group can decrease the participation o f another.
Representation and empowerment are both factors dependent on how the initiative 
is designed to achieve its goals. A third significant variable, capacity, on the other hand, 
depends on other sociocultural factors and relationships that are not directly under the 
control of initiative designers or project goals. I am defining capacity as the ability to 
participate in project activities. Within this definition there are two dimensions of 
capacity: pre-existing capacity, and capacity building. Representation and empowerment
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can potentially harness and enhance an interest group’s pre-existing capacity. Interest 
groups with high pre-existing capacity will potentially produce greater results if 
empowered, while a group with low capacity that is empowered will perhaps still not be 
effective. Finally, unequal representation and empowerment can also erode the capacity 
of an interest group because of conflicts with other differentially represented interest 
groups.
The following sections describe the combined effects o f representation, 
empowerment, and capacity in each of the three cases and are separated into two 
sections: overview and analysis. The overview sections highlight the main points from 
each case that cut across their different interest groups; conservation and development 
project goals; and project and non-project activities, which are summarized in an 
accompanying figure of each project’s web o f representation. Following the overview is 
the analysis o f the evidence for each main point. The analysis sections are organized 
according to the order of the main points. The secondary points and results related to 
each main point are discussed sequentially before moving on to the next main point. 
Foret Classee de Missahoe
The types of representation, empowerment, and capacity in this case conform 
closely with the protected area outreach framework of success for participatory 
conservation discussed in the literature review. This framework says that local 
participation can be an effective means of achieving conservation goals if there are clear 
biodiversity goals, well financed activities focused within the protected area boundaries, 
primarily on exclusion of use, with decision making remaining with the government
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agency (Figure 3). Therefore, the Missahoe case provides examples o f the effectiveness 
of these elements in designing and implementing participatory forest management. 
Overview: Despite the fact that the Missahoe project was designed in a way that
conforms to what the literature review suggests is necessary for its type o f protected area 
outreach participation, the project itself was not successful. There are four key elements 
of the top-down Ministry of Forests project design in the Missahoe case that resulted in 
ineffective monitoring and enforcement o f the project (Figure 18):
1. Local representation in management committees privileged landowners because 
their agroforestry interests coincided with the agroforestry project goals.
2. The different roles of management committees were based on the spatial 
distribution of land ownership, either inside or outside the Missahoe boundary.
3. Landowners on the village management committees were given the responsibility 
o f monitoring and enforcing the Missahoe boundary with village chief authority.
4. The Regional Ministry technicians that worked directly with local committees 
were also upwardly accountable to the national level Ministry and international 
donor (OIBT).
First, the Ministry defined the management roles of each committee based on land 
owner’s agroforestry interests and held the committees upwardly accountable to the 
Ministry goals rather than other local interests. This predetermined committee structure 
and goals result in two related issues, (1) it did not empower landowners to represent 
other village interests, such as infrastructure that would have benefited the village more 
broadly. The landowners on the management committees were limited by the Ministry 
to representing only their agroforestry interests despite their attempts to incorporate other 
community interests. Because land owners were not empowered to bring in other 
community interests by the ministry, other interest groups refused to participate in 
monitoring and enforcement activities. (2) Landowners exercised low capacity because
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of their limited financial and planning decision making power and low confidence 
inherent to external aid projects.
Second, the Ministry defined the roles of village management committees based 
on the spatial distribution, either inside or outside the Missahoe boundary. This resulted 
in three problems, (1) classification based on inside or outside did not recognize the 
different tenure and land use types within the boundary. Specifically, clan based tenure 
was self represented while tenant farming was non-self represented, which resulted in 
lower tenant participation in agroforestry. (2) Monitoring and enforcement roles were 
assigned based on the distribution of Missahoe landowners. However, this did not match 
up with the distribution across villages of tenant farmers and forest users using their 
lands. In other words, it was logistically difficult for landowners to monitor tenant and 
user activities and enforce penalties because they did not live in the same villages. (3) 
Limited project roles given to village committees with lands bordering but outside the 
boundary changed the nature of these roles, which resulted in less participation in the 
activities related to that role.
Third, chiefs did not have the capacity to enforce Missahoe regulations because of 
lost respect for traditional authority. Therefore, even if the committees worked out the 
logistical inconsistencies o f land ownership and use, chiefs did not have the authority to 
enforce their rules.
Fourth, Ministry technicians were conscious o f the previous three problems to 
some degree during the project, but could not adapt to them because, like the landowners, 
they were upwardly accountable and not empowered to make on the ground decisions.
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Figure IS^Web of Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity in Missahoe
Central 
Ministry 
Decisions
\
Representation
of
Landowner
Interests
Non-representation 
o f other interests
fût Empowere( 
Low Capacity
Traditional 
Authority 
Responsible for 
Enforcement
Village 
Committee 
Roles Based on 
Distribution of 
Land Ownership Mismatched 
/with Tenure and 
Distribution of 
Forest Use
Decreased 
Participation by 
Other Interest Groups: 
No Guides Monitoring, 
More Tenant Food Crops 
Hunting and Charcoal 
Making Continues
Regional 
Ministry 
Technicians 
Not 
Empowered
No Adaptation 
Ability
Low 
Capacity.
Low 
Capacity
Ineffective
Monitoring
and
Enforcement
This top-down representation strategy was sufficient in the short-term to get the 
trees in the ground for the reforestation effort, thus accomplishing the Ministry’s primary 
goal. However, this strategy failed to accomplish the project’s monitoring and 
enforcement goals. In the larger picture, this representation did not create the foundation 
for long-term participatory management of Missahoe. Instead it created many rifts in the 
project community: between villages based on management roles, between interest 
groups within each village, between youth and chiefs regarding enforcement, and 
villagers and Ministry Technicians.
82
Analysis:
Representation o f  landowner Interests on Local Management Committees:
Local committees were generically composed o f landowners, traditional 
authorities (chiefs and elders), and youth across the Missahoe project area. However, 
landowners had a more self representing role in the village committees than other interest 
groups (Figure 18) because the Ministry developed the project to coincide with 
landowner agroforestry, coffee production goals. In general, landowners organized local 
committee activities as defined by the Ministry technicians, which were designed to be 
implemented by the village youth with the authority o f village chiefs. Therefore youth 
who did not have a decision making role and whose livelihood interest (tourism) were not 
part o f the project took part in the committees as non-self represented labor and chiefs 
were self represented, but only as figure heads that did not actively participate in most 
committees. The following sections explain the consequences o f these committee 
organizations, corresponding with the first two representation issues, that landowners had 
low capacity and did not represent the interests of others.
N on-Em pow ered Landowners with L ow  Capacity: Although self
represented, landowners on local committees were not empowered to choose village 
goals vis-à-vis Ministry interests. The following is an example o f low landowner ability 
to incorporate and represent other village-wide interests due to hierarchical decision 
making authority that placed the Ministry at the top. As reflected in the example below, 
the Ministry ultimately decided what interests would be incorporated into the project 
goals making landowners dependent on Ministry decisions and leadership for project 
activities.
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During interviews the committee President in Konda suggested that the villagers
have a strong interest in building an alternative road from Konda to Kpalime on the North
side of Missahoe. Currently the only road passing to the South is dangerous because of
its steep curves and overuse, and includes several gendarme and bushtaxi syndicate
checkpoints where bribes are demanded for transporting goods to and from the regional
market (observations of market route). Thus, the President was seeking to represent the
broader interests o f the community as a whole rather than just landowners’ agroforestry
interests. As a result o f the President’s suggestion, the Ministry technical team
entertained the road building idea with the local committee during project initiation,
perhaps as a way to increase village support, but decided that road building would hinge
on the value of possible timber harvests in Missahoe rather than the existing (OIBT)
project funding. Thus the committee could contribute the road idea, but had no power to
decide how fimding was distributed between project activities. The Konda President said
the value of timber was estimated to be insufficient for road building by the Ministry, and
the road proposal was set aside as a future possibility for organization by the union of
local committees. This caused many Konda villagers to lose interest in the initiative.
When asked if the committees could possibly manage the road project without the
Ministry the Konda President replied:
We (committee members) need the Director (Ministry Chief). We can’t write 
anything (for funding) to OIBT directly. If  we have better ideas we will go to the 
Director. It was him that created the project.. .We want to construct an office.
We are making bricks (as our contribution). (Paulin)
Making bricks is symbolic o f the hierarchical power relationship between external
experts and local participants in development projects. Typical local participation
observed in the project area occurred in the form o f locals gathering local or producing
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materials and labor with great supply and little value to supplement externally designed 
projects with expensive and imported advisors and materials (observations of school, 
health center, and road building projects). In this case the committee had requested an 
office fi-om the Ministry and had started making bricks as a sign of their efforts.
However, their motivation for doing so was not to build the office themselves, but to 
convince the Ministry to assist them. This demonstrates that even landowners, privileged 
in the sense that they were self-represented, were not empowered by the initiative to 
make decisions to address their interests, particularly financial decisions. The landowner 
committee members also did not demonstrate the capacity to assume more management 
responsibility because of their understanding that local participation as labor and low 
value material supply related to development projects.
Non Representation o f  Other Interests, Lack o f  Youth Participation: Since
representation on the village management committees privileged landowners and did not 
represent other interests’, such as those of youth, youth did not participate in management 
activities unless there were direct economic incentives for their participation. This 
decreased the effectiveness of monitoring and protection activities because, unlike the 
reforestation activities, these were not paid. Thus, representation of youth as labor did 
not capitalize on the youth’s high capacity to engage in forest monitoring as if they had 
been motivated to participate through self representation or other means. In the broader 
village concept there is no clear definition of ‘youth’. Practically any male is a youth 
from the time they are no longer in school to the age or circumstances when they are 
considered an elder. Therefore, youth incorporates a range o f ages, livelihood activities, 
and interests. In the context o f the project, committee members and Ministry technicians
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referred to youth as labor, thus, this meant the younger, more active end o f the youth 
spectrum that are less engaged in farm and family responsibilities and have more time to 
work. This youth sub-population is also more interested in alternative livelihood 
activities than older youth that are integrated into traditional village way of life. The 
young youth resist the ‘traditional’ way of life, which revolves around subsistence 
agriculture, for many reasons beyond the scope of this discussion (see Chapter 7 for a 
more comprehensive analysis of youth values). The following sub-section describes the 
adverse consequences of the project not representing these particular youths’ interests in 
tourism (hereafter youth with such interests are called guides).
Unlike the local committees that were created during the initiative, the Konda 
Guides Association had pre-existing structure and capacity to manage youth labor and 
group finances. Konda is the main tourist destination for Missahoe because of its 
location at the mountaintop at the edge of the forest. The village is also accessible by the 
paved road and has a large hotel/restaurant and a smaller guesthouse. The Guide 
Association is a group of young Ewe residents who guide tourists on hikes, collect insects 
for sale in display cases, carve drums and figures, and organize traditional village fetes  
upon request. A portion of the revenues from all o f these activities is saved in a group 
fund. The fund is used for group celebrations, like Bonne Anne or Noel, and distributed 
during lean times as loans to group members. (Dieu Donne) The Ministry plan 
encouraged tourism to be developed by local committees with their own means, but 
disenfranchised local guides by not giving them a self represented role by funding 
tourism development in the project as it did agroforestry. The Ministry initiative only 
created opportunities for them to participate as laborers, not artists and nature
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interpreters. Guides participated in the committee work teams and paid per tree for 
transporting and transplanting seedlings.
Interviews indicated that guides held ideas for project goals and enforcement that 
clearly were not incorporated or reflected in the project initiative developed by the 
existing structure. With respect to goals, they criticized the reforestation and agroforestry 
goals of the initiative because it subsidized forest use. Guides wanted only natural forests 
in Missahoe, without coffee, cocoa, or agroforestry (Dieu Donne). With respect to the 
issue of enforcement, other than tenants living in Missahoe and illegal users, guides spent 
the most time in the forest, either while guiding tourists or collecting insects, plants, and 
carving materials to sell to tourists. One guide remarked that employing some of the 
guides as spies would be more effective than the monitoring o f illegal forest use done by 
the local committees and chiefs (Dieu Donne). In his mind the villager’s role in forest 
monitoring should be to observe illegal activities and inform the Ministry technicians 
who would arrest and fine violators. He emphasized that the monitoring positions would 
have to be well funded because of the danger of turning in illegal users (Dieu Donne).
On several occasions guides led me through the forest to observe villagers in the process 
of cutting down trees to harvest wild pepper, making charcoal, and hunting. This 
demonstrated their capacity to monitor forest use. However, since guides’ interests were 
not represented by the initiative, they were not personally invested in its goals and did not 
say or do anything to discourage the illegal use they saw and showed me (observations of 
guides and forest users).
Youth tourism interests were primarily not represented because the narrow 
reforestation and protection goals defined by the Ministry limited representation to
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agroforestry interests. However, landowners also did not resist this limitation because of 
other social conflicts between them and guides. These conflicts have to do with the guide 
lifestyle and reputation in Konda and the surrounding villages. Guides are seen by 
landowners and older, more traditional youth as untrustworthy thieves and not hard 
working because they do not farm. The following example illustrates the reason that 
landowners held this perception. The President of a local coffee roasting cooperative 
stated that his group had tried commissioning the guides to distribute their roasted coffee 
as a tourist product through the guide association. The guides refused to pay for the 
coffee up front, but then changed the price o f the coffee and were delinquent in paying 
back the group after they had sold it. When the coffee group broke its relations with the 
guides and tried selling the coffee through local boutiques and hotels, the guides 
boycotted the coffee and stole bags from the boutique to sabotage the system (Egan). 
Guides were also known to spread rumors to undermine other interest groups. For 
example, one guide told me the local committees were paid in lump sums; that committee 
leaders embezzled the village funds; and that money distribution was done secretly (Dieu 
Donne). However, they also said the local committees should have been paid more by 
the Ministry. This contradiction shows that the previous comments were made to 
discredit the committees. Thus it illustrates the type o f malicious rumors that led 
landowners to distrust guides.
Guides actively separate themselves from other villagers as well by the way they 
dress like tourists in western clothes rather than traditional cloth, speak French with a 
distinctly European accent, and look down on the agriculture way o f life. One guide 
described modem farming as untraditional, “Before there was dense forest all over here
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and people still grew enough to eat” (Dieu Donne). He was referring to the decreased 
cultivation of forest farms with mixed cash and food crops and increased cultivation of 
food crops for home consumption and sale. Since guides spend most o f their time with 
tourists, they do not manage fields and buy most o f their food in the village. These non­
project conflicts between landowners and youth, rooted in economic and social change, 
decreased the desire of landowners to represent youth tourism interests. Therefore, when 
the Ministry goals did not permit landowners to organize tourism activities, landowners 
felt like including the youth as labor in reforestation was just as good of an alternative if 
not better because it required the guides to get their hands dirty. However, the response 
of youth to this was less participation in project activities that they were not paid for.
Village Committee Roles Based on Spatial Distribution o f  Landownership:
Representation in the initiative based generically on land ownership did not 
address the variations in land ownership between different Missahoe areas. 
Representation based on spatial distribution of owners also did not coincide with the 
spatial distribution of tenant farmers and illegal forest users. The following data are 
examples of how the project’s system of representation did not differentiate between 
different tenure types, and how monitoring and enforcement management roles were 
vested in committees where user populations did not reside.
Two Tenure Types With Different Interests, Two Agroforestry Outcomes: The 
Konda committee President described that historically Konda farmers had no Missahoe 
in-holdings, but acquired them over time from their distant family members in Tokpli. 
The village o f Konda was founded by a small number o f clans jfrom Tokpli who 
separated from Tokpli to form their own village. As Konda grew, the original lands they
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separated with became insufficient and farmers sought permission to farm other Tokpli 
lands. Tokpli landowners granted lands in Missahoe adjacent to Konda to their relatives 
in the traditional fashion of clan based land use delegation (Paulin).
Since the Konda farmers are descendants o f Tokpli, their use rights are pseudo­
tenure rights, which means they do not share land use decisions or harvests with the 
Tokpli landowners. The result of their pseudo-tenure status is that Konda farmers use 
their forest farms for long-term income sources, like perennial, tree cash crops that 
coincide with the agroforestiy goals of the Missahoe project (Paulin). Because of these 
compatible interests the pseudo-landowner Konda farmers were self represented 
committee members in Konda, and were paid directly by the project for maintaining the 
trees planted in their farms (Paulin).
In contrast to this traditional clan-based tenure system, other Tokpli lands in 
Missahoe are under tenant farming agreements. Tenant farmers in Missahoe are migrants 
from the north of Togo, primarily from the Kabye ethnic group. In general, tenants and 
landowners form verbal agreements of terms, usually determined by the landowner, 
regarding what lands will be cultivated with what crops and how the harvests or profits 
will be divided (observations of tenant farming). However, tenant land use agreements 
differ outside versus inside Missahoe. Outside FMC the standard is for tenants to share 
one third of all crops, or the profit there of, with their landowner. This factor makes 
decisions of crops typically dependent on the market price of different crops.
Landowners also place restrictions about where and when crops should be grown and 
harvested. Tenants outside typically also have to work on other fields owned by their 
landowner during busy seasons and “gift” their landowners, i.e. obligated to share
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personal hunting and husbandry harvests, when landowners visit their farms (Bassan). 
Therefore, outside of Missahoe the type of land use by tenant farmers is heavily 
controlled by the interests o f their landowner. As a result, tenant agroforestry, 
particularly coffee production, is successful in many villages surrounding Missahoe in 
this context.
Land use agreements within Missahoe are significantly more liberal than the 
agreements made between tenants and landowners outside the protected area, which 
allows land use to depend on tenant interest. Most importantly, tenants within Missahoe 
only divide their coffee harvests with their landowners (Koffi 1, Koffi 2, Emanuel). As 
long as they grow coffee according to the extent specified by their landowner, any other 
crops they grow are for their personal use and profit. Inside Missahoe, landowners also 
do not restrict where and when tenants plant crops other than coffee. Tenants stated that 
these liberal agreements are due to the distance of their forest farms in Missahoe from the 
villages (Koffi 1, Koffi 2). Because of the distance landowners visit these tenants less 
frequently than they visit tenants outside of Missahoe that are closer to the village. This 
decreased the amount o f monitoring and control landowners have over their tenants 
activities. Fewer visits also meant fewer spontaneous demands of tenants, since visits are 
when “gifts” or “favors” from the tenants are expected. Therefore, landowner 
agreements inside Missahoe encouraged tenants to produce more food crops to maximize 
their personal profits, rather than shared agroforestry crops to satisfy their landowners.
Tenant farmers’ were incorporated into the project by landowners as labor, but 
unlike guides and Konda pseudo-landowners, tenants were not paid. Their tasks included 
weeding sites in preparation for tree planting and maintaining the reforested areas after
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planting by preventing fires and weeding. These project duties were added to the original 
negotiations between the tenants and landowners by their landowners without discussion 
(Koffi 1, Koffi 2). The amount paid to each committee per tree produced and 
transplanted was distributed among committee management and work team members. In 
addition, maintenance fees for weeding around trees after being planter were distributed 
to landowners (local committee members) rather than to the tenants who did the work 
(Koffi 1,2). To compensate for their additional labor inputs, tenants maximized their 
land use agreements, i.e. expanded their food crop production. This meant they did little 
to protect the trees planted in their fields, many of which were cut or burned while 
preparing fields for increased food crop cultivation (Koffi 1, Emanuel’s Son, 
observations o f tenant fields).
By creating committees based generically on land ownership the initiative 
incorporated two significantly different land use types with the same representation 
system. As a result of the way in which landowners were selected, however, only one of 
these land use interests groups were actually represented on the committee. Where 
Konda pseudo-landowners’ could be incorporated directly in the reforestation and 
monitoring efforts. In this case, the post planting project goals (the protection and 
growth) were relatively more successful. In contrast, tenant farmers were indirectly 
incorporated by the initiative through their Tokpli landowner agreements. The tenants 
that farm Tokpli lands cultivate coffee to meet the requirements of their tenant agreement 
and share the harvest with their landowners. Therefore, they do not have the direct 
incentive to grow more coffee in agroforestry systems, like the Konda pseudo­
landowners, because they would have to share additional coffee production with their self
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represented landowners who were paid by the initiative rather than them. Thus, while 
planting goals were met, subsequent protection was far less successful with Tokpli tenant 
farmers than for the Konda farmers with pseudo-landowner status.
Mismatched Spatial Distribution o f  Landowners and Land Users : The
Kabye tenants who work Tokpli lands have farm homes in the forest, but reside more 
permanently in Adame rather than Tokpli. The implications of this are that they sell their 
food crops and forest products in the Adame market, and are bound more to the social 
institutions, like traditional authority, family groups, and communal labor, in Adame than 
Tokpli. This severely limited the opportunities o f Tokpli landovmers and committee 
members, in charge o f monitoring their portion of Missahoe, to observe the quantities and 
types o f products tenants brought from their forest lands. Landowners in Konda, on the 
other hand, can see what other landowners harvest from the forest with minimal 
additional effort because their harvests are transformed or stored at their Konda homes 
and sold in the Konda market. Since the tenant farmers using Tokpli lands lived more in 
association with Adame, it would have been more appropriate to give the monitoring and 
enforcement responsibilities o f those lands to the Adame village committee. This would 
have required empowerment o f committees based on the distribution o f forest users, or 
empowerment across all committees regardless o f ownership location.
The spatial distribution of illegal use created a similar problem to the distribution 
of tenant farmers. Hunting and charcoal making are activities done by many youth and 
tenants opportunistically or as safety net activities when no other income sources are 
available (Bassan, Denis). These activities are banned within Missahoe, therefore hunters 
and charcoal makers were not represented by the project. Village committees with land
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ownership in Missahoe were also responsible for enforcing the regulation of these illegal 
activities. Committees were responsible for clearing and patrolling the border o f forests 
adjacent their village’s lands and controlling their village populations’ activities. 
However, hunting and charcoal making are done by residents of other villages that do not 
necessarily access the forest where they ultimately harvest resources (Aza, Bassan). 
Charcoal making commonly occurs on the forest edge between Adame and Konda lands 
by Kabye women, including tenants and Adame villagers, who all sell their coal in the 
Adame market. The Adame lands that border Konda lands are outside Missahoe and less 
forested. Because of this most of the wood used by the women to make charcoal is cut 
inside Missahoe on Konda lands and transported to their homes on Adame lands to 
actually be transformed into coal. Again, since Adame’s committee was not incorporated 
into the surveillance and enforcement roles o f the project because of the distribution o f 
their lands, they did not monitor charcoal making on their lands and these activities were 
not curtailed by the initiative. In other words, the local management committee did not 
include those who were geographically in the best position to successfully monitor the 
post planting protection.
Low Participation o f  Village Committees Without Monitoring Roles: Committee
roles based on spatial distribution of land ownership also resulted in low participation in 
the villages without monitoring roles. Since the Ministry vested monitoring and 
enforcement roles only to village committees with land ownership inside the Missahoe 
boundary, village committees with land ownership bordering, but outside the boundary, 
participated mostly in a tree supplying role. This single, paid supply role changed 
villager’s perception of the committees from communal labor to employment, which for
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cultural reasons limited their willingness to participate. The following is a description of 
how the Adame committee was given a less significant management role than Konda, 
which resulted in less participation in Adame by non-landowners, and participation based 
solely on economic incentives.
The Adame local committee was made up of landowners with lands adjacent to, 
but not within the Missahoe boundaries. For this reason the committee played a role only 
in tree production the only aspect o f the project that occurred outside of the boundaries. 
The Adame committee was paid a fixed price per seedling. In contrast, additional 
management duties were only vested in committees with lands inside Missahoe. For 
example, the Konda local committee organized fire break maintenance, boundary 
demarcation, and monitoring teams in addition to producing seedlings. Supplies, such as 
machetes, and cement and paint for erecting boundary pillars were furnished for these 
additional activities, but no wages. Therefore, the Adame committee was relatively less 
empowered, if additional monitoring activities are considered empowering. Without 
these additional management responsibilities the Adame committee considered their role 
primarily as a short term income generating opportunity, which limited participation and 
the level of investment made by committee members (Adame local committee).
Since the committees considered themselves an outsourced small business group 
rather than forest monitors and managers, participation in nursery activities and use o f the 
trees produced were limited to committee members. For example, the Adame committee 
produced 5,000 seedlings per year, 3,000 o f which were paid for by the Ministry for 
planting within the Missahoe boundaries, while 2,000 seedlings were left over to be used 
for reforestation in Adame’s portion of the lands surrounding Missahoe. Adame’s
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committee leaders said the left over trees were intended to be used fi*eely by all villagers 
(Aza). But villagers not involved in the committee nursery felt they could not use the 
trees because the trees were owned by the committee members (Aza, Bassan, Koffi 2). 
This was because of the cultural norm that business and wage labor are for individual, 
rather than public benefit. Thus the trees seemed like private goods to other villagers.
The limited empowerment o f the Adame committee also reduced its committee 
member’s management capacity because they were less motivated to work. Each local 
committee was broken down into a management team and work team, totaling around 
fifteen members. The Adame committee work and management teams met weekly at the 
nursery for simultaneous group work and discussion. The Vice President said that these 
days are ft-equently skipped by some members or cancelled. For example, even he did 
not attend the meeting for the week I discussed this with him because he went to a 
neighboring village to visit a friend. Therefore, most o f the committee work was usually 
done by a few committee members, which is one of the biggest reasons group projects 
failed in the Missahoe villages (Paulin, Aza, Koffi 2). Normally agribusiness groups are 
serious about absences, fining members for absences with poor excuses, those not 
associated with illness or death (observations of agribusiness groups). Thus, committee 
members took their obligations to the committee less seriously than agribusiness groups. 
The Adame Vice President also said that his committee holds discussions reactively, only 
when there is a problem, and discussions occur after the work session when people are 
anxious to depart. Finally, he commented that since the funds for growing trees have 
ended, encouraging other committee-based income generating activities, like mushroom 
cultivation, has not motivated participation. He meant that the current committee did not
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have the capacity to conduct training and distribute funding in the village for risky 
income generating activities and people would not trust them (Aza). The overall result of 
limited empowerment was the committee did not fimction as a village decision making 
and planning body.
Low Capacity o f  Traditional Authorities:
The third key element o f the design was assigning regulative authority o f the 
initiative goals to village chiefs, which have low authoritative capacity (Figure 18).
Chiefs were incorporated by the committees as authority figures, but did not participate 
actively. This section presents data supporting the suggestion that chiefs had low 
capacity to enforce project regulations because of their lack o f desire and the loss of 
traditional authority in the project villages.
Traditional authorities were co-opted by the village committees because they are 
the traditional institution in charge of calling villagers to participate in village activities 
such as meetings and communal labor, and regulating the events (Paulin). However, in 
the two primary study villages, Konda and Adame, chiefs and elders were not actual 
members o f the committees; they acted autonomously as a resource, but were not actively 
involved in organization and execution of the committee activities. In Adame the chiefs 
referred me to the village committee to answer project related questions because they did 
not know specific project details (Adame Chiefs).
One reason for this was that chiefs did not want additional village leadership 
responsibilities. Landowners in Konda accused their Chief as being unwilling to work on 
the project, “When asked to work he says he is tired or sick” (Prosper). In general, the 
stance o f the Chief of Adame on village governance is reactive. He and the elders are
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primarily responsible for settling disputes on judgment days. They were quick to 
describe village problems and development needs, but had no plans in progress or in 
development to achieve them other than asking for money (Adame Chiefs). Therefore, 
chiefs showed little desire to handle management planning and decision making for the 
project.
Chiefs did not often plan development activities or want additional responsibility
in part because the chiefs felt that traditional authority through chiefs was not respected
by their village populations. This was the case in activities I pursued with chiefs as a
volunteer in other villages. Chiefs were reluctant to initiate activities that they did not
feel they could successfully gamer support for and control with their limited village
authority (observations o f Dunyo Chief). A guide in Konda said that the authority of
village chiefs decreased because of Togo’s initiation o f democracy in 1992, which
resulted in political and economic turmoil nationally and uncontrolled exploitation within
Missahoe locally (Dieu Donne). He said villagers became more defiant and less
respectful of traditional norms:
Before you could not talk directly to the Chief. It had to be through a Tsame 
(interpreter). But now people, even kids, walk by the chief and don’t even greet, 
or informally (disrespectfully) greet.. .47% of the people won’t listen to the chief. 
(Dieu Donne)
In the design of the Missahoe project, the responsibility o f enforcement was 
defaulted to chiefs on the basis that it is their sociocultural role. However, even if  there 
was adequate monitoring o f Missahoe to detect violations of project goals (which the 
section above suggests would not be the case) this aspect of the design would not be 
successful. Village chiefs neither had the desire to play the enforcement role, nor the 
capacity to fulfill this role.
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Ministry Technicians Not Empowered:
The fourth key element of the central Ministry control of this initiative was non 
empowerment o f the regional ministry technicians. The Ministry of Forests was 
represented in the Missahoe initiative by a team o f technicians who implemented project 
activities. The Ministry technical management team was self-represented but not 
empowered (Figure Y). The hierarchically organized team consisted of the project 
director, project coordinator, four technical specialists, secretary, and chauffeur. The 
technicians divided the objectives of the project: protection and surveillance, plantation 
reforestation within Missahoe, reforestation in surrounding areas, and agroforestry 
management. These positions reflect the three zones and prescriptions o f reforestation 
from the Ministry plan. The Ministry’s protection and surveillance technician 
commented that each of the technicians had specific duties assigned to them, that they did 
not have the freedom to deviate from the plan’s local committee structure and activities. 
He refused to comment on the initiative’s benefits or future activities because he said 
those were not his duties in the project (Efako). Thus the strict hierarchy of the Ministry 
discouraged the technicians to consider the holistic implications of their individual 
actions.
Technicians were not empowered to make decisions based on their experiential 
knowledge of the initiative and local population. During the initiative the technicians 
developed on the ground understandings o f the threats to effectively managing the forest. 
The Director described specific problems including tenant farmers in the surrounding 
villages that were not addressed in the project plan. He told me these were his personal 
opinions, making an obvious distinction between them and his Ministry position (Efako). 
Therefore, the technicians could not directly address what they saw as the true threats and
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obstacles to reforestation and protection goals because their role was to implement how 
the plan was written and executed from above them, not based on their experience in the 
local context. Consequently, the Director’s explanation of project success was that he 
had correctly implemented his duties and satisfied his superiors, rather than having 
facilitated effective governance by the local committees.
Technicians were not empowered to make decisions regarding funding or the 
timeline of the initiative. The OIBT consultant and Ministry technicians held a final 
project evaluation workshop at the conclusion of the second year of funding in 2002. 
Unlike the initial workshops, local committee members were better represented in 
numbers during these sessions. The workshop participants summarized the initiative’s 
results as having only partially achieved its goals. Both technicians and committee 
members stated in the workshop that the project was working, yet still had problems 
associated with revenue generation and enforcement o f Missahoe boundaries and asked 
for more time and funding to continue the project (Ministry evaluation report). However, 
without OIBT funding the central Ministry was not able or willing to continue to support 
the initiative. The technicians and committee members had a voice during the scheduled 
time for their participation in evaluation, but they did not the power to influence 
subsequent decision making. Immediately after OIBT funding ended in 2002 the 
Surveillance Technician was promoted to regional Ministry Director position and the 
remaining technicians were relocated to different worksites around the country. In 
reference to the post-project role of the regional Ministry, which he now directs, the 
Surveillance Technician recounted, "The project is over. It ended in 2002. The Director 
is one person. That person is gone” (Efako). His quote demonstrates two important
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elements o f Ministry control. First, the Regional Ministry Director was the only person
who made decisions locally. Secondly, it symbolizes how the power vested in
individuals by the Ministry increased the central office control. By reassigning the
Director in 2002 the Ministry effectively ended the project. Since then the new Director
(surveillance technician) has not been given duties to continue the project. This
reemphasizes the top-down structure of the initiative and non empowering position o f the
technicians. Since the technicians had no control over critical decisions o f the project
their personal investment in the success o f the initiative was low.
Since the technicians were not empowered, the project did little to capitalize on
their pre-existing capacity or build their capacity. Furthermore, the technicians’ lack of
experience and training with participatory techniques displayed their low capacity to
work with and develop the local committees. The technicians’ roles in organizing the
village committees required them to engage villagers in the initiative through various
incentives and benefits o f participating. This role was a departure from the technicians’
past roles in exclusionary, technocratic management that was limited to enforcement and
sylviculture. The OIBT workshops described in the previous chapter were designed to
prepare them for this task. However, the following comments from the Surveillance
Technician display that the technicians did not play a supportive role in building local
committee capacity and representation. He spoke negatively about the local committees,
saying their deficiencies were the reasons for project failure, that the committees were
disinterested in management, afraid to turn in other villagers, and hooked on funding:
The State cannot continue the project forever. The villagers were supposed to 
take control and develop the project. They have not continued. We have the 
reports of our (technician) work done during and after (the project). We can’t 
look for a new project, new donor agencies, when the past project hasn’t worked.
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The villagers haven’t organized, haven’t done their part, just waiting for the State 
to organize (them). We need to see volunteering first. We tried mushrooms, but 
what do they have today? They wouldn’t organize to do the work. We can’t do 
everything. They need to show the effort. They got used to the money and then 
just sat back. (Efako)
These comments show how he felt the committees had duties, separate fi-om the
technicians that they did not fulfill, rather than a sense of connection and vested interest
in developing the committees. He viewed the results o f the project as something the
Ministry could not control because of unreliable committees and local participation.
Although the Ministry technicians were self-represented and had new
management responsibilities and training for the implementation of the project, they were
not empowered within the Ministry’s hierarchy. The hierarchy limited their ability to
adapt the initiative to local conditions and continue funding. The pre-existing capacity of
the technicians was low due to their lack of experience and training in participatory
management, which was further eroded by their limited power and negative feelings
toward working with villagers. Together these factors decreased the effectiveness o f the
technicians’ leadership role in the initiative.
Summary: The four issues that led to ineffective monitoring and enforcement in this
case were the results o f decisions made by the central Ministry. These included decisions 
about whose interests were represented and the role o f different actors in management 
committees, which collectively describe their representation. Since the Ministry did not 
devolve decision making power to any interest groups or Ministry technicians, there was 
no empowerment. The lack of empowerment limited the ability of the technicians and 
management committees to adapt to problems created by the project design. This case 
emphasizes the need for on the ground adaptation to keep top-down initiatives in check
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and avoid generic formulas that are not useful because o f local diversity. With the ability 
to adapt at the local level technicians could have addressed the problems o f village based 
differences in land tenure and spatial differences in forest owners and users. To do this 
the Ministry would have to change its hierarchical duty based management structure with 
its technicians, and village management committees would need to have decision making 
power, thus empowering both these groups that were self represented.
However, non-self representation among certain interest groups was another main 
limitation of this initiative because it limited the participation of youth and tenants. 
Addressing the differences in land tenure types would address the tenant situation. To 
ameliorate the lack o f youth participation the project would need to represent their 
interests either by including them in decision making or at least incorporating their 
tourism livelihood interests into the project goals. In other words, the factors that impede 
success in this case imply that greater self representation and empowerment would help. 
However, it does not mean that local committees should control all decision making and 
project design. For this reason the Missahoe project appears that it would benefit by 
incorporating more characteristics of a co-management framework. Specifically, joint 
decision making and a form of local representation that incorporates multiple interests 
would appear helpful.
Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary
This case presents examples of representation, empowerment, and capacity that 
address the elements of success from the co-management section of the participatory 
conservation continuum (Figure 4, Literature Review). Co-management is defined as:
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when a number o f parties engage in negotiation around a management plan as part o f a 
broader agreement, including complementary initiatives, by-laws, incentives and 
compensations (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). In other words, management activities 
related to conservation and local livelihoods. Success from the co-management 
perspective depends on local management bodies building upon pre-existing local 
institutions and management knowledge that is accessible by all management parties, 
which ultimately contribute to shared management power and roles between government 
and local bodies. This case demonstrates the inherent complexities o f achieving these 
factors and bonding management bodies from different scales o f government.
Overview: There are three conflicts in this case reflecting both individual and mutual
representation and capacity problems with the three co-management levels: national level 
agency, district level government, and local traditional authority that resulted in 
ineffective sharing of management roles and power:
1. Ghana’s national decentralization policy vested management design authority in 
the District Assembly, which resulted in the co-management system.
2. Although the most local level o f Ghanaian government, the District did not 
represent local interests in decision making to define co-management roles, or in 
fulfilling its roles in the system.
3. The Tourism Management Team represented the personal interests of chiefs and 
elders, rather than the interests of otiher villagers, which created resistance to their 
leadership.
4. Weak investment in the sanctuary by the central Ghana Wildlife Division and the 
lack of promotional opportunities for the wildlife officers, coupled with local 
conflicts with the Tourism Management Team, decreased the Wildlife Officer’s 
capacity.
First, the TMT instigated change in the Wildlife Sanctuary management to 
acquire local control of all management aspects from the national Wildlife Division.
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However, Ghana’s national decentralization policy requires the District Assembly to 
represent local populations in decentralized national government matters (Sasu 2002). 
Thus the District was empowered to oversee the changes in Sanctuary management. This 
resulted in three conflicts at the local level: (1) The District decided against total local 
control plan brought forth by the TMT and designed the co-management strategy with 
shared revenues and management roles between the three bodies. (2) Since the co­
management arrangement requires the TMT to share power and management roles with 
the Wildlife Division, which is exactly what the TMT wanted to end by instigating 
change, the District’s authority is also responsible for perpetuating and escalating the 
dysfunctional relations between these bodies. Therefore, the District authority created 
mutual problems between the three bodies rooted in each of the body’s internal 
representation and capacity issues, which are summarized in the remaining points.
Second, The District has not participated actively in the project, particularly by 
not fulfilling its dual roles of enforcement and investment. The TMT and villager 
dissatisfaction with the control o f power at the District level and the lack o f action by the 
District have been continual sources o f conflict between the two bodies. The TMT and 
villagers see the District as simply a different level of government taking money away 
from the local level without reinvesting. The District’s interests on the other hand are by 
definition not at the single village level. Therefore, the percent revenue they share 
presumably is used in other district wide development efforts. However, conflict 
between the District and TMT chiefs has partially been defused by their complementary 
non-compliance with their co-management roles: the chiefs not complying with their role 
in the TMT bylaws to represent the village population, and the District not complying
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with their co-management role to enforce the TMT compliance with their bylaws. Thus 
the District is in greatest conflict with villagers who are also in conflict with the TMT.
Third, although the TMT formed as a body to represent all village interests, chiefs 
and elders represented their sole interests in decision making and were unaccountable to 
other village interests, particularly those of village youth (Figure 19). This resulted in 
suspicion of corruption among villagers, low participation by youth in communal labor, 
and resistance to the TMT in the forms of hunting, farming, and charcoal making. The 
TMT provides an example of an initiative building on the high capacity o f a pre-existing 
institution. Empowerment of the TMT that was captured by the chiefs, however, resulted 
in greater control over revenue and decision making power limited to their interests, 
which decreased local representation and cooperation with the Wildlife Division officers.
Fourth, the Ghana Wildlife Division Officers did not have the capacity (Figure 
19) to fulfill their management roles of excluding local sanctuary use because of the low 
investment in the project by the central Wildlife Division, specifically the small number 
of officers assigned to the sanctuary. Rather than shifting their investment in the 
Sanctuary fi-om their national employees to local employees, the Wildlife Division simply 
decreased investment entirely. The officers were also unmotivated by the lack of 
training, promotion opportunities, and affirmation the government afforded them by their 
agency. Conflicts with the TMT over division of management roles and information 
sharing created other difficulties for the wildlife officers. The result o f these factors was 
decreased capacity and effectiveness, which fostered village hostility towards the officers 
who were seen as lazy figures of the central government.
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Figure 19. Agumatsa Webj)f Representation, Empowerment and Capacity.
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Rather than creating shared management and decision making roles, the inclusion 
o f the Tourism Management Team and District Assembly in sanctuary management with 
the Ghana Wildlife Division simply brought together multiple levels o f hierarchies in 
competition for resources and decision making power. Each o f these hierarchical bodies 
presented their own internal representation and capacity issues. The emphases from these 
results are distrust and dissatisfaction among the three management bodies and village 
populations, which prevented effective sharing o f management roles and power. This 
case demonstrates that although all three co-management bodies meet the requirements of 
self representation (Figure 16), this did not result in cooperation. By distributing 
management roles and power across the three bodies the effectiveness o f all three 
management bodies were individually and collectively are limited.
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Analysis:
District Assembly Empowerment and Lack ofParticipation:
Co-management with authority vested in the District Assembly was not the desire
of the TMT when its members demanded total control o f the sanctuary to be handed over
to them from the Ghana Wildlife Division. This section describes animosity at the
village level by both TMT leaders and other villagers because they feel the District
Assembly does not represent them and that the District is not fulfilling its proper role.
The District self designed its dual enforcement role in the co-management
arrangement as: (1) to enforce the rules of the sanctuary, and (2) to enforce the rules o f
co-management, i.e. prevent one body from taking control. Villagers object directly to
the District assuming these roles. The TMT Chairman described the District’s role in
enforcement of the sanctuary rules, stating that the District says it will bring “the
hardened ones” who continually break the sanctuary rules, such as hunters, to justice
(Steven). However, he contradicts the District’s role:
It is better to punish them through the chiefs because we can work with the 
person, their family, and educate them, rather than hardening them by learning to 
fear the laws (fines or jail time). It ruins the message o f conservation if  they don’t 
learn. (Steven)
He thinks it is more effective to deal with violators through the traditional authority 
system to create a sense of ownership and self-regulation among the village.
However, the villagers disagree with the District’s definition o f their own co­
management roles. In their minds the appropriate role for the District is neither o f the 
two District defined roles, but rather than directly object to them, the villagers I 
interviewed simply believe the District roles are different. Instead of the dual roles 
defined by the District, villagers think their role should be to invest in village and project
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infrastructure to develop the value of the project (William, Alfred). This presumption is
based on the general role of the District in development projects not related to the
Sanctuary, such as schools, roads, and health centers, where the District channels funding
from the central government or donors to the village level (William). Therefore, with this
role in mind, villagers feel the District is not fulfilling its duties. The TMT Chairman
said he thinks the District should remain part o f co-management to procure financing for
building the tourism center and permanent bridges leading to the waterfall (Steven). One
of the guides commented, “They (District) tried to have the road to Hohoe redone, but it
has sat for several years still unfinished. They have not given us anything for the tourism
facility or guides. They only take money out” (Alfred). These villagers do not feel that
the District is effectively playing an appropriate role to justify the twenty percent o f the
Sanctuary revenue they take. The percentage of revenue sharing is particularly sensitive
since it was the main motivation for the TMT instigation of control.
Even the District Assembly Representative for the village said:
The District is getting fat from the project (by) not reinvesting their percentage in 
infrastructure and facilities... (During the Togo boundary dispute) the District 
was also there, but only as window dressing. Their leader, the District Executive, 
did not act strong enough... The District is poisoning (discouraging) the 
community. (William)
In this quote he also assumes the unofficial investment role of the District in addition to
criticizing their lack of enforcement of Sanctuary boundaries, one of the District’s official
goals. By ‘poisoning the community’ he meant the District is setting a bad example for
the TMT and wildlife officers by taking their percentage of revenues and not reinvesting
them or fulfilling its other duties. He feels the District’s lack of compliance with its own
co-management roles has discouraged the TMT and wildlife officers to comply as well
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(William). To illustrate this, the Assemblyman described that the TMT wrote their 
bylaws at the time of their initiation and ultimatum, with the intent o f gaining total 
management control. As previously described (Initiation Chapter) the bylaws included 
goals and measures for representing all village interests and using revenues for village 
development. These were accepted by the District whose role it was to enforce these as 
the bylaws governing the actions o f the TMT. Since then the chiefs and elders have 
violated the TMT bylaws (to be discussed). The Assemblyman stated that the District 
compensates for not fulfilling its investment role in the project by also not fulfilling its 
enforcement o f the co-management arrangement role, i.e. letting the chiefs break the 
bylaws and misrepresent the village population (William). The District Assemblyman 
described this as a corrupt alliance between the chiefs and the District that fuel the 
animosity of villagers and wildlife officers.
Limited Village Representation bv Tourism Management Team:
Although the District Assembly was the most empowered management body, 
required by the government to lead the power sharing co-management roles o f the 
sanctuary, the TMT was still significantly empowered. The TMT percentage of revenue 
from the sanctuary increased through the co-management arrangement from twenty five 
to fifty seven percent. The TMT was a self-represented body for village interests in this 
initiative. The TMT constitution required one o f the three TMT members from each 
village to be a Chief to build upon the traditional form o f village representation and 
authority, i.e. decision making, calling youth to communal labor, and enforcement 
(William). However, the minority of chiefs have overwhelming power over the TMT as
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a whole. Operationally, the TMT was controlled by traditional authorities who co-opted 
village landowners, guides, and the Accra Youth Association.
TMT Meetings: The ch iefs presence at TMT meetings dictated that they
were conducted according to traditional ceremonial protocols that maintain chiefs in the 
dominant role. The meetings I observed began with formalities, such as introductions 
and prayers, between the chiefs and others present. The chiefs always sat on one side of 
the meeting place, spread out with no distinction between chiefs in or out o f the TMT 
because in these meetings chief status was obviously more important than the TMT. The 
Accra Youth Association was commonly present at meetings, but sat on cramped benches 
rather than chairs, in three rows rather than spread out. The TMT chairman or secretary 
typically sat in front of both groups and mediated between them. Chiefs typically dress 
in traditional kente cloth for the TMT meetings, another status symbol that separated 
them from the other participants in the meetings. Topics were brought up by either a 
TMT or Youth member; seldom did chiefs initiate discussion. Usually it was the 
‘outsiders’ like the Youth from Accra, or Chiefs that reside outside the village and came 
back for a special occasion that were the most vocal at meetings (Observations o f TMT). 
Thus, the chiefs participated in meetings as if  they had been called to judge project ideas, 
rather than planning and proposing topics for the meetings. The role o f chiefs on the 
TMT built upon their traditional role in village authority, that o f having ultimate veto and 
decision making power.
TMT Decision Making'. One of the guides described that the TMT
technically does make all management decisions, but they are provisionary until they are 
approved by the chiefs and elders, “The TMT makes a decision, but then their decision
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goes to the elders for a decision, and then it comes back to the TMT” (Emanuel). During 
one meeting about future planning, which concerned only how to spend revenue, there 
was heated debate between the Accra Youth, Chiefs, and TMT members over spending 
on income generating investments. The Accra Youth had proposed buying plastic chairs 
to rent for village festivals and beverages to sell to tourists. Most chiefs agreed with this 
idea, but some argued to save revenues for village development needs, like school 
repairs. The chiefs ended the debate by leaving the meeting place briefly to make a 
decision in private and decided to invest in the chairs (Observations of TMT). Thus, 
neither the discussions, nor final decisions were made in a village forum where public 
comments could be made. Ultimately income generating investments prevailed in private 
decision making over investments directly in public facilities.
Non-self Representation o f  the Accra Youth Assembly: There are two groups
o f youth concerning the initiative, the village youth (all males approximately under the 
age o f fifty-five) and the Accra Youth Association. The Accra Youth Association’s 
interests were in developing the sanctuary income generating potential to increase the 
benefit to all village youth (Youth Meeting). This section describes how the chiefs used 
their power on the TMT to non-self represent the Youth Association by including their 
income generating interests. However, the chiefs included them to capture greater 
benefits themselves rather than sharing greater revenue with the village.
The Accra Youth includes about twelve young men, mid to late twenties, living in 
Accra, but originally from Wli. The Accra Youth formed when the first term o f the TMT 
ended in 2002 with the intention of replacing them (Emanuel). Guides and the 
guesthouse owner said the Accra Youth have proposed many income generating, tourism
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related village activities for the project that the TMT has refused. One guide, Emanuel 
said, “(Accra Youth) want to replace the TMT and overturn the chiefs. I f  the chiefs say 
‘Okay you replace the TMT’ it’s like overturning the chiefs (village government) because 
(the TMT) is their system” (Emanuel). By this he meant that in order for the village wide 
proposals by the Accra Youth to be accepted by the TMT, they would have to be 
accepted by the chiefs. This was not the interests o f the chiefs, and would have to share 
power with the youth, something that goes against the norm of traditional authority. 
Therefore, from his viewpoint, it would be impossible to incorporate other interests into 
the TMT without ‘overturning’ its power structure.
Instead of a radical change in power, the TMT co-opted the Accra Youth and 
began allowing them to participate in meetings by generating ideas. In reference to youth 
participation, the TMT Chairman said they had volunteered the village “bright ones”, the 
Accra Youth, and “organized the others”, village youth, for labor (Steven). If  the youth 
had effective leadership they would have both the creativity and energy necessary to 
develop the project, presumably in the interest o f the village since youth and their 
families make up the majority of the population. However, this comment demonstrates 
that the TMT manipulated both groups to benefit their own interests.
Although misrepresented by the TMT, the Accra Youth obviously sided with full 
village control o f management. Two ideas created and managed by the Accra Youth 
were printing t-shirts and calendars for sale on Easter Monday. The t-shirts and calendars 
were popular among the Wli villages. They had a picture o f the waterfall printed on them 
with the title “Agumatsa Falls” without the recognition o f the wildlife or sanctuary, like 
the signs that frustrated the officers. The shirts also said “Community Solidarity, United
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We Stand” written below a Venn diagram with the names of the three villages converging 
together, rather than the three co-management bodies (Observations o f Accra Youth). 
These are examples of other small ways the TMT and villagers resisted the co­
management strategy.
Non Representation o f  Village Youth: Non representation o f village youth
was another consequence of chief dominance of the TMT. A small number of village 
youth were non-self represented as tourism guides, while other entrepreneurs, hunters and 
charcoal makers were not represented by the initiative. Traditionally, Village Youth are 
represented by a Youth Chief who holds meetings to hear their views and reports them to 
the Village Chief. When I approached the Youth Chief he discouraged me from calling a 
youth meeting because they have a poor history of coming to meetings in recent times 
and would not gather if  the meeting was about the AWS initiative (Youth Chief). He 
reluctantly agreed to hold a meeting in two days, but when the morning arrived he told 
me he had forgotten to send the crier to call them. With the help of the District 
Assemblyman we convinced the chief to summon a meeting the next morning. I suspect 
this was simply an excuse because he was eager and excited to meet with me. I think the 
Youth Chief did not call the meeting with the Village Youth because the TMT chiefs did 
not want me to consult with them. At this meeting, the Village Youth did not feel free to 
discuss the AWS project. They responded to my questions about project goals and 
revenue as follows: “Those questions are for the TM T.. .we are under the decisions the 
TMT makes” (Village Youth). Thus, their Youth Chief Representative is unwilling to 
call them for meetings and they are not able to voice their interests directly in the project 
because they were excluded from TMT meetings and intimidated by the chiefs.
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However, they discussed their interests that are not represented by the TMT and 
chiefs. The youth said the lack of economic opportunities is their main problem in Wli. 
When villagers are trained in skilled labor they have to leave for cities to find work 
because the only sources of income in the village are surplus food crops. They would 
like the TMT to invest in their labor to construct small business project facilities, 
“Employ the village masons and carpenters to build projects...as well as laborers to 
maintain animals” (Village Youth). They suggested an intensified communal pig 
husbandry where they could be hired and paid wages like the guides, landowners, and 
TMT members. (Village Youth) However, chiefs only demonstrated interest in narrow 
investment opportunities, like the plastic funeral chairs and selling drinks at the tourism 
center, which they could easily control.
Besides the content of this meeting, its attendance was also telling of the 
exclusion of village youth from the TMT. There was a complete absence of all but one 
guide and all non-chief TMT members. Although they are also village youth by 
definition, they did not answer the call o f the Youth Chief for the meeting. Despite not 
coming to the meeting, one guide in his early 20’s stated his disappointed that “They”
(the youth) did not show better numbers in the meeting. He separated himself from “The 
Youth” because he is one of the five village youth paid to work as permanent guides. He 
described that the village youth are the trouble makers, the resistance to the TMT. He did 
not recognize their grievances as a result o f non representation, thus perpetuating their 
reputation as a valid reason to exclude their interests from the TMT.
Resistance and Lack o f  Support fo r  the TMT: There is a consensus among
non-TMT members, including guides, wildlife officers. District Assemblyman,
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guesthouse owner, elders, youth, and hunters, that the TMT is focused on remaining in 
power and having control over revenues, not in developing the sanctuary or the village. 
This list o f non-TMT actors is an unusual alliance of village interests that jumped back 
and forth during interviews between supporting the TMT to gain total control o f 
management and revenues from the District and Wildlife Division, and supporting the 
District and Wildlife Division in an attempt to make the TMT represent them. According 
to how the TMT bylaws were written they would have had both, but in reality they have 
neither. The following sections are examples o f division between the interests of youth 
and TMT, and types of resistance to the TMT from multiple perspectives.
Guide and Youth Resistance to the TMTi Guides and business owners also 
said the TMT is not forthcoming with project information, particularly the use of 
revenue. A guide said chiefs are reluctant to spend or invest revenue in the village or the 
project, “(Chiefs) speak badly about getting money and immediately spending it” 
(Alfred). He described this as a norm of traditional authority, wise decision making by 
not acting hastily. However, he also said money is used regularly for buying drinks for 
meetings and chiefs’ transportation to the regional capital for reasons unrelated to the 
project. His description of chiefs drinking conformed with my observations in which 
TMT meetings always involved heavy alcohol consumption, presumably for ceremonial 
and spiritual reasons. However, drinking in these meetings commonly went beyond the 
ceremonial prayer and offering to the ancestors I observed in other village ceremonies. 
Based on the low participation in discussion and high participation in drinking by most 
chiefs, it seemed like drinking was their motivation or reward for attending the meetings. 
TMT funds usually paid for three or four bottles of gin, or locally made distilled palm
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wine, sodabi/apitache, as well as a crate o f soft drinks for each meeting (observations of
TMT meetings). Guides, the District Assemblyman, and the guesthouse owner talked
about similar misuse of TMT revenues by chiefs.
The guesthouse owner said this was a division between the youth and elders, with
the youth having many ideas for project development that the elders would not accept
(Guesthouse). One of the guides said he hears recommendations from tourists about
improvements for the sanctuary, like labeling and interpretation of plants, reforestation,
and litter, but when he offers these to the TMT, “They don’t want to hear that story”
(Emanuel). He blamed this partially on the TMT lack of training. He said the Volunteer
who organized the TMT ended her service just as the TMT was getting started. She was
followed by two other volunteers who were supposed to continue her capacity building
work, but they both had to leave for personal before training the TMT. He felt the
Volunteer guidance was crucial to keep the TMT true to their village development and
representation goals and encourage them to invest in new village youth ideas (Emanuel).
He said the chiefs have refused to develop a village home stay system because they are
not used to these kinds of projects (Emanuel).
One of the effects o f non representation of village youth is low participation in
village meetings and labor unrelated to the Sanctuary. Because it is the village chiefs
who are not representing them, they resist village wide activities, which further decreases
the TMT and chiefs’ desire to include them. A non-TMT village elder discussed the
exclusion of the Village Youth as one of his major concerns for the project:
In the case of jobs and benefits offered to youth, there are only a few guide 
positions. When tourists come (the TMT and Wildlife) didn’t want them to be 
disturbed by youth wanting to guide them to the falls. So they ban that. But the 
youth argue that if they cannot have that source of income they will not do
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communal labor. And, in fact, they will choose to hunt to get a source of revenue 
from the project area instead. (Cleophas)
These youth activities, caused by their lack of representation, directly impact the
Sanctuary. However, they actually create more trouble for the wildlife officers to
exclude their use, which in a way helps the TMT. But they also decrease the capacity of
chiefs to manage the village effectively; without communal labor little can be
accomplished.
Although not directly related to the Sanctuary, a village guesthouse owner also
mentioned several conflicts she has had with hiring village youth to cook, clean, and
maintain her rooms. She said the Youth take advantage o f her because she has a
successful business by raising the prices o f their fhiit and produce for her and demanding
high labor fees for construction. She has also experienced problems with jealousy
between villagers she employs, theft, and employees using the guesthouse for
prostitution. She sees these as acts o f desperation due to the lack of economic
opportunities in the village that are antagonized by the non representation of youth by the
TMT. She hopes that her business provides an example for more villagers to develop
their own projects separate from the TMT. (Guesthouse)
Non-TMT Elder Resistance to the TMT: Two of the most vocal and active
villagers in opposition to the TMT were a non-TMT elder o f Wli who works as a private
consultant on development projects both nationally and internationally, and the District
Assembly Representative for Wli. The consultant said that the TMT has too much
unchecked power, particularly over the use of money;
They (TMT) formed themselves and then wrote their own laws. It should not be 
like that. They should be appointed to do a task and given guidelines. Now they 
can say ‘we are going to hire 4 more guides and pay them 400,000cedis’. Who is
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going to approve that, to assure it’s not just making a job for someone?
(Cleophas)
To address this problem he recommends that the TMT needs to have an advisory board, 
like the village elders, that hold them accountable, “The board will not have an 
overbearing control over the TMT, but they will have to be approved annually according 
to their activities.” By saying this he meant that the TMT needs to be able to make 
decisions more effectively and timely, but that they also need to be accountable to the 
village population. Because of this he thinks the TMT should simply be the management 
implementation body, rather than represent village interests and actively manage. As a 
private consultant he is just as individually motivated to make money as the chiefs and 
TMT members. He said he is not a TMT member only because his job requires him to 
travel frequently. Therefore, it is not the chief’s narrow interests per se that he sees as a 
problem, but that they can implement or restrict TMT action without needing anyone’s 
approval (Cleophas).
Besides being the District Assemblyman for Wli and the surrounding area, 
William is one o f the founding, non-chief TMT members. He has engaged himself in 
reforming the TMT towards what he sees as its original intentions, representing and 
benefiting the entire village population. He stated that this problem lies within the co­
management structure and members of the TMT as well, that “there are many hiding 
behind the chiefs” (District Assemblyman, Wildlife Officer). By this he meant that it is 
not only the chiefs, but more of the TMT members that are involved in embezzling, non 
representation, and undermining the co-management arrangement; that this number has 
gradually grown in number as the TMT has become less representative. He has 
approached the TMT problem using his District Assemblyman authority to appoint a non-
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TMT committee to review and reform the TMT constitution and by-laws. This was not 
an assignment for him from the District; rather he took it upon himself in lieu o f District 
action (William). He selected individuals from across the villages to meet and make new 
decisions about elections, goals, planning requirements, and budgeting for revenue use. 
He wrote a proposed draft of a new constitution and bylaws with some flexibility for the 
committee to choose from (William). His leadership experience gives him the 
confidence to attempt to reform the TMT vis-à-vis chief anger. He admits that even if  he 
succeeds in gathering the committee to reform the TMT bylaws, it will require strong 
action by the District to legally recognize and enforce them, something they have been 
unable to do. The examples o f Cleophas and William demonstrate that there is broad- 
based resistance to the chief dominance of the TMT from youth as well as non-chief 
elders.
Bat Hunters and Charcoal Makers'. Bat hunters and charcoal makers are not 
represented by the project. These activities are banned within the sanctuary, but occur 
relatively uncontrolled. Bat hunters are village youth that primarily farm, but hunt 
opportunistically for personal consumption and sales from their homes (Moses). 
Decisions regarding when to hunt are made within their larger agro-economy, when they 
are not too busy with their fields and have extra money to buy ammunition. They also 
plan their hunts around the presence of the TMT. However, hunters are not secretive 
since their methods include using shotguns, hunting at all times of the day, and accessing 
the cliffs adjacent to the waterfall where the bats roost through the main tourism trail. 
When describing the good market for bats in the village, a hunter said that TMT members 
are frequently among those that buy from him (Moses).
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Hunting is downplayed as a serious issue in group contexts, such as TMT
meetings, conversations between guides and wildlife officers, and the Village Youth
meeting. The TMT Chairman and Youth both described hunters as a limited number of
“hardened youth” or those “without conscience” (Steven, Youth). However, in personal
interviews it was identified as a threat, but primarily in the context of the TMT or wildlife
officers blaming each other for failing to control hunting, rather than how to effectively
control it. Therefore, the act o f hunting per se is seen as a minor issue, but it is a major
symbol o f power in the co-management conflict.
The guides and TMT regard hunting as a serious conflict with tourism, largely for
safety and aesthetic reasons:
(Hunters) throw rocks down (to make the bats fly within shooting range) like last 
week when there are guides and tourists here. They threw big rocks and hit one 
guide and broke a section of the bridge. We called the police and they came, but 
did not catch them .. .It will be a very bad thing if  a tourist comes and is killed by a 
rock. The word of this will come to the village, in Ghana and Togo, and it will be 
severe. (Alfred)
On the other hand the wildlife officers head officer sees it as illegal because o f the
sanctuary laws (Anthony). A guide said:
They (Officers) say we cannot control our own people to stop poaching. They 
give us examples.. .stories about their old projects in their home towns.. .how they 
would stop hunters and bring them to justice. They should be patrolling. 
(Emanuel)
Others blamed the District Assembly for not playing a large enough role in enforcement 
(Alfred, William). Thus it is unclear which management body is responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing hunting.
Guides stated that strict enforcement was the only way to stop hunting, “It would 
be better to take all the guns away.. .with tough examples, when people are arrested and
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taken to court they will be fined or put in prison. After two or three cases there will be an 
example.” (Alfred) Strict enforcement, as guides described it, implied that it should not 
be the duty of village authority, but that hunting is a problem for the wildlife officers and 
District level courts. When I suggested the possibility o f more flexible village-based 
hunting regulations like license fees or seasons to another guide, he said these would be 
ineffective, “Hunters here are not like you in Europe. If  you say go do this, pay (for a 
license), and stop at some point, they will never respect it” (Alfonse). But a hunter said 
he thought the possibility of having hunting hours in the early morning when tourists are 
generally not around to reduce conflict would interest him (Moses). Despite their distain 
for hunting, guides did not confront or report hunters when they were encountered at the 
falls or on the trail. A guide said this was because the hunters have guns and are 
dangerous (Alfonse), while the hunter said they let them go because they are friends 
(Moses).
These contradictions in problem definition, solutions, and actions taken by the 
different management bodies exemplify that the hunting debate is not about if  the village 
could control hunters. TMT members who buy bats and guides that do not turn in 
hunters do not seem genuinely concerned about its negative ecological or economic 
effects on tourism. Rather hunting it is made an issue by these groups as evidence that 
the Wildlife Division is ineffective and should not be part of co-management o f the 
sanctuary.
Charcoal Making'. Few of the actors thought charcoal making was problematic 
for the sanctuary. Guides, TMT members, and Wildlife officers commonly replied that 
as long as it was not happening in the sanctuary; it was not an issue. However, charcoal
122
making and regular burning o f the surrounding fields have contributed to making the 
sanctuary an island of forest habitat, physically and ecologically separated from other 
forested tracts (observations of Wli). Charcoal makers in Wli described it as a permanent 
source of supplemental income from their farms that surround the sanctuary (John, Street 
Vendor).
In one such instance a landowner adjacent to the sanctuary, whose land was 
bisected by the main tourist trail, felled a large odum tree for making charcoal. Guides 
and TMT member defended this activity by saying things like, “It was not actually in the 
sanctuary boundary” (Mary). However, it represents a form of resistance by villagers to 
the Sanctuary management since chain sawing a large diameter hardwood tree making up 
a large portion o f the canopy, and burning it for coal within a few feet o f the main trail 
used by tourists is obviously not a benefit to those visiting to experience a wildlife 
sanctuary. Two groups of British and German tourists commented to me at the tourist 
center about their disappointment with this particular charcoal event. The farmer used 
one of the permanent bridges constructed for access to the sanctuary to transport the coal 
to the main road, which meant passing by the tourism office and wildlife officers.
Continued charcoal making by landowners adjacent to the sanctuary also 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the TMT revenue distribution system. O f the TMT 
fifty-seven percent o f total revenue, sixty percent goes directly to landowners to 
compensate for the lost production potential of their lands (Steven). Going back to the 
previous charcoal making example, the landowner’s actions were part o f a precisely 
calculated land use decision. He hired a sawyer to cut the tree and taxi driver to transport 
the coal to the regional market in Hohoe. Considering both of these costs he calculated
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the approximate profit margin, which would be used to establish a cocoa farm on 
different lands (John). Had the landowner percentage system been effective, this 
landowner could have used his portion of revenues to establish his cocoa farm without 
making charcoal on the sanctuary border. However, his choice to do so reflects his 
disregard or dissatisfaction for the sanctuary, since he could have harvested trees 
elsewhere, and that his revenue percentage fulfills some other element o f his farming 
economy not intended by the project.
This section described that there is village wide opposition to the TMT power and 
revenue control. The youth resistance occurs through hunting and a general lack of 
participation in communal labor, while the non-TMT elders are concerned with reforming 
the TMT structure to increase accountability. It is unclear if  these actions will have an 
effect on the TMT since it is not in their narrow interest to represent these groups. 
However, with such a large opposition to the TMT it is difficult to imaging reconciling 
their differences through negotiating new bylaws.
Low Capacity o f  Wildlife Officers:
The wildlife officers play an ineffective role in the co-management strategy 
because o f their low capacity to engage in monitoring and enforcement. This low 
capacity was further degraded by conflicts with the TMT and village animosity. The 
following data demonstrate (1) the low National wildlife officers investment in the 
Sanctuary, and (2) the pressures put on the wildlife officers by TMT and village hostility.
Lack o f  National Wildlife Division Investment'. The lack of support and 
investment in the Sanctuary by the central wildlife officers has fmstrated the officers and 
decreased their motivation to work as well. The most obvious example o f this is the
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number of officers. Initially the Wildlife Division employed twelve officers, while today
there are only three. This quadruples the responsibilities per officer. However, the
increase in duties has not been effective, partially because officer employment benefits
have remained low. One officer complained that he has worked as an officer in two
protected areas over the last ten years and has not been trained or promoted:
Some people work ten years without being promoted. For very little (pay). 
Someone can work their whole career in the same position. It’s not satisfying, 
(local) people don’t like you in this job. We have to stop them from doing what 
they like to do. So they (wildlife officers) have to make us happy too. But only 
those in Accra get appointed. (Felix)
He would like to be paid more and have more authority. He feels unwilling to risk his
safety and decrease his quality of life by creating conflicts with villagers over
enforcement because of the low incentives offered by his job. Thus the lack o f Wildlife
Division investment decreases his capacity by not encouraging him to act.
I observed this example of Felix’s frustration and unwillingness to act during an
interview at the tourism center. It was the day after Easter Monday, the sanctuary’s
highest use day of the year with approximately 2000 visitors, primarily Ghanaians from
Accra came to picnic at the waterfall. Due to the high number of visitors on this day
everyone pays a flat rate holiday price, rather than the usual differential fee system for
students, Ghana residents, and those with cameras. To avoid conflict with the high use,
local villagers are not allowed to visit the waterfall that day, but the village plans a
festival for residents the following day, Easter Tuesday. The TMT also controls all ticket
sales on Easter Monday by employing the guides and additional members o f the Accra
Youth Association as ticket collectors. The problem encountered by Felix was on
Tuesday, the village festival day. Local residents are never required to pay to visit the
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sanctuary, but for non-residents, Tuesday is a normal fee day. During our interview 
many non-residents approached Felix at the fee collection desk and begged him to let 
them go free because it was a village free day and they could not make it for the reduced 
price non-resident day. Felix refused initially, but then quickly gave in and allowed them 
to pass or they simply ignored him when he said they would have to pay. Each time this 
occurred Felix became more depressed, sighing and shaking his head. During this 
interview he described how he found it difficult to enforce the sanctuary regulations 
because of the lack of training and wages offered by the Wildlife Division (Felix).
The lack of officers and low morale has compromised the wildlife officers’ ability 
to control sanctuary access logistically, which in turn has angered the villagers and 
exacerbated the difficulty of the officers performing their duties. A private guesthouse 
owner said, ‘̂They sit back and watch the hunters go by, say ‘hello, how are you?’, but 
then they (wildlife officers) say they can’t stop them because they (hunters) will make it 
too hard for them to live here” (Guesthouse). Similarly, the District Assemblyman said, 
“villagers hired as public servants would appreciate their salary and do the work.. .the 
wildlife (officers) just sit there” (William) Guides complained that the officers numbers 
have become too few to be effective, “If you’re going to take most away, why don’t you 
take them all? We don’t like to see them working like that, behind a desk. It’s not their 
job, that’s not why they’re here. They should be patrolling” (Emanuel). The District 
Assemblyman also remarked that wildlife officers’ leadership does not defend the 
Sanctuary, “It is always like a butterfly in the back. A butterfly looks big but has no 
strength, but always like to suck the sweetness” (William). He was referring to a border 
dispute with a village in Togo over access to the waterfall from the upper, Togolese side.
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He felt the chiefs and elders (TMT) fought to exclude use more than the wildlife officers,
i.e. another reason the officers are not benefiting the Sanctuary.
Another type of investment not made by the central Wildlife Division that lowers
their morale is affirmation of the officer’s work. The Head Officer lamented the loss of
prestige he felt from the recognition from his superiors for managing the Sanctuary. He
expressed this by saying that this year they were not in the Ghana Forestry Commission
calendar, “I do not know if it will be a protected area (anymore). Usually it (the
waterfall) is one o f the pictures.. .one of the prominent tourist attractions” (Anthony).
That he bases his feelings of affirmation on the annual calendar rather than direct
feedback demonstrates the lack of communication within the Wildlife Division. The
Head Officer stated he feels frustrated and says he wants to leave the village but his
Wildlife Division superiors will not give tell him what their plan is for AWS:
Now this decision comes through (village chiefs confiscated the revenue books to 
force the wildlife officers out of the tourism office) and we don’t know (what to 
do). I get my orders from my superior, but haven’t heard what they will do with 
us...I am working in this community for these people. If  they don’t want me they 
should give me some signals. I just don’t want to be here. I’d just as soon not 
come to service. (Anthony)
This quote describes the officer’s difficulty with not having clear orders from his 
superiors concerning his current co-management duties and his future employment. He 
does not want to collaborate with the TMT because of their undermining tactics. Rather 
that having clear orders on how to collaborate, he would prefer being reassigned to a 
different protected area. He made reference to his traditional top-down monitoring and 
enforcement duties at his previous assignment in another protected forest. Therefore, like 
Felix, he is also discouraged to act but for different reasons.
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TMT Conflict and Villager Hostility'. Initially the co-management working
relations between the TMT and wildlife officers were more effective. The head officer
recalled that when he arrived there were no official guides; anyone in the village could
invite tourists to follow them through the forest to visit the waterfall. This created
competition among village youth to the point of tourists being mobbed as they arrived in
Wli. He proposed that the project hire and train official guides to decrease this
harassment. The TMT organized and selected five youth from different clans who were
trained by the Officers and incorporated into the management system (Anthony). But
over time the relationship between the two bodies has changed because of the chiefs take
over o f the TMT and undermining tactics o f the other bodies. The Head Officer
discussed changes in TMT activity over time from trying to proactively manage the
sanctuary and represent to simply controlling power and revenues:
We had been going along for the past years handing over (management duties), 
preparing the TMT to eventually take over. Now it’s about taking control o f the 
money.. .not using the books.. .not going through the District.. .then getting all our 
shares (of the revenue). (Anthony)
This quote and other comments made by the Head Officer describe that the TMT 
was, at some point, more willing to collaborate, but are no longer accountable to either of 
the other two management bodies.
Increased animosity between villagers and wildlife officers escalated to a break in 
at the Head Officer’s house and theft of his Wildlife Division issued motorbike. Because 
of this he moved his family to the regional capitol. Ho, for their protection. Today the 
Head Officer is bitter about the whole situation. Quickly after telling me the success 
story about creating the tourism guides in the co-management beginning, he said, “They 
are not special guides. They’re just guys that lead people there” (Anthony). The TMT
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tactics o f forcing the wildlife officers out o f the project continues to increase tension
between them and the officers.
The officers are ignored and excluded from discussions and information sharing
by TMT members, which annoys and detaches them from their work. One day I brought
a letter describing my research goals to the tourism office for the wildlife officers and
TMT to read. The TMT member sitting at the desk read it and immediately said they
would keep it with their records. Only after I asked him to share the letter with the
officer, who was sitting at the desk next to him, did he reluctantly hand it to him
(observation of TMT). The officer later told me if I was not there to say anything they
would never have shown it to them (Felix). Since the TMT does not agree with the co-
management agreement, they actively try to exclude the Officers from information and
decisions, thus making them less effective, and support the TMT argument that the
Wildlife Division should not be a part o f the Sanctuary management.
Other discrete excluding acts done by the TMT ftmstrated the officers. One of the
officers pointed out the new signs the TMT painted to post on the trails:
Look, they have all the rules: no weapons, no cutting, no litter, bats are a part of 
the ecosystem.. .These are all Wildlife (Division) laws. But on the sign they just 
wrote ‘Agumatsa Sanctuary’ rather than Wildlife Sanctuary. (Felix)
What upset him about the signs was that the TMT is copying the Wildlife Division rules,
but then claiming them as their own, essentially using the officer’s rules as a way to
exclude them, i.e. show that they are no longer necessary, rather than help the officers
enforce the rules since they already existed. He saw the act o f painting the signs as
another undermining power move by the TMT. These comments illustrate that, besides
the lack o f motivation to act because of the low Wildlife Division investment, the TMT
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greatly limited the officer’s opportunities to participate. Therefore, the wildlife officers 
are self-represented only in theory by the co-management arrangement and are truly 
ineffective in practice.
In contrast to Felix’s apathy, the Head Officer reacts to the pressure from the 
TMT by becoming more rigid. In reaction to the TMT excluding the officers as 
management partners, the Head Officer separates himself from the TMT by exaggerating 
his authority. Whenever in public he wears a military style officers’ uniform with knee 
high black boots and a wide brimmed jungle hat. The other officers and TMT members 
all dress like average villagers, wear flip flops and t-shirts. He is more diligent and 
professional with his duties than the other officers, guides, and TMT as well. His 
obsessive work ethic, in contrast to Felix’s apathy, detaches him from the TMT co­
management intentionally as resistance to their undermining tactics. He commonly 
listens to politics on the radio by himself at the desk and constantly works on keeping 
records while the others socialize outside the office. He is always serious when he 
‘reports to service’, which contrasts his casual demeanor that I observed during our 
meetings at his garden and other private situations. These examples illustrate that the 
TMT has been successful in undermining the wildlife officers and cultivating hostility 
towards them in the village, which have decreased their already limited capacity.
Summary: This case demonstrates a co-management protected area that satisfies the
key to successful participation in theory. However, in practice deficiencies within all 
three bodies limited their effectiveness. Specifically each o f the bodies was deficient in 
the following ways: non-representation of village-wide interests by the chiefs and TMT;
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lack o f investment in wildlife officers by the Wildlife Division; and lack o f investment 
and enforcement by the District Assembly. Because of these three large individual 
problems, it is difficult to analyze what elements o f co-management are particularly 
relevant. Therefore, I have several recommendations.
This case could benefit from a protected area outreach structure if  the Wildlife 
Division was to invest more in its officers or invest higher in the TMT equivalent o f 
government officers. The latter could go a long way in improving the value of the 
Wildlife Division with TMT and villagers. On the other hand, this case could benefit 
from a community conservation framework if the TMT was more transparent. For this to 
happen it appears that the chiefs would have to be separated from the TMT. Ultimately, 
however, the responsibility o f the co-management arrangement lies with the District 
Assembly because of Ghana’s national decentralization policy. In this case the District 
was not the appropriate level to represent either the village or national interests and 
became part of a corrupt alliance with chiefs to serve its own income generating interests. 
This case demonstrates that for co-management to be successful the initial negotiations 
are critical and the decentralization policy does not allow enough flexibility for the three 
bodies to engage in meaningful negotiation of their roles based on their individual and 
shared interests and capacities. Because of this the three body system was not able to 
effectively share power and management roles.
Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area
This case demonstrates representation, empowerment, and capacity elements from 
the community conservation pole o f the participatory conservation continuum. This
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framework defines criteria o f success including: project goals reflecting community 
needs and economic security o f livelihoods; management based on local ownership and 
local knowledge; cohesion between social and geographic boundaries; and locally 
legitimate decision making and authorities (Figure 4, Literature Review). The broad- 
based Project Management Committee in this case attempts to incorporate each o f these 
elements, thus this section analyzes these elements in the context of this set o f local 
interest groups and actors.
Overview: There are four key points in this case that arose through the broad-based
representation strategy, but never-the-less resulted in low village-wide ownership and 
responsibility for the project, and high expectations and authority of only chiefs and non­
governmental organization managers (Figure 20):
1. The Ghana Wildlife Society (NGO) required the project form a broad-based, 
multi-village Project Management Committee that self represented all interest 
groups in the project area. However, this was a foreign concept to the population.
2. Due to traditional leadership expectations, chiefs and the Ghana Wildlife Society 
managers were empowered more than other project committee members, as 
traditional authorities and external experts/aid workers.
3. Decisions concerning small scale enterprise activities narrowly made by chiefs 
and the managers missed opportunities to create greater local ownership and build 
villager capacity and were generally unsuccessful.
4. Villagers had greater success organizing themselves to participate in these 
activities in ways not determined by chiefs and wildlife managers.
First, Afadjato’s project committee approach, designed by the Ghana Wildlife 
Society, inserted their managers within a group of village representatives. Therefore, 
theoretically with only one seat on the project management committee, like the other 
village representatives, the Wildlife Managers and villagers had equal self representation
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and decision making power. The other village representatives on the project committee 
built upon pre-existing local institutions. Thus the committee was broad based and 
included locally legitimate representatives, but traditionally these roles exist in a 
hierarchy separated by village boundaries. Therefore, the committees did not function as 
they were designed.
Second, in practice the committee design resulted in top-down decision making 
because the traditional roles of village chiefs, as decision making authority figures, and 
the Ghana Wildlife Society managers, as external experts, limited the representation o f 
other interest groups. Specifically, landowners, youth, and women that technically had 
“seats” on the project committee were insignificantly self represented, i.e. they did not 
participate equally with chiefs and managers in project meetings and decision making. 
This was a socially determined limitation, not a result o f chief and manager direct 
exclusion of other representatives. Never-the-less, the wildlife managers and chiefs were 
empowered within the project committee with greater authority and management 
responsibility over the project than other representatives.
Third, decisions narrowly made, but with good intentions, by the wildlife 
managers and chiefs resulted in missed opportunities to increase local capacity and 
unsuccessful enterprise development activities. In several instances the project managers 
made decisions that they thought would avoid problems, which further concentrated or 
reaffirmed their power and took responsibilities away from other interest groups.
Because of this, the capacities o f pre-existing institutions, such as private entrepreneurs, 
and the social norms that influence them were not built upon.
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Fourth, despite the limited success of decisions made by the project committee 
leaders, villagers involved in the project such as guides and enterprise group members 
developed other successful forms of participation and organization. These included 
holding the chiefs and managers downwardly accountable through the public forum o f 
project committee meetings; alternatively organizing enterprise groups; monitoring 
enterprise groups and leadership roles held by project guides rather than village authority 
figures; developing enterprise activities based on but autonomous to the project; and 
incorporating an alternative model o f management committee.
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Analysis:
Broad-Based Project Management Committee:
The majority of the actors in the Agumatsa initiative fall within the project 
management committee as self represented interest groups, including: representatives of 
chiefs, elders, landowners, youth, women, entrepreneurs in project activities, health
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center employees, and schools. The representatives for these interests were identified and 
appointed from preexisting village roles, like the Queen Mother that represents women’s 
interests. Youth Chief for village youth. Paramount Chief, etc... To avoid limited 
representation there is no limit to the number of project committee interests or members 
(Edem). In the scheme of project decision making, the Project Manager stated that all 
final decisions are made by the project committee in an effort to include all 
representatives (Edem). For these reasons, the project committee, by design, is in a 
different class from the previous cases’ village management committees that relied on 
small numbers o f villagers with similar interests to represent their village populations. 
However, this design did not coincide well with the project area’s preexisting social 
boundaries.
The Ghana Wildlife Society used the term ‘community’ as the target population 
of this initiative to cultivate broad-based support. Project advertisements such as 
billboards, brochures, and website read, “A partnership between the Gbledi Community 
and Ghana Wildlife Society”. However, when wildlife managers and chiefs described the 
actors involved in the project, they stated the individual Gbledi villages, Gbogame and 
Chebi, plus Ahor, one villages from the neighboring Fodome Traditional Area (Edem, 
Togbega, Mancredo). Guides identified themselves by the village they lived in and the 
small-scale enterprise groups were especially grounded in individual villages (Isaac). For 
instance rather than having a “community” bee keeping group, there were groups specific 
to the individual villages (Mancredo). Therefore, it was not easy for the project to 
represent all community stakeholders because o f the historical separation of villages, and 
it took considerable effort and designing o f the project to organize the project committee.
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Creating the project committee with chiefs and across village interests that 
spanned multiple social boundaries together on one body was one of the first external 
strategies implanted by the wildlife managers (Edem). This sense of multi-village and 
traditional area community did not exist previously. Each of the Gbledi villages had their 
own village chiefs and elders that could cooperate under their Paramount Chief, but 
bringing together the Fodome village also brought a second Paramount Chief o f that 
traditional area into the picture (Togbega, Mancredo). It was apparent that the term 
community had been adopted because of its frequent use by chief, wildlife managers, and 
other representatives; a term not commonly used in the study area villages (observations 
of study areas). For these reason the community definition of the project population by 
the Wildlife Society became a critical element to creating and maintaining a cohesive 
social population.
The reason for creating a project committee that crossed so many social 
boundaries was to expand the size o f the project’s forest reserve to make it more 
attractive for funding from the Dutch Embassy. The Project Manager said the original 
proposal including only the two Gbledi villages was too small (under 10 hectares)
(Edem). However, to increase the protected area size landowners and other village 
populations had to be incorporated into the project. Thus, the chiefs from Gbledi and 
wildlife managers stretched the project boundaries by creating a new definition o f the 
“Gbledi Community”. The Project Manager said he and the other wildlife managers 
made several mistakes initially by overselling the project, including filming publicity for 
the project on neighboring lands not within the boundaries of the project, and advertising 
nearby attractions, such as the Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary in Wli as being part o f the
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Afadjato initiative (Edem). He said these resulted in boundary disputes that are 
continuing problems for the project, particularly competing ecotourism projects in 
neighboring Liati and Wli Traditional Areas (Edem). These implementation 
shortcomings based on the external interests o f the wildlife managers are indicative o f the 
narrow representation problems throughout this initiative.
Empowerment o f  Chiefs and Wildlife Manasers Over Project Committee:
Although the project committee was formed to broadly self represent all village interest 
groups this created many inconsistencies between the committee and the traditional 
village hierarchy. The result of this, when it came to implementing the project committee 
for decision making and planning, was village representatives were either physically less 
involved or non vocally engaged while chiefs and wildlife managers played the dominant 
roles. This happened because chiefs and external experts are traditionally the active 
participants in development and conservation projects. Furthermore, the meetings where 
committee members were supposed to participate took place in the form o f normal, chief 
led village meetings. Therefore, the other village representatives expected chiefs and 
experts to take the lead. The following sections provide examples of how project 
meetings were dominated by chiefs and wildlife managers; multiple dominant roles 
played by chiefs; and the technical and financial roles played by the wildlife managers.
Project Committee Meetings: Typically meetings were held in the public open 
space in Gbledi-Gbogame where the project office and trailhead are located and the 
residence of the Paramount Chief. On one particular occasion the wildlife managers and 
liaison presented the chiefs with tourism revenues to divide among landowners and the 
general village. From a physical participation standpoint, only the Chiefs, village-project
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liaison, and wildlife managers were seated in the meeting space. The rest o f the project 
committee members were mixed in with the rest o f the village. Thus, the project 
committee members like youth and women’s representatives were not physically on the 
same level as the chiefs and wildlife managers. The chiefs were dressed in traditional 
kente cloth, sitting in the formal hierarchical seating arrangement, under a bamboo and 
palm canopy created for such public events. The ceremonial protocols of the meeting 
were no different from any village meetings I had observed in the study area. Thus, there 
was nothing more ‘participatory’ or ‘community-based’ about this one.
The wildlife project manager led most o f the meeting; speaking first to the chiefs 
who sat across from the three wildlife members in the center o f the public space, and then 
turning to address the village that surrounded them. This demonstrated that the villagers 
were being informed of project activities during this meeting, while the chiefs were 
formally sharing responsibility and authority. This was more apparent when the Project 
Manager gave the Paramount Chief the project tourism revenue and the Paramount Chief 
had to sign their documents while the Enterprise Coordinator took photographs of the two 
shaking hands. This symbolized that the wildlife managers required the approval and 
authorization of the chiefs on behalf of the village. However, this meeting was primarily 
a ceremony. Since the tourism revenue and distribution percentages had already been 
calculated, the chiefs and wildlife managers engaged each other in no discussion. 
(Observations of project committee)
Dominant Roles o f  Chiefs: The Project Manager adamantly supported the chief
leadership of the project committee. Before I could conduct interviews with wildlife 
managers and project committee members the Project Manager required the approval of
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the Chiefs as well as his Wildlife Society superiors (Edem). To fulfill this approval I had
to meet with the chiefs to discuss the goals and methods of my research project and
written copies of them, along with authorization letters from the University of Montana
and Peace Corps, to the Ghana Wildlife Society office. However, I did not have to meet
with any other project committee representatives. In this meeting with the chiefs, they
agreed to my research project without any hesitation or need to contact the other project
committee representatives. Thus the chiefs, in particular the Paramount Chief, spoke on
behalf o f all village representatives.
In the Project Manager’s opinion, the other village representatives on the project
committee do not participate adequately. He said “The women on the committee are
simply not vocal” and the Youth Representative can not fulfill his role because of
problems he has with the Paramount Chief:
(The youth representative) participates well in meetings but doesn’t get the word 
spread...There are internal problems, something between him and Togbega 
(Paramount Chief). He (youth rep) needs to bean the gong-gong and call them 
(youth) but because of the problem he can’t (Edem).
He viewed these representation problems as problems inherent to the Youth and
Women’s Representatives, rather than results of chief control that is enhanced by the
wildlife managers. For this reasons, he sees an increase in the number of village-project
liaisons, a position held by a village chief, as a key to increase representation (Edem).
Thus, the Project Manager believes there should be more formal representation
responsibility vested in chiefs than other village representatives to make up for their lack
of participation. This pragmatic approach contradicts his definition and the project plan’s
requirements of the project committee and is exemplary of how the wildlife managers
approached adaptation to problems encountered throughout the project.
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Project- Village Liaison'. One o f the most active members of the chiefs was
the project-village liaison. The Project Manager stated that it was the role of the liaison 
to facilitate information sharing between interest groups and the implementation of 
project activities (Edem). This role was created by the wildlife managers specifically for 
one village chief because he was the main initiator o f the project (Mancredo). The 
Liaison has a history of instigating village development through external connections, 
such as American, Japanese, and British volunteers. However, because of his chief 
authority and empowered project role, the Liaison limited the participation of other 
interest groups. During small group meetings with guides and enterprise groups, and 
especially the final conference between the three projects, he was dominant and 
outspoken. He abruptly reprimanded a landowner for voicing a different opinion about 
the overuse of funds for small-scale enterprise projects and kicked another landowner out 
o f the conference because he said the man was not serious and had been drinking 
(Mancredo). The Liaison’s authoritative conduct occurred in his monitoring o f the small 
scale enterprise groups as well. To visit these groups the liaison would generally ride 
around the village in the Wildlife Society truck and call people over to him from their 
compounds and speaking to them out the window (observations of Mancredo). This type 
of monitoring severely limited the time and encouragement given to enterprise group 
members during these “home visits”.
The Liaison also expressed his role between the village and wildlife managers 
over the chiefs at times. When the Project Manager required that I get the chief’s 
approval before beginning research, the Liaison took me to the meeting to introduce us.
140
Since I had already discussed my research ideas with him and the Project Manager, on
the way to see the chiefs he said:
We are not going there to ask for permission. We are going to introduce you and 
inform him of your activities. The only permission needed has already been 
granted by the office (Ghana Wildlife Society). If you ask them for permission 
the will go into a meeting and put you through all that again. We will just go to 
inform. (Mancredo)
Therefore, despite the intentions of the liaison to facilitate greater information sharing 
between village representatives, the actions o f the individual playing this role had the 
opposite effect.
In a general sense, by creating the liaison position the wildlife managers made 
direct project committee meetings less necessary, which resulted in more one-way 
information sharing from the wildlife managers to the village representatives and the 
likelihood that information designed by the managers to increase participation would be 
corrupted before it could be realized. Therefore, increasing the number of liaisons, via 
chiefs, could make information sharing more efficient, but would also increase the 
amount o f wildlife manager influence on the project.
Dominant Ghana Wildlife Society Role: The Wildlife Society’s role in the
Afadjato initiative differs from its description as a single member of the project 
committee. The wildlife managers and liaison described a more controlling decision 
making and total management role o f the managers in the two main project areas: reserve 
management and small scale enterprise development.
The initial wildlife manager activities in reserve management established their 
leadership role in the project. These activities included the demarcation o f the forest 
reserve area, baseline wildlife inventories, and community education (Edem). During
141
these activities the wildlife managers employed village guides extensively for field work, 
and also led the education sessions themselves concerning detrimental land use practices, 
regulations of the reserve, and values of conservation (Edem). In other words, these roles 
o f the wildlife managers coincide with the keys to protected area outreach success o f 
convincing the local population of the virtues of scientific, protectionist conservation. A 
project guide confirmed this by saying that the Wildlife Society filled the same role in 
their project as the governmental Wildlife Division in the Wli Agumatsa Sanctuary, as far 
as enforcement of rules and forest protection (William).
In reserve management the wildlife managers vested a large amount of knowledge 
and duties in a limited number of youth by hiring and training the guides to work closely 
connected to them on biological surveys, tourism, labor around the office grounds, and 
small scale enterprise projects. Several o f the guides were members o f the enterprise 
groups and because of their connection with Wildlife Society they played monitoring and 
technical advising roles (observations of guides). Their close interactions between the 
wildlife managers and guides made the guides more knowledgeable than most villagers 
about project organization and activities. While other villagers, like landowners and 
small enterprise group members, had diverse perceptions about the objectives o f the 
Wildlife Society, values of the reserve, and management of the enterprise activities, the 
guides’ comments echoed those of the wildlife managers and liaison. Guides knew about 
the histories of most of the project activities. They even described the failed butterfly 
farming project in great detail (Isaac, William).
However, because of their close interaction with the wildlife managers, the guides 
represent the tourism and conservation objectives of the Wildlife Society, rather than the
142
village or their own. Their duties include guiding tourists on hikes through the forest and
protecting the forest. The Project Manager jokingly interchanged these roles and titles,
“They are the guides who are also the guards!” (Edem). The guides’ conservation duties,
such as trap sweeping, surveys, and monitoring, are activities that also represent the
Wildlife Society. This Wildlife Society defined roles o f the guides differs from their
specific knowledge and interests of the forest. On a hike to the peak of the Mt. Afadjato
Reserve I asked a guide about the ecology of the area, and the specific connections
between wildlife and the forest habitat. His responses were general, naming the generic
tourism draws listed in the project brochure, like monkeys and the golden cat, but no
specific interpretive knowledge. Rather than describing wildlife in detail, he changed the
subject to the history of the area, contested traditional area boundaries, ancestral land use
changes, and current pressures:
Once at the top he showed me a trail that cuts NE and meets the trail to Kuma- 
Davota (by Eugene’s farm). He showed me Kuma-Bala, which you could see on 
the horizon straight East. Then he pointed out the valleys, where the Gbledi 
traditional area meets Liati and Kuma. He described a chateau they have on the 
next hill North o f Afadjato where they go camping. He pointed out a Kabiye farm 
and homestead near it and the large areas o f forest they cut and replanted with 
bananas and other fiuit trees. (Notes from William)
This local history and knowledge of land use was more important to him than the biology
of the animals highlighted in the Wildlife Society brochures. To build upon the capacity
of guides, and local expressions of conservation, the project would have had to
incorporate this knowledge into their ecotourism design. In other words, tourism did not
coincide with the knowledge and interests of the villagers. The guides and village could
have supported tourism more if this local history and knowledge was promoted rather
than external, scientific knowledge of wildlife. Instead, project tourism focused only on
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the internationally funded conservation value of preserving wildlife, like the endangered 
golden cat. This demonstrates that although the wildlife managers employed village 
youth as guides to provide tourism services that would benefit the entire village, the way 
the managers engaged these guides and the village did not reflect the characteristics o f 
the village. This is a reoccurring theme among the managers influence on small-scale 
enterprise activities as well, which will be discussed below regarding missed capacity 
building opportunities.
Factors Contributing to Wildlife Manager Dominance: The Wildlife
Society’s controlling role was created at least partially by a desire from the community 
for Wildlife Society to take certain responsibilities as the external conservation and 
development experts. One landowner said with pride that the Wildlife Society protects 
the forest from illegal activities like hunting and cutting, “Now you will be caught at once 
if you went to the forest!” (Honoue) The guide that described the role of the wildlife 
managers being like that of the government officers in Wli also said the reason the village 
did not want the government Wildlife Division involved in their project was that the 
government only takes money out, while besides their controlling management activities, 
the Wildlife Society also provides money to the community (William).
Despite the Wildlife Society intentions of integrating into the project committee 
the Wildlife Society managers’ employment status and work schedule divided them and 
the community. The Wildlife Society project field manager said he, the other officer, and 
chauffeur were financially independent from the project as contract employees of 
Wildlife Society rather than the community. He said they will only continue working on 
the project only as long as there is external funding for the project (Edem). In contrast to
144
this, being paid by the project committee based on project success, like how landowners 
were compensated through the distribution of tourism revenue, could have increased 
downward accountability for their actions and make them true members o f the project 
committee. The wildlife managers also divided their work time each week between the 
project site and their main office in Accra. They commuted from Accra every Tuesday 
evening to work in the village Wednesday through Friday. This separated them from the 
rhythm of village life (Edem, Mancredo).
Another factor contributing to heavy Wildlife Society decision making was 
corruption among villagers that initiated the project and skepticism o f corruption from 
other villagers. An advisor to the project committee, who described himself as the Side- 
Support Representative, said that many villagers are confiised by the project because they 
have been misled about the Wildlife Society (Marseilles). He said the well-off villagers 
that initiated the project expected a bribe or percentage of the project to be paid directly 
to them as a reward for getting the village to participate in the project. According to the 
Side Support Representative, the village initiators (mostly residing in Accra) thought they 
deserved something in exchange for allowing the Wildlife Society to use the village to 
get project funding; i.e. the village well-offs understood that the goal o f the NGO in the 
project was not only to help the community, but to pay their salaries and acquire funding 
to develop their national capacity. However, he said that when the initiators were not 
paid they spread rumors in an attempt to discredit the Wildlife Society plan (Marseilles). 
Comments from the project committee’s Youth Representative confirmed that there was 
something going on between the wildlife managers and project initiators. He said the 
chiefs and Wildlife Society are more responsive to their comments, “They only listen to
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the ‘big cars’ that come from Accra. I might have a better idea, but because they come 
dressed fine they get listened to” (Sasa). The Wildlife Society designed the project to 
promote broad representation and group benefits to prevent corruption. However, these 
comments illustrate that they had reason to retain control over the project in case the 
project objectives or local actors were corrupted. Because of the secretive nature of this 
corruption it was difficult to collect data on this topic, but the following examples 
illustrate the desire of the wildlife managers to control the project to prevent corruption.
Results o f  Chief and Wildlife Mana2er Dominance on Small-Scale Enterprise Activities:
The wildlife managers and chiefs created organizational and financial boundaries 
for the small-scale enterprise activities. Specifically, the wildlife managers 
predetermined that the enterprise activities would be organized as groups with elected 
leadership, and controlled technical and financial expertise o f the groups. Once groups 
had been formed the chiefs made the decision as to which of the group proposed 
activities the project would fund. The wildlife managers and chiefs made these rules with 
the intentions o f facilitating enterprise growth the quickest by reducing the possibility for 
conflicts and increasing efficiency. However, these boundaries restricted the amount of 
participant buy in and ownership that are important for overcoming obstacles to these 
development activities. Thus, the villagers that participated in the small-scale enterprise 
activities as members were primarily following the rules the wildlife managers defined 
for them. The following sections describe the obstacles faced by the enterprise groups 
because of these boundaries created by narrow decision making.
Group Organizational Problems'. One of the main obstacles of the enterprise 
activities, working effectively as groups of independent, power sharing individuals, was
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created directly by wildlife managers. The liaison said, “They (Wildlife Society) said 
they wanted small enterprise groups of at least ten but less than thirty” (Mancredo). The 
Enterprise Coordinator (one of the wildlife managers) said the group concept was part of 
the Wildlife Society’s plan from the beginning. It was how they envisioned the economic 
development half o f the project (Rubin). He defended the original concept, “Group 
projects work in Northern Ghana and other places” (Rubin). Similar to Togo, the 
Northern regions o f Ghana are inhabited by other ethnic groups, predominantly Muslim 
rather than Christian, and with different social norms for farming and commerce. In 
Togo, the Kabye tenant farmers from the North have a system of working in extended 
family groups on individual member lands during peak seasons, which is not common in 
the South (observations o f farming practices). For this reason, forming groups did not 
build upon preexisting local institutions with legitimacy and capacity to work effectively.
Once formed, Wildlife Society required the groups to elect a President, Secretary, 
and Treasurer as group leaders (Edem). However, this form of elected leadership is not 
consistent with traditional local business organization. For example, the beekeeping 
groups formed as small, family-based groups (Mancredo), which is more consistent with 
pre-existing, non-project small businesses. Common local small business groups, like 
palm oil and gari production, fish smoking and animal husbandry, are organized by 
individuals, usually with the help of others, but not as employees or group members with 
equal power and revenue sharing partners. For example, local non-project oil production 
and fish smoking were organized as family hierarchies with mother and daughter groups 
with three or four members (observations o f private entrepreneurs). Therefore, the family 
membership structure that were decided upon by locals as the way to organize themselves
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was consistent with local culture, but the group structure with divided power between a 
president, secretary, treasurer and advisors determined by the wildlife managers did not 
reflect how local groups are organized. This created groups with democratic organization 
only in theory, while in practice they were still governed by hierarchical family bonds, 
which provide unequal benefits to leaders at the top and workers at the bottom.
As a result of the previous problems, working as groups was the most widespread 
difficulty encountered by the enterprise activities. Many actors involved in the enterprise 
activities described that traditionally labor and business practice among Ewe is 
individual. The President of the women’s palm oil group said, “It is always difficult to 
work in groups...some people try hard, others are lazy” (oil group President). Many 
others, including the liaison, landowners, guides, and project committee members 
reiterated this, often using the word “lazy” to describe the problems of group efforts.
Two private businesswomen, producing oil and smoked fish, said they did not think the 
group projects sounded like good ideas. The fish smoker said, “The groups are not 
working hard...I used my own money for this” (Private Entrepreneur). Having made her 
own investments in her fish smoking materials, she would not have to share her profits 
with anyone, which increased her capacity to work for herself.
Soon after the Wildlife Society asked for groups to form there were twenty 
proposed groups (Rubin). The groups decided what activities they wanted to pursue, like 
farming, gari, soap, and oil transformations. From the twenty groups, the Wildlife 
Society and project committee analyzed the groups and decided that twelve of these 
looked like good activities to fund, while eight seemed less likely to succeed based on 
each group’s relevant experience, organizational history, and economic feasibility
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(Rubin). In the name of the project committee, chiefs rather than the wildlife managers, 
made the final decision about which enterprise activities to fund. However, they decided 
to fund all twenty groups to avoid conflicts and jealousy over project benefits (Rubin). 
Thus, the chiefs and wildlife managers imposed general boundaries on the groups, such 
as the group concept and leadership that were foreign to the project area, i.e. based on 
transplanted practical evidence. However, when it came to critical analytical decisions 
where expert opinions would seem more beneficial, especially with the confusion and 
conflict one would expect from implanting a new strategy, the chiefs and managers left 
the decisions up to group members. This represents the greatest shortcoming o f the 
dominant chief and wildlife leadership.
Technical Skill Capacity Building Problems'. Group activities were based
on different skill sets, primarily differing in the type of product, either traditional or new, 
and the way they were produced, using traditional or new techniques. Some groups were 
traditionally organized by family, while others displayed new forms o f group 
organization. Similarly, some groups intensified traditional products with local or 
external markets, while others created new products with external markets. Finally, some 
groups used traditional technologies and knowledge, while others used new techniques. 
These differences created different keys to success across the enterprise activities. The 
key to success for traditional product activities was sustaining their group organization to 
provide an advantage of pooled labor over individual producers. On the other hand, the 
key for new product activities was sustaining production of unfamiliar techniques and 
finding markets. The results o f the wildlife managers control is discussed through the 
issues of organization and product below. The following sections provide examples for
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how decisions made and actions taken by the wildlife managers, and to a lesser extent 
chiefs, hindered the capacity building for both traditional and new skills.
The enterprise coordinator described palm oil, gari production, and farming 
activities as examples o f intensifying traditional products, “Most of the activities were 
not new, people have been doing them since infancy” (Rubin). These products built upon 
local production knowledge and local markets. For these activities the Wildlife Society 
simply gave loans to increase investment and production with the same methods. 
Therefore, the project funding gave these groups an advantage over individuals producing 
the same products by providing more capital and organized labor. However, the 
Coordinator described that farming groups in particular showed the worst results o f all 
the groups:
The problem is working with groups; people don’t work together and apply 
themselves the same. The (production from the) amount of lands used as group 
(farming) lands didn’t increase proportionally. Previously, one person was 
cultivating half an acre. We could have helped to increase each person to one 
acre, but instead twenty three people grouped together to farm five acres. The 
possibility of increasing production is not being met. Plus the five acres was not 
even maintained to produce. The reason they failed was lack of labor and 
commitment. (Rubin)
Thus, the project built upon local knowledge and preexisting markets in these types of 
activities, but the requirement o f group organization negated these because other group 
dynamics limited production.
Wild honey gathering and palm oil soap making are also traditional activities that 
the project built upon. However, in these cases the project introduced new methods of 
production to make higher quality farmed honey and import quality soap. In this way the 
concepts were not new, but new, quality enhancing techniques were taught by external 
experts (Rubin). A guide said there were originally six beekeeping groups, three in both
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the two main Gbledi villages, each composed of fifteen members with three hives per 
member provided by the project (Isaac). Although the beekeeping market for honey is 
good both locally and nationally, the groups encountered problems organizing and 
sustaining production in this activity. One o f the group leaders said members became 
discouraged by the slow hive colonization rate because o f the poor advice the trainer had 
given them about how to capture bees, which resulted in low immediate benefits and 
many people abandoned their hives (Mancredo). Another member said that “People were 
falling back. Instead of getting eighteen people at a meeting, you get six” (Marseilles). 
After poor initial results the Enterprise Coordinator decided to find a new beekeeping 
expert to train the groups. The new trainer recommended a slightly different design and 
location o f hives. Therefore, the Coordinator recalled the hives to change their roof 
design. However, when he did he also made decisions about who was still serious about 
the project and only redistributed hives to these group members (Mancredo). Thus, in 
response to problems created by the external control o f this activity, the Coordinator 
increased his control in an attempt to ‘fix’ things.
Financial Capacity Building Problems: Finding markets for enterprise
products, like soap and gari, was a limiting factor for these activities. When the groups 
were formed profitability was estimated by the wildlife managers using optimistic 
transportation and market prices, “When they (Wildlife Society) did the feasibility studies 
for the small scale projects they said we would find the greatest markets to sell things, but 
now the prices o f the products are all down” (Marseilles). The role o f researching these 
markets was held by the Wildlife Society rather than group members, thus maintaining 
the villager’s role o f production much like that of producing export cash crops where they
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have no power over the price o f their product because o f limited access to market 
knowledge and restricted communication with buyers because of middlemen.
Another financial role o f the wildlife managers in enterprise development was 
financial, specifically in buying machines for the village to process raw agriculture 
products. Like the chiefs decision to fund all enterprise groups, the Liaison and 
Enterprise Coordinator said that to save money and avoid problems Wildlife Society 
bought most large equipment and transported it directly themselves rather than devolving 
these tasks to the groups themselves (Rubin, Mancredo). This certainly reduced costs of 
transport by shipping equipment in the Wildlife Society vehicle. However, it reinforced 
the wildlife manager’s role in large-scale purchases and cost negotiation. The group 
leaders could have set up purchases that included the use of the project vehicle. Again 
this limited the access of villagers to market knowledge, and trivialized the fiscal 
management training the wildlife managers previously required as part of the training of 
all groups, i.e. they were trained to manage financial resources but not given the 
responsibility to implement that training into practice.
There was also a general belief that machines, tools, and in general, money, were 
the missing ingredients to village enterprise success. One chief and landowner said, 
“Everything is hard to start, but we are hoping for the future. If  only donors and funders 
can help. We have plenty of land and workforce, but no capital to purchase machines” 
(Monty). A guide described the Wildlife Society role by saying they had, “Brought 
many machines to the village” (Isaac). Wildlife Society made large investments in 
equipment and supplies depending on the group activities, like bee hives, mills for 
grinding cassava and palm nuts, butterfly screening, and field tools for farming groups.
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However, since these machines were purchased for use by groups, they relied on the false 
assumption that the machines would easily intensify individual level production. The 
farming activities showed that this was not the case since working in groups created other 
group dynamic issues that decreased production. Never-the-less, machines were 
perceived as essential ingredients for successful development and thus the wildlife 
managers that provided the machines as well.
The machines were paid for by the project as rotational loans that the groups were 
expected to repay. When they repaid the project, the funds would be available for new 
groups to apply for (Rubin). However, because of the loan system, villagers treated the 
machines as property of the Wildlife Society, rather than village owned and village run. 
Besides protecting the forest, villagers expected the Wildlife Society to protect “their” 
(Wildlife Society) machines. The Wildlife Society was synonymous in the village with 
“the wildlife project”, “their project”, and “their machines”. Unforeseen costs were also 
experienced by the gari group when their cassava mill broke down. Because o f the role 
o f Wildlife Society in purchasing equipment the group assumed that Wildlife Society 
would pay to repair the mill and refused to contribute amongst them (Gari Group 
Member). When the mill broke down that was purchased for the cassava processing 
group, one of the members said, “The group is waiting for (Wildlife Society) to fix their 
machine” (Gari member). The president of the women’s oil making group said she felt 
they had to repay the cost of the palm nut mill before they could begin profiting because, 
“We were being chased to pay it back by the project” (Oil group President). Therefore, 
because the project expected repayment for the mills the groups felt pressured and as 
renters not willing to invest.
153
The previous examples demonstrate the negative effects of decisions made by the 
wildlife managers and chiefs. Overall, these decisions did not build on preexisting local 
knowledge and did not increase the capacity of groups to address organizational and 
production problems. The impact of this was group members had less incentive to 
dedicate themselves to their activities when the projects encountered difficulties.
Adaptive Management o f  Enterprise Activities Controlled By Wildlife Managers:
The project has shown adaptations to initial group enterprise problems regarding 
group organization, sustaining production of new products, and securing external 
markets. However, the wildlife managers continue to play a dominant role in making 
changes without realizing that their dominant role contributed greatly to these 
shortcomings.
Changes in management o f enterprise activities, such as the beehive example, 
show adaptive management on the part o f the Coordinator. With respect to group 
organization problems, the Coordinator shared the lessons they have learned, “We have 
tried two aspects. The group work didn’t succeed, but neither did the individuals in the 
groups when they separated. We are now trying to dissolve the groups to find those that 
are serious” (Rubin). They have also reformed and re-trained the soap making group to 
use molds to make bars in the preferred market shape versus traditionally made soap balls 
(to make them look machine made), and researched a higher quality gari (cassava flour) 
export market that requires this group to make a dryer and lighter colored product 
(Rubin).
Again these comments are indicative that the Wildlife Society is the only body 
involved in enterprise evaluation, in an effort to ‘fix’ or ‘save’ the activities. Rather than
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attributing the activity failures to heavy top-down influence, the coordinator described the 
group problems as partially the wildlife managers’ fault for inadequate monitoring. 
Therefore, one exemplary adaptive solution he is trying is more strict, phase type loans 
for farmers that depend on their step by step accomplishments. He said, “Phase one to 
clear (the land) and purchase inputs... (phase) two, to plant. Like that we are seeing 
results” (Rubin). The managers and Liaison are also threatening group members, like 
those in the snail husbandry group, to make them work harder. The Coordinator said, 
“We have told them we can take them (snails) back if they are not doing a good job. We 
have with one lady” (Rubin). Increasing the strictness and monitoring done by the 
Wildlife Society further increases their role in management, rather than building the 
capacity o f the groups to self regulate, or to be accountable to the project committee. 
Converse to this, both the Enterprise Coordinator and Project Manager said these 
elements were lacking in all the enterprise groups. Yet they are implementing more 
controlling measures without realizing their undermining effects.
Successful Project Elements Built Through Greater Villager Participation:
The previous sections provided examples and discussion highlighting the 
dominant roles played by chiefs and especially by wildlife managers, which painted a 
grim picture o f this initiative. However, there were several successfiil elements of this 
initiative not present in the other two, most significantly downward accountability of 
chiefs and managers, and different forms o f adaptive management. The following 
sections illustrate that the keys to success in these areas was broader village participation 
that built upon local capacity. Ironically those were among the core objectives of this 
project.
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Downward Accountability Through Village Meetings: Despite the limited
representation and scripted nature of the majority o f the ceremonial project meetings 
between the wildlife managers and chiefs, there was also a high level of participation at 
the end between the chiefs, managers, and villagers at large. This dialogue between 
villagers and chiefs on the project committee represents a form of downward 
accountability where the chiefs were held responsible to the village population by 
spontaneously responding to questions about project decisions and activities.
The following are examples of this from a project committee meeting. At the end 
of one meeting a man shouted out a question about the amount o f money each family 
would receive and the duration of payments. He argued that he could be making more by 
farming his land than tourism was generating. Another man complained that the village 
youth were not participating enough in communal labor. The chiefs replied to both of 
these comments. First, one Chief said that he had also donated lands that could be 
harvested and farmed for more than this payment, but that he accepts this immediate loss 
for the good of the project. Another Chief replied that the youth missing communal labor 
would be fined. (Observations of project committee) Although the youth that asked 
these questions were not empowered, their participation in village meetings forced the 
chiefs and wildlife managers to present and defend their decisions publicly. It also 
allowed them to ask questions directly, rather than going through their project committee 
representative. Therefore, village meetings held the village and project representatives 
accountable to their sociocultural and professional roles o f representing broader village 
interests.
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Women also participated in the project meeting open discussion period. Two 
women spoke up to illustrate the benefits o f the project and propose changes in village 
hunting behavior. The first woman said that men need to stop hunting because it is not 
honest to be paid by the project to develop business alternatives to hunting, but continue 
to hunt. She said it would take more family pressure from hunter’s wives for them to 
stop, “We know when they leave, where they are going” (village woman 1). She also 
mentioned how the palm oil processing mill has decreased the labor required to make oil 
by saying, “You do not hear people pounding to make oil anymore. We are benefiting!” 
(village woman 1) A second woman said she has been preparing food for tourists to 
make money. She said, motioning towards me, “some even speak Ewe (local language)” 
(village woman 2), which generated a cheer and laughter among the village. Besides 
holding leaders accountable, the village meeting dialogue allowed non-decision makers 
to voice their concerns about other interest groups besides chiefs and wildlife managers. 
This provided another form o f intercommunity regulation.
Building Internal Capacity fo r  Enterprise Success: The palm oil group showed 
the most promise in both collective sales by increasing production of a traditional product 
and regulation of productivity as a new, non-family based group. Unlike the soap, gari, 
and honey groups, this group succeeded because it achieved self regulation and internal 
decision making. The others relied more heavily on the wildlife managers. This is the 
only group that has not lost any of its original members, all women. However, gender 
was not the reason for this, as other women’s groups like soap and gari making failed 
alongside men’s groups. The oil group uses a mix of strategies: bulk group sales to 
increase profitability and decrease transport costs along with traditional, individual labor.
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The amounts of oil produced per group, by each individual, are internally regulated 
because of how the large group is structured according to traditional norms. The forty 
member group is divided into four, ten woman teams. These teams buy palm nuts at the 
regional market together where prices are low. Each individual woman within the small 
groups is responsible for producing oil for her portion of the nuts. If  a woman produces 
less oil with the same quantity of nuts than her group members, or one group produces 
less than the other groups, they have to make up the difference by purchasing and 
transforming more personally. They succeed in internal decision making also because of 
the small group organization. The group President said the organization allows her to 
consult with the other small group leaders to make decisions based on input from all four 
groups without having to hold unproductive large group meetings (Oil President).
Bottom-up Guide Monitoring o f  Enterprise Activities: The guides also led
small-scale enterprise activities. As leaders o f the groups they play an important 
education and monitoring role as local citizen participants rather than the Wildlife 
Society enterprise manager or the village-project liaison. Because of their close contact 
and daily exposure training with Wildlife Society managers the guides knew great detail 
on all the enterprise activities. They frequently monitored bee hives, gari production, oil 
making, and snail raising group members. In contrast to the way the Project Liaison 
visited enterprise group members, the guides monitored them as non-chief villagers 
integrated with other enterprise group members, by walking from house to house and 
spending time demonstrating techniques for the group members (observations of guides). 
By taking time to answer their questions, the guides encouraged group members to
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participate more than top-down monitoring from the liaison or Wildlife Society managers 
that utilized control and fear to motivate.
Non-Project Enterprise Activities by Villagers: In contrast to the Wildlife
Society heavy handed adaptations to group enterprise activities previously described, 
some villagers are creating individual projects based on the activities o f the groups. A 
leader o f one honey group said that since he harvested honey from his first three hives 
other people not in the bee group have become interested in beekeeping, “Some have 
even built their own hives apart from the project groups” (Mancredo). Like the 
comments made about groups ‘not working’, this shows that villagers do want alternative 
enterprise activities, but are unwilling to work under the project’s conditions. These 
could ultimately be seen as positive developments resulting from the project, i.e. villagers 
taking matters into their own hands. However, fear of Wildlife Society control certainly 
was not the intended method o f the enterprise plan to develop enterprises separate from 
the project.
Reform Project Management Committee: The Project Manager said he would
like to model the project committee and enterprise groups after the steering committee 
from Ahor, the one non-Gbledi village in the Afadjato project. The Ahor Steering 
Committee was formed and supplied by the Ghana Fire Service as a local bushfire 
fighting team. Similar committees were formed in villages across Ghana to allow 
villagers to control bushfires during the dry season, like the historical fire of 1983 that 
devastated the cash crops of the Gbledi landowners that the village chiefs discussed. The 
Project Manager said the past successes of the members of the Ahor Committee working 
together makes volunteerism, planning, and activity follow through high (Edem).
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Therefore, this committee had high pre-existing capacity that he would like the project 
committee and enterprise groups to emulate it.
Summary: This case shows examples of community conservation designed by a
national level NGO. This design strategy achieved certain planning and decision goals 
through the broad-based committee to represent village interests. However, the social 
norms of traditional authority decision making and village expectations of external aid 
reasserted project control with the chiefs and wildlife managers. The dominance of these 
two decision making groups resulted in several shortcomings related to limited local 
ownership and capacity building. However, the examples o f adaptive management that 
have started to emerge demonstrate that the opposite o f this may be more beneficial to 
creating village self regulation, representation, and ownership of project activities. 
Success, therefore, relies on chiefs and wildlife managers using their power to require 
themselves and other village and activity representatives to fully discuss and negotiate 
project details.
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Chapter 7 Competing Forest Values and Benefits of Participation
The previous results chapter looked at the results of representation, 
empowerment, and capacity, which focused on the effects o f how participatory 
conservation was approached, through what processes, and by what actors. This chapter 
looks at how, through different activities, each project afforded local actors benefits to 
achieve its conservation values. These activities included and benefited segments o f the 
local populations differentially, which created conflicts. As a result o f these conflicts, 
benefits fi*om most activities did not enhance the conservation values as they were 
intended. Therefore, this chapter describes the conflicts created by each initiative’s 
activities between actors concerning the inequitable distribution of their benefits. The 
following two paragraphs provide an overview of the values, activities, and benefits 
(Figure 21) explored in this section. This overview is followed by sections analyzing 
each initiative in greater detail.
The villagers and managers sampled in these three cases recognized six values 
regarding the use of forests: agroforestry use values, tourism use values, preservation 
values for ecological and spiritual forest qualities, conversion o f forest to non-forest 
farming values, safety net resource use values, and opportunistic resource use values 
(Figure 21). These values were promoted differently through each projects’ schemes o f 
activities. The first two values, agroforestry use and ecotourism use, were directly 
promoted in each o f the three initiatives’ primary activities: reforestation via agroforestry 
(Missahoe), waterfall-based ecotourism (Agumatsa), and small-scale enterprise 
development with hiking-based ecotourism (Afadjato). The projects designed these 
activities to provide benefits in conjunction with different types of conservation. This
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chapter demonstrates that the benefits derived through these activities differentially 
benefited actors in each project. In all three projects, older villagers, particularly 
landowners and chiefs, received large amounts o f direct benefits, while youth received 
smaller amounts that also required greater costs, such as labor and time investments or 
the loss of other activities.
Figure 21. Overview of Values, Activities, and Benefits.
Values:
Agroforestry
Activities:
Reforestation, cash crop production, 
fuel wood collection
Benefits:
Harvests for land 
users and landowners
Spiritual Ceremonies, sacred areas, shrines Cultural, historical 
preservation
Tourism Guiding, trail maintenance, gift 
sales, food and lodging
Fee Collection and 
distribution
Preservation Exclusion, border patrol, 
monitoring use
Compensation to 
landowners
Opportunistic Use Hunting and other NTFP* collection Meat, social capital
Safety Net Use Charcoal making Immediate income
Alternative Income 
Projects
Animal husbandry, value added 
processing
Long-term income
* NTFP = non timber forest products, like mushrooms, medicines, wild honey, peper, etc...
The preservation value inwall three initiatives was promoted through exclusion of 
use that converted forest into farmland and savanna, i.e. cutting and burning forests for 
their timber, charcoal, or non-tree food crops. The projects justified limiting these 
activities and decreasing their benefits based on the new benefits provided through their 
primary agroforestry, ecotourism, and enterprise development activities. However, this 
chapter demonstrates that the promotion of other forest values through the projects’
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primary activities and restrictions did not decrease forest conversion activities. These 
conversion activities, which were antithetical to the projects’ forest values and 
conservation goals, continued because they were done by youth that did not receive 
benefits from the primary activities, and those that did receive direct benefits did not 
restrict the youth conversion activities. Safety net and opportunistic forest values were 
also restricted in the three initiatives in conjunction with the conversion of forests, even 
though activities of these types, like hunting and fuelwood collection, could feasibly 
occur in harmony with agroforestry and tourism forest use. However, like conversion of 
forests these activities were continued by those not receiving benefits and not restricted 
by those receiving benefits.
Foret Classee de Missahoe
The Ministry controlled organization of this initiative clearly favored agroforestry 
use values and preservation of natural forest values through reforestation, enforcement 
and monitoring activities. Groups benefited differentially from these activities. 
Landowners benefited directly from reforestation payments for growing, transplanting 
and caring for trees on their lands, and stood to profit in the long-term from the value of 
the mature trees. Additionally, landowners benefited from the legitimization o f their 
tenant farming relations in Missahoe and protection o f their lands through monitoring 
activities. Finally, landowners did not incur any costs from other project activities.
In contrast to landowners, youth and tenant farmers benefited less from project 
activities. Youth benefited directly only from growing and transplanting project trees. 
Project activities also created direct and indirect costs for youth, like their unpaid time
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and efforts in monitoring activities and lost tourism value due to increased cultivation 
respectively. Tenant farmers benefited only indirectly from the project by legitimately 
growing food crops in Missahoe. In addition, this initiative organized mushroom farming 
and tree raising income generating activities as alternatives to forest use among youth and 
landowners. However, these income activities excluded tenants and were not desirable to 
most villagers because of their difficulty and low profitability.
Figure 22. Differential Benefits to Landowners, Youth, and Tenants in Missahoe.
Landowners: Youth: Tenants:
Reforestation Payments Reforestation Payments (direct cost)*
Mature Tree Value (no cost) (no cost)
Agroforestry Income (indirect cost) (direct cost)
Monitoring (direct cost) (direct cost)
(no cost) (indirect cost) Food Crops
Alternative Income (indirect cost) (indirect cost)
* Direct costs are those that are incurred because of the efforts spent providing benefits for others. Indirect costs are the cost of 
decreased value or lost opportunity. No cost indicates an independent benefit for another group.
Therefore, landowners cumulatively benefited more than youth and tenants, and often 
benefited at the cost of youth and tenants (Figure 22). Additionally, youth and tenants 
were aware that landowners incurred no costs from the project. These issues created 
conflicts that decreased youth and tenant incentives to participate. These ideas and 
evidence supporting these interpretations are developed in greater detail in the sections 
below that flow in the order o f Figure 22, from landowner benefits to youth and tenant 
benefits and costs.
Benefits o f  Asroforestrv: This initiative focused on agroforestry as a means of
preparing previously cut lands for reforestation and indirectly addressing illegal 
activities. This method planted and maintained seedlings within coffee or food crops
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until the trees established themselves. One of the Guides from Konda showed me an area 
planted with a mixture o f timber species:
We came to a farm along the trail in Missahoe. I asked if  farming was allowed. 
He said it was one of the reforestation areas and pointed out several dozen small 
Frake, Acajou, Erico, and other common timber reforestation trees. It was also 
being farmed with a scattering of coffee and manioc. He said “while the trees are 
small they farm, until they reach a certain height, then farming is not allowed. 
While there is farming, it is clean and the trees grow rapidly.” (Notes from 
Awube)
Therefore, in this case the landowner was benefiting directly from the trees that had been 
planted on their land in two ways. The trees were a cash crop in the long term, while in 
the short term, until the trees reached a certain height, the coffee and food crops that were 
simultaneously being grown.
Landowners and youth directly benefited from agroforestry through wage labor. 
The Committee President in Konda said that his group included nine committee members 
and thirteen village youth, all Ewe residents o f Konda (Paulin). For each tree the group 
produced in their nursery 40CFA (African Francs) were deposited into their group 
account and, “Divided by the total number of man hours. All members present were paid 
for their time including laborers and leaders” (Paulin). The Committee leaders in Adame 
echoed this saying they established, “A group account, which is divided among the 
laborers” (Adame Committee). Additional sums of 50CFA per tree were paid to youth 
for transplanting and 70CFA per tree to landowners for caring for the trees (Paulin).
These benefits sufficiently motivated youth and landowners to participate in reforestation 
activities.
These results of these benefits were the successful growth and transplanting of 
trees in many areas of Missahoe. The Ministry Chief and Konda Committee President
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described this method of reforestation on Konda farms as major accomplishments (Efako, 
Paulin). The farms I visited in these areas held trees planted during the initiative that 
displayed high survival and growth rates (Observations). These were the farms where 
Konda farmers have pseudo-landowner status and thus control land use decisions, 
harvests, and benefited directly from project funds. Therefore, the agroforestry activities 
and benefits were successful when land use was stable, i.e. controlled by one party or all 
parties involved benefited directly. However, these conditions were unique to Konda 
Missahoe lands, while results were less successful on Tokpli lands where tenant farmers 
that did not benefit directly were more heavily relied upon.
Costs o f  Youth Employment Benefits: The previous section described that the
direct benefits for non-landowners were youth employment in agroforestry activities. 
However, benefits to youth through employment did not generate the social capital 
benefits normally received through communal labor. Additionally, youth employment 
did not coincide with the design of the project for their activities to be regulated by 
traditional authority. Since they were being paid to participate, it was not considered to 
be communal labor and could not be controlled by the chief.
First, communal labor activities are valued by the general local population. 
Providing services like road maintenance and school construction provides village youth 
with social capital benefits. Unlike communally valued activities, youth reforestation 
efforts on individual landowner parcels in Missahoe were not activities with wide public 
value and support. Other forms of employment, such as store keepers, market sales, 
butchers, and taxi drivers provide social capital as well, in that villagers depend on them 
for their services and pay for them based on quality. The reforestation employment did
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not provide these benefits either. This decreased the efforts youth were willing to put 
into the reforestation activities. For example, in an interview a tenant farmer described 
all the work he had done to prepare one of the reforestation sites by establishing a coffee 
farm for his landowner. Adjacent to this field were others that were overgrown with 
weeds that had not been reforested. He said the committees did not plant trees in these 
fields where he had not planted coffee because they were “too lazy” to weed themselves. 
(Koffi 2) Therefore, youth did not receive the social capital fi*om employment in 
agroforestry activities that communal labor provides, which decreased the extent o f their 
activities.
Second, employment is not controlled by traditional authority in the way 
communal labor is. Chiefs have the social power to call youth to work on communal 
labor days, define tasks, and punish those that do not participate (observations o f chiefs). 
Typical communal labor activities include maintaining roads, public open spaces, soccer 
fields and schools. However, this is not the case when materials are being produced for 
sale or used for personal, rather than communal benefit, as was the case with the trees 
that were produced for sale to the project and were planted on individual landowners’ 
properties. In such personal cases, the land or business owner has to hire laborers and is 
responsible for their regulation. Since youth were employed by the project, rather than 
working for the village, they had no social duties to the Village Chief. This decreased the 
already weak capacity of chiefs to play an authority role to support the village 
committees, which carried over into chiefs having no power to assign mandatory youth 
labor on boundary maintenance and monitoring activities.
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Asroforestry Costs for Tourism Preservation: Guides supported the preservation
aspects o f the initiative, but not the agroforestry activities because they felt contributed to 
continued use values. On hikes with the guides they pointed out the examples of food 
crops being grown without reforestation trees (Awube, Dieu Donne). A guide explained 
that they wanted to have Missahoe to take tourists to see the unique natural forest. He 
said that there were plenty of farms with coffee, cocoa and other crops outside Missahoe 
where tourists could see agroforestry, but there should also be a protected place without 
use (Dieu Donne). Because of this he is against coffee and cocoa being grown in 
Missahoe and manages a portion of his family lands as strictly natural forest to take 
tourists (Dieu Donne). This was primarily for his economic interests to have a more 
diverse and attractive tourism venue. However, these feelings were also tied to the values 
that made them want to be tourism guides in the first place. The guides grieved the loss 
of the Missahoe forest they grew up with, “I can remember back to my childhood 
memories, around 1984, there was darkness here. Some places you couldn’t see” 
(Awube). The guides could have been an asset to the project for monitoring forest 
access, but their disenchantment with the use activities promoted by the project decreased 
their perception of employment benefits and prevented their participation in monitoring.
Tenant Farmer Agro vs. Forestry Benefits: In contrast to the Konda farms that showed 
successful reforestation results, reforestation on tenant farms succeeded in varying 
degrees depending on how individual tenants managed their fields. As previously 
discussed, land use agreements between landowners and tenants within Missahoe 
encompassed only coffee production. Besides growing coffee to satisfy this agreement, 
land use on tenant farms did not comply with the reforestation goals o f the project.
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When I visited tenant farms, they showed me fields with results similar to 
landowners with a variety of project trees planted among young coffee. However, in 
other fields coffee grew in the sparse shade of avocado monocultures with no 
reforestation trees planted among them. Fields with food crops produced by tenants for 
their own profit were well maintained and contained no project trees, although 
theoretically these areas were all designated by the project plan for reforestation. The 
surface area cultivated in food crops was greater than agroforestry coffee in all of the 
tenant farms. Therefore, on the most compliant tenant farms, only one third to half of 
their lands were managed for reforestation (Observations o f tenant farms).
Tenant farmers gave personal reasons for the inconsistencies in reforestation 
between their agroforestry coffee fields and food crops grown in full sunlight. One 
tenant said he did not see Missahoe as his permanent home. He was trying to make 
enough money, by selling food crops like com and yams, to build a house in Adame, the 
nearby village, or Kpalime, the subregional capital (Koffi 2). His long-term aspiration is 
to be an elementary school teacher. He studied to get his BAG (diploma) to become 
eligible for teaching and was given an offer in a nearby village. However, the salary he 
was offered was not enough to support his family. He decided instead to farm in 
Missahoe until he saves enough to build a permanent house in the village and then 
become a teacher. Therefore, he is exploiting the short-term production potential o f the 
lands not in coffee production and is not concerned with the long-term agroforestry and 
reforestation goals o f his landowner and the project.
Similarly, another tenant had a small amount o f reforested fields planted with 
coffee, while the majority of his land area was planted in com and yams. He said this
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was because when the project started he had just arrived in Missahoe from living in the 
neighboring village, Adame. He had not yet established his compound and reserved the 
areas planted with com for his house and food crops when the committees came to 
transplant trees (Emanuel Jr.). His decision of where to have space to grow food crops 
was favored over reforestation. On a different tenant’s lands, reforestation trees were 
only present along the trails to and from his fields because his fields had been cut and 
burned to plant yams and manioc (Emanuel). Therefore, the personal household values 
of this individual tenant superseded the project goals. Although the landowner’s values 
coincided with the project, the tenant’s values did not.
Tenant Perceptions o f  Landowner ‘‘De ” and ''Re ” Forestation Benefits: During
interviews both tenants and guides pointed out that landowners were benefiting the most 
from the project. In a discussion over why one tenant had established a coffee farm in its 
particular location, he said it was an area cut during the early 1990s political crisis (Koffi 
2). Therefore, he did not have to invest the time and labor in clearing the forest. This 
also meant that either the landowner had cut that section of the forest, or not defended it 
against cutting during the crisis. This sparked a question from my research assistant 
(Bassan) about that initial forest clearing benefit to the landowners that was now being 
built upon by the project. The tenant agreed that it was the landowners whose lands that 
were deforested, i.e. lands that were not defended by their landowner during the political 
crisis that the project was now focused on. Guides stated that it was landowners 
themselves cutting the forest at that time or, more likely, ordering others to cut the forest 
as laborers (Aswube). The project was now encouraging landowners to employ tenants 
on these lands and benefiting them landowners again through the reforestation payments
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and tenant agreements (Koffi 2). Therefore, since there were no costs to deforestation 
during the crisis, that benefit plus the benefits from the project cumulatively represent 
three levels of landowner benefits. None of these benefits required the landowners to do 
anything to proactively manage the forest.
Continuing in the discussion with the tenant, Bassan half joking said, “Perhaps I 
could become part of the project also (if I cut a section of forest).” The tenant jokingly 
replied, “Yes, but would you made it home before being caught (by the committee)” 
(Koffi 2). He was obviously not serious about being caught by the committee since 
landowners and youth regularly observed illegal activities in the forest. This half serious 
discussion represents how tenants are not willing to defend the landowners’ lands for 
them as part of the project since they would not benefit from doing so. On the other 
hand, cutting more forest and putting it into cultivation would provide them with 
additional benefits, because their landowners were not monitoring them. Therefore, 
despite the multiple benefits from their Missahoe lands, landowners are neither defending 
them against uncontrolled tenant food production, nor illegal use access.
Ministry Non-Ne20tiation ofIllegal Forest Use Activities: The viewpoint of the 
Ministry Chief, the technician in charge of surveillance and control during the initiative, 
was that his team had a project plan to follow that paid for certain activities and banned 
others, and banned activities would simply not be discussed (Efako). Hunting and 
charcoal making commonly occurred in all portions o f Missahoe investigated during the 
study; charcoal was always for sale in Konda and along the Missahoe Road 
(Observations o f Missahoe). Whether or not banned activities were actually occurring 
was not as important to him as the principle that they were illegal. “The plans are there
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for that”, the Ministry Chief said with frustration when I asked him about ongoing 
hunting (Efako). By this he meant that the laws governing hunting existed for the project 
area. Because of that he believed the project had no reason to further consider hunting as 
an issue. In particular, he did not think that villagers should have to benefit from the 
project to abstain from such illegal activities. He said that the reforestation payments 
hindered the project because it established this type of relationship, which discouraged 
voluntary compliance (Efako). This bureaucratic mentality from the Ministry 
compromised the ability to negotiate competing land use values, values that could have 
been complimentary income generation possibilities, like tourism, hunting, and fuel wood 
cutting permits. The following subsections illustrate the values behind hunting and 
charcoal making activities that were not considered because o f Ministry control.
Opportunistic Hunting: Historically, hunting has been a preferred livelihood
in the study areas. The settlement stories o f the Kuma villages all involve hunter 
exploring new forest areas and gradually establishing ownership through use (Adame 
Chiefs). However, hunters said that over-hunting and deforestation in the 1990’s political 
turmoil made hunting an unfeasible primary livelihood (Fiabenu, Bassan). Today 
hunting is an opportunistic activity done in and adjacent to Missahoe when farmers have 
free time from farming activities. Hunting is enjoyed because it is a bonus activity. 
Wildlife is a free resource; the only cost associated with hunting is the time and low 
expense inputs like hand made gunpowder and shot (Fiabenu, Bassan). Hunters, 
particularly Kabye hunters who tenant farm, also enjoy the freedom o f this time versus 
farming, “What I catch from the bush is for me alone, no division” (Bassan). Therefore, 
since hunting occurs at low levels, and relies on forest habitat rather than forest
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conversion, hunting could be considered an official youth benefit that is compatible with 
agroforestry goals. The Ministry could also use these values o f hunting to determine 
what kind o f project benefits could deter hunting activities. However, since the Ministry 
is non-negotiable, hunting continues as an illegal activity in resistance to the project.
Safety Net Charcoal Production: Charcoal makers, who are primarily women,
see charcoal as a free income resource because access to trees in the forest is not limited. 
All farmers have coup-coups and hoes, the essential tools for making charcoal; therefore 
it has no direct start up costs other than the investment o f time. Unlike hunting, charcoal 
making is not a preferred livelihood. It is done when a quick source of income is needed 
or to invest in preferred income generating activities like buying fields o f manioc to 
transform and resell (Charcoal makers). While bushmeat is secretively sold in houses, 
charcoal is openly sold in the market in small quantities for local use as well as large bags 
which taxi drivers purchase to transport and sell in urban markets. The market price for 
charcoal fluctuates more than most products (no competitive price fixing) because 
women are eager to sell. Women were occasionally charged a fee per bag of charcoal 
being sold in the market by the village market revenue collector, a village tax paid to the 
Chief by all women with market stands, unrelated to the Missahoe initiative 
(Observations). The market tax could have been a regulatory mechanism on forest 
conversion, although it would have been difficult to differentiate charcoal made from 
Missahoe wood and the surrounding woodlands. However, since charcoal making was 
non-negotiably illegal, there was no discussion about actual regulatory mechanisms.
Thus, hunting and charcoal making were ignored because the Ministry declared them as 
‘illegal’ activities.
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Project Initiated Small Business Activities: The Ministry initiated a small business tree 
nursery project in Konda to produce traditional tooth brushing sticks (cure-dent), 
Garcinia trees. These are planted by farmers in agroforestry systems and typically 
purchased by market women who cut and transport the wood to their homes to process 
and sell in the regional market (Observations o f Garcinia use). This project was funded 
by the Ministry but was carried out solely by the Konda Committee President. He was 
given supplies to develop a private nursery and purchase the seed collection rights from a 
landowner of a mature Garcinia tree. He sells seedlings in small quantities locally and in 
large quantities to landowners who come from the Maritime Region to buy for plantation 
use (Paulin). His sales have allowed him to expand to producing over 5,000 seedlings 
annually, which he sells for 150-200CFA each. This project has become his primary 
personal livelihood. He said, “They (Ministry) asked for volunteers, but I was the only 
one” (Paulin). Besides this questionable, individual implementation, the tree nursery 
business, intended to increase agroforestry, was not desired by youth or tenants in their 
preferred income strategies. Therefore, this activity was targeted at changing local 
values, not at preexisting values of the local population.
The Ministry also organized mushroom cultivation with village committees. The 
Konda President said they initially had about 50 members who were trained as a group in 
the steps of making compost, treating with mycelium, aging in a dark room, harvesting, 
and drying mushrooms for commercial sale (Paulin). He said they had difficulties with 
the external restaurant market in the capital city, Lome, and the reoccurring cost of 
mycelium. However, the greatest problem he said was group members disliking the 
delicate and precise nature o f the work (Paulin). For these reasons only two youth
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continue to grow mushrooms. The Adame Vice President said that it is a good idea to 
have income coming to the villages, but it needs to be something other than generic 
projects like mushrooms and beekeeping because, “They have tried these and they are not 
profitable” (Aza). Activities such as these are not likely to replace opportunistic and 
safety net resource use, or provide alternative livelihood supplements for tenants because 
of their large time requirements and greater degree of uncertainty. These are risky 
alternatives that rely heavily on non-local markets. Besides time and profitability, these 
activities are not as desirable to local youth as their other ideas.
Alternative Youth and Tenant Income Ideas and Internal Problems: Both tenants
and guides desired alternative income activity development through the projects. Guides 
said they would like funds for small animal husbandry, like turkeys, goats and sheep, “To 
complement the preservation of the forest” (Dieu Donne). Tenants also wanted 
husbandry fiinds, but to raise animals at their farms in the forest. One tenant described 
the forest as an ideal place for husbandry because it was far from the village to avoid 
common in village problems o f thieves, disease, and that the forest canopy would prevent 
hawks from killing young offspring (Adzo).
I questioned why guides and tenants did not start group husbandry activities 
autonomously from the Ministry since they both seem to be making steady income 
through guiding and crop sales. Tenants replied that internal conflicts between the 
tenants prevented them from working as a group despite their small number and isolated 
location. The six tenant households on adjacent Tsame and Tokpli lands within Missahoe 
are strongly bonded by family. The oldest tenant, Emanuel, had many sons and 
daughters sharing the management o f his lands. One of his sons, Emanuel Jr., had his
175
own farm adjacent to Emanuel. One daughter married another Kabye who established a 
tenant farm and invited his brother to live next to them. These four households, as well 
as the remaining two, relied on Emanuel for leadership. When I organized meetings for 
all tenants to discuss the project together, several individuals replied, “What did the old 
one (Emanuel) say?” or “Will Emanuel be there?” (Koffi 1, Koffi 2).
This displayed their loyalty and cohesiveness. Rather than a possible group 
project foundation, tenants described Emanuel’s leadership as a hindrance to developing 
group business projects (Koffi 2, Emanuel Jr.). Emanuel has a tendency to be dishonest 
and corrupt in group projects, to take unfair proportions o f the produce or default on 
borrowed group funds (Koffi 2, Koffi 1). A guide said that members o f the Guide 
Association also took loans from the group and never repaid them, and that there were 
other internal problems that made it difficult for them to continue group projects as well 
(Dieu Donne). Therefore, strong internal leadership that is not compromised by close 
relationships is required for animal husbandry and other small business projects to 
succeed. Despite their capacity to work together in other ways, such as tenants with field 
labor and guides with partitioning the tourism market, these missing elements make 
income generating activities difficult for them.
Summary: The top-down Ministry design in this case developed activities with direct
benefits for certain agroforestry values. It also restricted activities that provided other 
forest benefits and non-agroforestry values, like opportunistic use and safety net resource 
use. To mitigate the loss o f these activities and benefits the Ministry designed alternative 
income activities. However, these did not provide sufficient benefits to replace non­
agroforestry values. Furthermore, the direct benefits associated with agroforestry did not
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require actors like landowners and tenants to restrict other non-agroforestry land uses, 
including forest conversion by tenants. The main problem in this case was the lack of 
equitable distribution of benefits. Besides landowners all other actors had insufficient 
and undesirable benefits. This demonstrates a case where benefits o f participation were 
not negotiated, which perpetuated open access to forest use.
Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary
Actors in the Agumatsa case discussed forest values as those associated with use 
through included agroforestry, fuel wood collection, bat hunting, and charcoal making 
activities. Non-use values were expressed as wildlife sanctuary preservation, waterfall 
tourism, and education (a combination of wildlife and tourism) activities. The initiation 
o f local participation through the co-management system of this initiative created a shift 
in values from forest use, ecological, and spiritual values to economic values, instigated 
by the focus of the Tourism Management Team on controlling revenue (Figure 23). This 
was most prevalent in conflicts within the village and between management bodies over 
the distribution and use of tourism revenue. TMT supported economic values 
overshadowed landowner agroforestry use values, village supported spiritual values, and 
Ghana Wildlife Division preservation values, because the TMT controlled local decision 
making in favor o f waterfall based tourism. Since villagers, particularly youth, did not 
feel represented by the TMT they did support the emphasis on economic development 
that they would not benefit fi*om.
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Figure 23. Shift to Economic Values in Agumatsa.
Non-Economic and
Non-TMT Values: TMT Economic Values: Resulting Conflicts:
Agroforestry Tourism income generation. Guide employment versus
Spiritual Control o f decision making youth communal labor.
Wildlife and revenue use. Over reliance on tourism
Education Fear o f revenue sharing with revenue.
other interests.
Asroforestrv Use Values: The Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary was historically
managed as a strictly protected area. No harvesting o f any resources within the sanctuary 
are allowed, except for tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, oil palms, and fruit that were 
planted before the establishment of the sanctuary in 1975. Most landowners have 
abandoned their farms within the sanctuary, leaving unmanaged coffee and cocoa mixed 
with regenerated forest in many areas. Other land users continue to bum and farm lands 
bordering the sanctuary. In some places these are encroaching on sanctuary boundaries, 
or creating abrupt edges between forest and fields. The Head GWD Officer said that 
farmers continue to farm illegally inside the sanctuary boundaries because they have no 
other lands (Anthony). This pressure has changed his protection approach from guarding 
all sanctuary boundaries from use to focus on the village sanctuary interface where use is 
most likely to cross the border. This represents the ongoing conflicts between 
preservation and use o f the lands designated for the sanctuary.
Besides the use, non-use conflicts, there are also disputes among landowners and 
the TMT over the amount of compensation for their lost lands. In the co-management 
system landowners receive sixty percent of the TMT fifty seven percent o f tourism 
revenues. However, some landowners continue to bum, farm, and cut along and within 
the sanctuary boundary. The District Assemblyman suggested that disputes over land
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ownership, land use, and compensation could be resolved by surveying the land area and 
defining a fixed value per season to pay the landowners based on estimated crop values, 
“We know the amount o f com an acre can produce.. .how much cassava can be made”, 
rather than paying them a percentage of TMT revenue independent o f actual land use 
value (William). However, the landowner making charcoal on the sanctuary border, 
discussed in the previous chapter, illustrates that land use in one location is linked to 
other land use decisions, and as in the other cases labor for farming activities is often 
done by village youth that would not be compensated through such a landowner payoff 
system. Therefore, a simple calculation based on the area and value of one parcel would 
not necessarily represent the value of discontinuing its use.
Spiritual Forest Values: One of the TMT guides told me how the area that is now
the sanctuary has strong spiritual significance about when the village was settled, “At that 
time the area was very wild. You could not just go in and hunt. People who did  ̂were 
very strong spiritually” (Alfonse). Another guide said the falls has always been a symbol 
of magic and dangerous animals (Emanuel). He said during the Ashanti War, wars that 
halted the western migration of Ewe people, their ancestors took shelter in the falls and 
Ashanti were not brave enough to go after them. Their village locations, surrounding the 
waterfall, symbolize their strength. In the past the villages used the falls for ceremonies, 
but these have been replaced by tourism, such as the Easter Monday holiday (Alfonse). 
More recently the management value of the sanctuary has changed, “It’s not about 
protection or sacredness anymore; it’s about the role o f the government, money, and the 
(Wildlife) Officers duties” (Emanuel). Therefore, the ecotourism values promoted for 
development by the TMT have decreased the spiritual connection to the waterfall.
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Wildlife vs. Tourism Values: The District Assemblyman promoted more developed
tourism use rather than wildlife management. He said, “We are actually too close to the
village to preserve wild animals. It won’t be possible this close to people living”
(William). A comment from one of the tourism guides supported this when he described
the non-environmental ways that Ghanaians recreate at the waterfall as:
Lots o f drinking. People get drunk, swim, then whatever they have prepared they 
share to eat with friends. And they bring their music boxes. It is also very 
common to see lots of fast food.. .people complain about the distance too, that 
there should be a lorry road or motos (motor bikes) allowed in. (Emanuel)
One of the wildlife officers complemented this, “Ghanaian’s idea of tourism is not
compatible with a wildlife sanctuary”, but saw this as a trade-off with the economic value
of tourism revenues, by saying, “but realize that (Easter Monday use levels) is very rare.
It only happens one or two days a year” (Felix). A guide said that in the past there was
more wildlife, like baboons, in the sanctuary, “Now they live further away on the range,
by Afadjato. With all this sound they won’t come back here” (Emanuel). A different
guide said the goal o f the sanctuary should be nature education, not noisy tourism or
traditional use, “Why should we be hassling animals? Nobody is chasing us. Let’s leave
the wildlife” (Alfred). These comments all show the conflicting values of the sanctuary
between wildlife preservation and tourism.
TMT Fear o f  Sharin2 Benefits: The TMT demonstrated aversion to sharing and
negotiating with neighboring village-based activities as well as within the Wli villages. 
When discussing his consulting document on the possible merging of the Agumatsa and 
Afadjato projects, the consultant said, “The environment the project operates in is 
difficult because of how secretive it is. The TMT was absolutely against the Gbledi
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expansion. They feared sharing revenue” (Cleophas). However, it was the TMT that 
originally contacted Ghana Wildlife Society to see if they could assist them in a similar 
way to the Afadjato project (Emanuel). When the Ghana Wildlife Society drafted a plan 
with the two traditional areas grouped into one project (during the initial phase when they 
were trying to increase the size of the forest reserve area), the Chiefs o f Wli immediately 
refused to participate (Chiefs). Historical village and Traditional Area boundary disputes 
also play a role in this divisive attitude (William). This attitude, embodied by the TMT 
existed in all study villages, particularly in small business projects.
The TMT Secretary was skeptical o f my research goal to share information 
between the three initiatives in a workshop. During a TMT meeting to discuss this idea 
he raised many questions about my jurisdiction and the purpose of the workshop. He 
asked, “Are you sure with all this time we are spending with you, the community will 
definitely have a benefit?” (Robert) I replied that in my opinion the other projects have 
more experience with reforestation and small business development activities that 
Agumatsa has attempted with difficulty to establish. I added that if they could benefit 
would depend on how willing they were to communicate with the other projects. This 
type of skepticism presented itself within the project management as well, illustrated by 
the lack of communication between TMT and GWD officers, private decisions made by 
chiefs and elders, meeting protocols, and apathy among youth (see previous chapter for 
more details). The skeptical and secretive, non-power and information sharing behavior 
o f the TMT and chiefs discouraged villagers fi*om supporting their push for economic 
values o f the sanctuary. Villagers, particularly youth, had no reason to believe the TMT 
planned to share the benefits with them.
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TMT Guide Employment vs. Youth Participation: Guides work at the tourism office six
days a week and are paid 200,000 cedis per month (Emanuel). They contested this wage 
as being too low because it does not reflect the guide fee, o f 5,000 cedis per tourist. One 
guide said, “Revenues from the guide fees alone go into the millions per month, but this 
does not go to the guides” (Alfonse). Another guide said that their wages are too low 
because they are not enough to support a family, and guiding consumes too much o f their 
time to allow them enough time to farm (Alfred). The guides’ discontent with their 
salary makes them unwilling to participate in additional activities like reforestation and 
monitoring of sanctuary boundaries (William).
Unlike the low capacity of chiefs in the Missahoe committees, the overwhelming 
power of chiefs on the TMT also does not apply communal labor to manage the sanctuary 
because of the personal income guides and TMT members receive. At the youth meeting 
one of the villagers said, “We do not do communal labor for the sanctuary project 
because there are enough people employed who earn their daily bread from it. If we go 
there is no direct benefit” (Youth Meeting). To remedy this situation, both the District 
Assemblyman and TMT Chairman said that there should be more village employees 
(William, Steven). However, with the current distribution o f revenue percentages, guides 
that are employed feel under compensated. Increasing the number of employees would 
require a change in revenue distribution, which the TMT seems unwilling to consider.
Over-reliance on Sanctuary Funds: All guides would like to be paid more for their 
efforts, but some think the co-management system is better than others for the village as a 
whole. One said, “It is much better now. Before, whenever anything was to be done we
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had to contribute (money)” (Alfonse), while another guide’s comments contradicts this, 
“The village is too used to the money. Before, if  there was something (to be done) we 
would beat the gong-gong and everyone would contribute. Now everyone points to the 
waterfall for financing” (Emanuel). The TMT Chairman described that the fifty-seven 
percent of total project revenues gathered by the TMT are divided as follows: forty 
percent is shared among landowners, ten percent is given to each of the three villages, 
and the final thirty percent is allocated for development projects that directly involve all 
three villages (Steven). He said that little can be done with the ten percent o f revenues 
going to each village because they are too small to make investments (Steven). The 
District Assemblyman thinks this dispute over use of revenue and distribution of 
percentages needs to be addressed by reinvesting in the sanctuary to increase its income 
making potential. In order to do this the village has to be convinced that the profits will 
eventually be used in the broader village good. However, the conflicts between the TMT 
and village make this seem unlikely.
Summary: This case demonstrated tension between the use and non-use wildlife
preservation, forest use, and spiritual values of the sanctuary supported by the Wildlife 
Division and non-TMT members, and the economic tourism values supported by the 
TMT. The TMT focus on tourism development overshadows wildlife and spiritual 
values, and decreases the concern for resolving use conflicts because the focus of tourism 
is on the waterfall rather than the forest. The TMT emphasis on economic development 
in theory will increase the amount o f village benefits through income. However, the non­
transparent history of the TMT makes villagers reluctant to trust their intentions.
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Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area
This case reveals less conflict over forest values and more discussion of how 
benefits from the initiative were distributed to the local population. This project directly 
compensated landowners through revenue sharing and the continuation of agroforestry 
activities in the buffer zone area surrounding the forest reserve (Figure 24). Like the 
Missahoe case, the payments to landowners did not compensate for the direct and indirect 
costs to youth for their lost opportunities on landowner parcels. The project also directly 
benefited a small number of guides through employment. However, the majority o f local 
actors, village youth, benefited from the project through alternative income (small-scale 
enterprise) activities (Figure 24). The directness o f these benefits depended on the 
successfulness o f the different small-scale enterprise activities, which all required large 
investments o f time for uncertain results. In addition, small-scale enterprise activities 
were set up by revolving loans, rather than compensation. Therefore, youth were 
expected to repay the project for their benefits. These issues created conflicts that 
decreased youth motivation to participate.
Figure 24. Differential Benefits For Landowners and Youth in Afadjato.
Landowners: Youth: Others:
Direct compensation (indirect cost) (indirect cost)
for preservation of
forest lands
Buffer zone agroforestry (direct cost) (no cost)
(no cost) Small-scale enterprise (indirect cost)
activities Infrastructure*
* Infrastructure benefits were desired but not supported by the project.
Landowners in particular considered this benefit strategy to be sufficient, while 
others wanted community wide benefits, such as infrastructure, health care, or
184
opportunities rather than income (Figure 24). Despite initiating a community based 
approach, the Wildlife Society primarily saw non-conservation activities and benefits as a 
means to achieving their conservation goals of establishing the forest reserve. Therefore, 
the managers were not critical of the equity of benefit distribution.
Payments for Preservation v .̂ Presentation Per Se: The creation of the Mt. Afadjato 
Reserve was the primary concern o f the Ghana Wildlife Society project manager to fulfill 
the projects conservation mandate (Edem). The reserve was a condition of the Wildlife 
Society project plan for the village to receive the technical and financial assistance o f the 
project. Therefore, the debate over values fi’om a villager’s standpoint was between the 
value of forest use (i.e. no project) and the value of funding and possibilities o f 
development from the initiative for creating the reserve. Thus not use values versus 
direct values of preservation, like ecosystem services. The Ghana Wildlife Society 
coordinator o f small-scale enterprise activities said, “The community has worked on the 
conservation part very well, but they don’t want to see just rainforest. They also want to 
see village development” (Rubin). He described the village perceptions o f the first round 
o f funding for the small-scale enterprise activities as a payoff for cooperating in 
conservation activities, “We (Ghana Wildlife Society) see that people view the first loans 
as a gift to the community for their initiating the project and donating their lands, like a 
payment” (Rubin). Therefore, the benefits o f conservation through the project were the 
incentive for the village to participate, not conservation itself.
Similarly, the reserve area was supported by landowners for its payoff value, “We 
don’t want to climb to the top (to farm). Even digging there to plant trees is difficult.
We would rather market it to have people come and see what Gbledi people have done”
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(Monty). From their perspective any income from the steep forested hillside would be 
better than use since use is too difficult. Another landowners said he would be happy to 
cultivate more cash crops in different places outside the reserve, but would need the 
project to fund him to do this (Aprepsu). Hunting was also banned in the reserve area. 
Most landowners discussed the loss of bushmeat as a protein source, but again said this 
was okay as long as the project provided them enough revenue to buy meat and fish at the 
cold store (Morrty, Aprepsu, Agima IV).
All types o f forest use within the core o f the Mt. Afadjato Nature Reserve were 
restricted; only tourism and other low impact traditional use, like the collection o f wild 
fmits, were allowed. The Ghana Wildlife Society manager said that fhiit harvesting is 
promoted as an educational opportunity to link forest conservation and economic activity 
because many of the fruits grow only in non-bumed forests (Edem). Landowners said 
that they could collect one head load of dead wood from the reserve, but only for home 
use (Agima IV, Aprepsu).
Landowner Buffer Zone Use Benefits: Outside of the core area, this initiative
established a buffer zone between the village lowlands and the forested mountainside. 
This sloping land is cultivated with agroforestry systems including coffee, cocoa, kola, 
oil palm, banana, citrus, mango, avocado, pineapple, and other locally named fruits 
(Morrty), Ghana Wildlife Society has organized tree planting in this zone with fast 
growing leguminous species and economically valuable trees (Edem). This buffer land 
use is partially consistent with traditional forest land use; however, it focuses on the late 
stage of the agroforestry cycle and does not allow the cutting and burning cycle used to 
achieve this. Therefore, in the long run this buffer will become more like the reserve.
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This may be acceptable for the landowners who are continually paid a percent o f tourism 
revenues, but this would not account for the lost opportunities for youth food production 
in the traditional agroforestry system.
Typical agroforestry use occurred just outside the buffer zone. In one o f these 
areas the landowner granted use rights to a section of forest to his nephew. The nephew 
cut and burned the forest. The wood from the trees was used to make charcoal or saved 
for household use based on its quality for coal making. After burning, the land was 
immediately cultivated with com. Following the com harvest, the land was used to 
produce cassava while simultaneously being planted with oil palms, plantains, and other 
valuable fruit trees. In this arrangement, the nephew profited from the majority of the 
initial produce, the charcoal, com, and cassava, and the landowner established a farm of 
long-term cash crops. Following this the farm would exist as a tree farm for 
approximately ten years, providing annual palm nut harvests, until the trees were mature 
and cut down to make palm wine (Honoue). Other landowners described this three year 
cash crop development, agroforestry cycle as well (Morrty, Mancredo).
The initiative allowed continued use of farms previously established in the buffer 
zone, but no new cutting and buming for food crops that was part of the establishment of 
the fields. Therefore, this only recognizes the landowner end o f the lost value of use.
One landowner said, “The young men not advanced in education need the land. The land 
is not growing; the population is” (Agima IV). Landowners are also large beneficiaries 
in the tourism revenue sharing percentage scheme: 50% landowners, 20% Project 
Management Committee, 15% community, 10% traditional authorities, and 5% District 
Assembly (Edem). The youth, on the other hand, were expected to benefit from the
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initiative through participation in small-scale enterprise activities. Their desire to 
continue farming livelihoods led to the small-scale enterprise farming groups that failed 
largely because they were forced to organize into groups. One of the snail group 
members said he is more interested in expanding his plantain production because there is 
always a good local market for them. However, he is a member of the snail group 
because that is what is available through the project’s small-scale enterprise activities 
(Marseilles). The small-scale enterprise Coordinator said, “We are less interested in 
farming projects. We know all over Ghana that farmers don’t pay loans” (Rubin). In 
other words the project is benefiting landowners, but not appropriately compensating 
youth.
Youth Small-Scale Enterprise Benefits: Enterprise activities were valued by their
members differently according to the perceived successfulness and actual amounts of 
benefit from the activities. There were several keys to successful small-scale enterprise 
activities in providing local benefits. One of these characteristics was efficiency. 
Members of the beekeeping group described the efficiency o f the hives and extraction 
design for producing large amounts o f high quality honey (Isaac, Mancredo). However, 
there are many designs o f bee hives and extractors to choose from in the apiculture field. 
Unlike more intricate hive models and centrifuge extractors used by beekeepers across 
the border in Togo, the hives and press style extractor used by the Afadjato bee groups 
were less tedious to construct and use, yet still much more efficient than traditional wild 
honey harvesting. (Observations of beekeeping) The President of the oil group also said 
efficiency o f labor was a benefit to their activity, “(The mill) takes only two minutes per
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headpan (of palm nuts), instead of pounding them” (Oil President). Therefore, activities 
that were efficient were higher valued more by group members.
Another similar key was the extent that the small-scale enterprise activities could 
integrate into other livelihood activities, particularly farming o f food crops. A member of 
one of the beekeeping groups said their activities will be lucrative, not as a livelihood in 
itself, but as part of fruit harvesting, tourism revenue, and other alternative income 
activities like fruit collection and animal husbandry (Mancredo). Palm oil processing 
also integrated well with the farming calendar. The President of the group described that 
the peak fruiting season for oil palms to make red palm oil is between the planting and 
harvest seasons for com and yams. Additionally, the inner kernels used to make clear oil 
can be saved and transformed during the dry season when there are few farming 
opportunities (Oil President).
By not conflicting with existing activities, successful small-scale enterprise 
projects were additional income rather than substitution income. However, increasing the 
efficiency and popularity of clear oil production through group sales could substitute for 
other traditional safety net resource uses like charcoal making, since it requires little 
initial investment and can be done at any time with a secure market. An example o f this 
was the oil making group, which capitalized on selling oil as a group to reduce 
transportation costs and sell at a higher price in the regional market. Private oil makers 
said they sold their oil locally for 500 cedis less per liter than the regional price because 
they would each spend more than that amount in travel and food (Private business 
women). An increase in profitability such as this could be enough for charcoal makers to
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switch to palm oil production, especially considering its increased efficiency, as a safety 
net income activity.
Costs o f  Small-Scale Enterprise Benefits: One o f the oil group members said she did
not like the way profits from oil making were not reinvested in making more oil. She
felt forced to use her oil income for everyday living expenses rather than saving it,
“When you only make ten or twelve bottles (of oil), that only pays for school fees, fish,
sauce, and it is finished. Not enough to buy more palms” (Oil member). She thought if
more profits were invested initially or reinvested, they could profit more, “We should be
making oil everyday because we have the machines” (Oil member). Since oil making
was not profitable enough to cover her household expenses, she did not consider it to be a
successful enterprise.
A member of the snail husbandry small-scale enterprise says the villagers have
unrealistic expectations o f the alternative income activities:
The question o f funds being insufficient is something different. People expect to 
work for a year and get something right away rather than pay back loans and 
slowly develop something over several seasons. (Marseilles)
Therefore, he thinks the enterprise benefits are not being realized fast enough. He
realizes the potential of small-scale enterprise activities to alleviate stress on the
household budget, but not to be substitute livelihood activities. However, he was
discouraged by what he saw as a large amount o f responsibility the youth have to take on
to make the small-scale enterprise projects succeed. He said he would rather be a slave
than have so much uncertainty:
I would like to have the chance to be like that (a slave).. .Have a job to go to 
everyday.. .Come home to a house kept up for my family. If  we have a health 
problem they (project owners) will look after us (Marseilles).
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People do not want to invest their time in insecure benefits, such as those associated with 
working in groups, external markets, and new products that require new skills, like many 
of the small-scale enterprise activities. If  they do take such a risk, they would like the 
benefits to be enough to support them, not just supplement their current workload.
Infrastructure Benefits vs. Income Benefits: Actors discussed other desired benefits
besides enterprise development that could have been viewed as more traditional
development benefits than the difficult small-scale enterprise approach to building village
capacity through group activities with loans to repay and high uncertainty. A landowner
said he would prefer “Some construction. There’s not much to see here (from the
project). Other projects build school blocks and pay school fees for primary school”
(Aprepsu). Another project committee member supported the long-term benefits that
infrastructure could provide:
When I was a kid I went to Senior Secondary (School) in Hohoe. Now because 
of our work our kids can go here at the Senior Sec that we got funding for through 
the Japanese Embassy and built. But if  projects don’t benefit today (like schools) 
people are going to say they aren’t good. People here want something that 
benefits today, not the future. (Marseilles)
By this comment he means that people want enterprise developments from the project
because long-term infrastructure benefits are not direct enough. The youth representative
said he thinks having a youth center built would encourage the youth to organize for all
kinds of activities, cultural, music, sports, not just income generating projects (Sasa). He
thinks the loss o f these cultural aspects of village life, caused by the migration of youth to
urban areas in search o f employment, have just as much of an impact on the quality o f
village life as the lack of job opportunities. The Paramount Chief said that some o f the
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greatest needs for the village are road improvements and erosion control to facilitate 
transportation, and village latrines to solve sanitation problems (Togbega). Chiefs also 
said a gravity fed water system was a village wide priority because the village population 
exceeds the current borehole pumps that continually break down (Chiefs). However, the 
Wildlife Society project plan determined that enterprise development would be the 
economic benefits component o f the project for the community. These comments 
demonstrate that the enterprise activities did not satisfy other local values.
Summary: The motivation for villagers to participate in this initiative was primarily
for economic benefits. Likewise, the Wildlife Society viewed benefits as means to 
achieve conservation. However, the project did not adequately consider the 
disproportionate distribution of benefits. This project divided benefits between directly 
compensating landowners for restricting their use activities on forested lands and creating 
benefits for youth through alternative small-scale enterprise activities. Like the previous 
cases this resulted in landowners receiving greater amounts o f benefits for less effort, 
while youth were required to invest themselves to receive insufficient benefits.
Summary and Discussion
Actors from all three initiatives displayed diverse forest use and non-use values 
and low capacity to negotiate them. This appears to be a result of competitive 
organizational structures, i.e. certain groups not wanting to share benefits with others, 
which was enhanced by each project’s focus on one primary benefiting scheme. Even in 
the Afadjato case, where agroforestry use, tourism, and alternative income sources were 
promoted, their distributions of benefits were disproportionate. Agroforestry benefited a
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small number o f older landowners and tourism activities provided jobs for eight guides, 
while the majority (one Project Management Committee member estimated 80%) of 
youth were benefited through the small-scale enterprise program. However, the benefits 
from enterprise activities were low, required large time investments, and their benefits 
were uncertain. Similarly, the limited benefits of reforestation in Missahoe and tourism 
in Agumatsa could not represent the spectrums of values in their local populations.
Benefits fi*om the projects depended on the organization and type of the activities. 
Some activities, like the TMT guides in the Agumatsa case were an example of substitute 
income sources, while tourism income divided amongst the community in the Afadjato 
example was additional income that did not change land use behavior. The enterprise 
income in the Afadjato case showed that to be successful the benefiting activities had to 
coincide with actor’s values, but this does not guarantee more sustainable or beneficial 
outcomes than the original land uses. Despite social and economic studies in the 
Missahoe and Afadjato case, the projects did not critically analyze the associations of 
different types of benefits with positive and negative pre-existing livelihood activities. In 
the Afadjato case, additional income for landowners replaced their desire for bushmeat, 
but additional income that requires ongoing time and material investments like the small- 
scale enterprise activities do not replace safety net resource activities like charcoal 
making.
The projects did not capitalize on the complementary and contrasting potentials of 
values and benefits. Benefiting one group, such as Missahoe landowners via 
reforestation also benefited tenant farmers, but in ways counter to the goals o f the project. 
Benefiting the landowners also created relatively narrow benefits for guides whose
193
preservation values were compatible with the Ministry technicians. For benefits to have 
more widespread influence in promoting desired land uses, they will have to be addressed 
on a larger scale as webs o f interconnected benefits. Local management committees did 
not make project decisions as value and benefit tradeoffs. The projects assumed that 
satisfying the values of one group could exist without negative impacts from another 
group, and that those benefiting would internalize the costs of minimizing conflicting 
benefits from other groups, like hunters.
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations
Looking back at the continuum of participatory conservation described in the 
literature review (Figure 2), the three initiatives display characteristics from the three 
main perspectives o f participatory conservation: protected area outreach (Missahoe—  
Figure 25), co-management (Agumatsa—Figure 26), and community conserved area 
(Afadjato—Figure 27). The previous results chapters described how elements o f 
participation from these perspectives were demonstrated by the projects through their 
distinct reasons and methods of initiating participation, webs o f representation o f local 
interests; and activities to create benefits that reflect local values, which each resulted in 
site specific problems. Although each initiative had site specific characteristics and 
difficulties, the three initiatives displayed similarities relative to participation that 
impeded and facilitated their success. This chapter briefly summarizes the results o f each 
initiative in three figures (25, 26,27) and then discusses the projects’ similarities. With 
regards to their similarities, I make recommendations for participatory conservation 
initiatives.
The results chapters demonstrated that each project failed to accomplish the 
foundational elements o f participation described in the literature review for meeting their 
approach to participatory conservation. Specifically, the Missahoe protected area 
outreach case encountered difficulties through initiation, representation, and 
identification (or distribution or generation?) of benefits, to effectively monitoring and 
enforcing forest use and regulations (Figure 25), which are the foundation to the 
protected area outreach approach. Likewise, co-management in Agumatsa failed to 
create shared decision making and management roles (Figure 26), and the Afadjato
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community conservation approach relied too heavily on external management and 
therefore did not build upon local capacity and create local ovmership (Figure 27), which 
are the foundations of these respective approaches to participatory conservation. 
Therefore, the three cases all displayed distinct problems that prevented the projects from 
achieving their goals.
Through their different goals, organizations, and activities, the initiatives ran into 
distinct problems caused by similarly narrow methods in which participation was 
initiated, differentially represented levels o f interests, and provided insufficient and 
inequitable benefits based on narrow project values. In other words, the distinct 
problems exhibited in each case were the results o f conflicts caused by each initiative’s 
different narrow approach to participatory conservation. Narrow participation initiation 
resulted in assumptions and narrow definitions o f ‘conservation’ and ‘participation’ in all 
three cases. Although the cases designed different forms of representation aimed at 
incorporating multiple local interests, each approach resulted in limited decision making 
and exclusion of other interests. These narrow initiation and limited representation 
processes transferred into activities and benefits that did not satisfy the diversity of local 
populations or the values of the projects.
Therefore, I conclude that at the site level, particular elements o f each approach to 
participatory conservation limited these initiatives. At a general level, I conclude that it 
was the narrowness of the participatory approaches that impeded their successfulness; the 
limited scope in which local participation was incorporated as a step or ingredient, rather 
than a as process throughout the stages of initiative development and implementation. 
Specifically, the projects did not realize or openly identify the conflicts that were created
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by the limited inclusion of multiple parties and perspectives at the local level, and did not 
negotiate through shared decision making processes to resolve these conflicts. Not only 
did this limited inclusion hinder the successfulness o f projects initially, but it has 
prevented the projects from adapting to improve their participatory processes 
incrementally. By adaptation I mean the ability to resolve conflicts that arise during the 
implementation of the initiative due not only to external control, but to differences among 
actors at the local level. The following subsections describe how the three initiatives 
displayed this similar problem among the three themes: initiation, representation, and 
values. Following this, the recommendations section discusses a method of facilitating 
dialogue to include broader perspectives o f participatory conservation and more local 
actors, specifically non-leadership and non-authority figures, to resolve conflicts among 
participatory conservation initiatives that may promote better adaptation to local 
conditions.
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Figure 25. Foret Classée de Missahoe Summary
Initiation: The project ran from 2000-2002 under the control of the Ministry o f 
Forests. The project was initiated to restore Missahoe as a wood producing forest 
after a decade of uncontrolled access for timber harvest, charcoal making, hunting, 
and farming. The international NGO (OIBT) ftmded and technically advised the 
Ministry management team on participatory management techniques. Participation 
was initiated to correct the ineffectiveness of State management, but ultimately to 
achieve the same goals of wood production. Thus, the transition to participatory 
techniques was a top-down means of achieving predetermined conservation goals.
Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity: The initiative created local 
management and protection committees to organize participation in reforestation 
activities. Landowners made up the decision making positions on these committees 
while youth and tenant farmers provided labor for their activities. The interests of 
youth and tenants, therefore, were not represented by the project, which resulted in 
low participation in forest monitoring on their part. Additionally, representation o f 
landowners did not coincide with the diverse forms of land tenure and the distribution 
of forest use, and the designation of chief authority did not recognize their low 
capacity, resulting in ineffective monitoring and enforcement
Values and Benefits: This initiative clearly benefited only the agroforestry values o f 
landowners through payments for reforestation and protection of their lands. 
Agroforestry appeared to benefit tenant farmers as well. However, agroforestry coffee 
production was required of tenants for permission to grow food crops, the basis of 
their livelihood, which was the only way they benefited. Guides valued forest 
preservation* as a way to enhance their ecotourism livelihood, but only benefited from 
the project through temporary employment to grow and transplant seedlings. Because 
of this, guides and tenants engaged in, or did not participate in restricting hunting and 
charcoal making as the project was designed.
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Figure 26. Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary Summary
Initiation: The initiative began in 1998 when village elders formed a Tourism 
Management Team and demanded control of the sanctuary from the Ghana Wildlife 
Division. The TMT was motivated to control tourism revenue that had been going to 
the central government, rather than access to and management of forest resources. 
However, Ghana’s decentralization policy requires devolution of authority from 
central agencies to the District Assembly, a partially elected sub regional government 
body, rather than the village level. Therefore, through negotiations led by the District 
Assembly, the three bodies joined in co-management. This arrangement distributed 
project revenues and management duties between the bodies.
Representation, Capacity, and Empowerment: Although the three body co­
management system was designed to represent the interests of all three management 
bodies, the TMT in particular did not want to share revenues and thus did not 
recognize the roles of the other management bodies and undermined their 
management capacity. These tactics created animosity between management bodies. 
Additionally, the Tourism Management Team was dominated by chief and elder 
decision making, which did not represent village interests, particularly village youth. 
This resulted in resistance towards the TMT from the village as well. The result o f 
these conflicts between management bodies and villagers were ineffective sharing o f 
management decisions and roles.
Values and Benefits: This initiative demonstrated a definite shift from previous 
ecological, spiritual, and agroforestry use values of the Sanctuary towards ecotourism 
based economic values. Although management goals remained in place from the 
preservationist sanctuary goals, all decisions made by the TMT revolved around 
tourism revenue. However, since the TMT did not represent village interests broadly 
and denied sharing control over revenue from tourism, there was weak support for 
tourism and economic values from other villagers. Therefore, village youth resisted 
the TMT by not participating in management activities and by hunting in the 
sanctuary.
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Figure 27. Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Area Summary
Initiation: This project was initiated by a small group of well-off villagers that 
approached the Ghana Wildlife Society, a national level NGO, to provide technical 
and financial assistance to their village to conserve their forested mountainside and 
promote village economic development. The Wildlife Society was familiar with the 
forest area from prior ecological surveys it had conducted on bird diversity. After 
conducting socioeconomic surveys of the village, the Wildlife Society wrote a project 
plan focused on creating a project management committee to oversee the creation o f a 
forest reserve and small-scale enterprise developments, which was funded by the 
Dutch Embassy.
Representation, Capacity, and Empowerment: The Project Management Committee 
included broad-based village representation, within which the wildlife managers and 
village elders were single members. However, due to social norms, these two interest 
groups dominated decision making and management roles, which resulted in activities 
that did not build upon local knowledge and capacity. Therefore, villagers were not 
invested in the project activities and relied heavily on the external support of 
managers and chief decision making when the project encountered difficulties. In 
contrast to the shortcomings of the narrow decisions o f managers and chiefs, activities 
designed through the actions of villagers produced greater participation and success.
Values and Benefits: The focus of actors in this initiative was on economic 
development. Forest conservation and the leadership o f the Wildlife Society were 
seen as the means to acquire funding for the village. However, there were conflicts 
among the village over the types o f economic benefits derived from the project. 
Landowners benefited directly from tourism revenues for the lost farming 
opportunities on their lands, which did not compensate youth. Youth participated in 
enterprise developments that required new skills, large time investments, and 
uncertain benefits. Additionally, income from these activities was supplementary 
rather than replacement income, thus they did not change negative forest use. Finally, 
other villagers desired infrastructure benefits rather than cash from these activities.
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Participation Initiation: Despite their differences in origin, organization and
implementation, each initiative developed similar concepts o f ‘conservation’ and 
‘participation’. In each case conservation was carried out through exclusionary 
techniques such as delimiting boundaries and patrolling to achieve predetermined and 
externally valued conservation goals, like wildlife conservation and reforestation. To 
achieve these conservation goals the initiatives relied heavily on external financing, either 
through project grants or tourism revenue, to motivate participation in project activities.
In other words, because the projects’ conservation goals did not reflect local interests, 
other incentives had to be provided to achieve conservation goals, and receiving benefits, 
in some form of monetary compensation, were the foundation of local participation. In 
Missahoe youth were paid directly per tree to participate in reforestation activities (Figure
25). The management roles o f both the wildlife officers and TMT in Agumatsa were to 
preserve the sanctuary in return for their percentage of the ecotourism revenue (Figure
26). Even in the Afadjato case, the most community controlled, the village donated lands 
for the forest reserve in order to receive funding for economic development activities 
(Figure 27).
Therefore, in all three cases participation was initiated to receive incentives in 
exchange for, or as means to achieve external conservation goals. This compensation for 
participation foundation reified the mentality that participation was not something local 
actors would want to do, that they would need to receive benefits because the project 
activities would not normally be doing them anyway. In other words, local interests were 
not directly incorporated because none of the projects built upon a local desire for forest 
conservation. Since the projects’ conservation goals were not based on local interests.
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the histories o f each area, diversity o f interest groups, actors, and the capacity o f social 
institutions such as traditional authority were not adequately considered. This was 
demonstrated in the Missahoe case by the Ministry’s ignorance of the discrepancies 
between land tenure and land use distribution in the historical use of this forest (Figure 
25). The Agumatsa and Afadjato cases implanted preservation goals and tourism based 
on preservation, in areas historically used for agroforestry, thus requiring local users to 
change their livelihoods rather than changing from within and promoting more effective 
agroforestry and adding value to it with agroforestry tourism (Figures 26 and 27).
In these projects the initiation of local participation, regardless o f its motivation 
and origin, did not result in locally adapted conservation goals, which created conflicts 
among different interests in the local population. However, since these conflicts arose 
through implementation, the real problem is that the projects have not dealt with these 
conflicts to incorporate local interests more appropriately. In other words, even though 
all the project were characterized by what was described as shallow participation in the 
literature review, none identified the need for deeper participation to help negotiate and 
resolve conflicts.
Representation, Empowerment, and Capacity : In writing, each of the projects
established representation and empowerment goals at the village or community level. 
They each based representation on different types of local management committees to 
represent multiple interests and incorporate pre-existing social institutions. The 
Missahoe case showed local committees controlled from above by the Ministry (Figure 
25). Conversely, the TMT in the Agumatsa was controlled locally by Village Chiefs 
(Figure 26). Finally, the Afadjato management committee was divided between NGO
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and Village Chief influence. Despite these differences, each o f the projects favored 
certain interests over others. They all demonstrated narrow decision making by upper 
level traditional authorities or managers. Therefore, these projects did not transfer 
enough power to all levels of interests and representatives and representatives were not 
strongly accountable to their constituencies.
The results o f narrow representation were different in the three cases because each 
case had different goals. In all three cases, however, the lack o f representation 
contributed towards not achieving its goals participatory conservation by creating 
conflicts between interest groups, i.e. those that did not feel represented were not 
motivated to participate in conservation activities. Thus, in the Missahoe protected area 
outreach case, conflicts resulted in ineffective monitoring and enforcement (Figure 25) 
Shared decision making and management roles, were barred by conflicts generated by the 
lack of representation in the Agumatsa case (Figure 26). Low representation in the 
Afadjato case created low local ownership and high reliance on external manager and 
authority figure conflicts (Figure 27).
All these cases demonstrate that the opportunity for self representation in itself is 
not enough to realize broad self representation in circumstances where there is not a 
history of self representation, i.e. where it goes against social norms to have multi-party 
self representation. Therefore, like initiating participation with local legitimacy, broad 
local self representation is something that must be cultivated. In other words, this 
conclusion is that neither building on preexisting local representation (Agumatsa), nor 
creating new types of representation (Missahoe, Afadjato) are adequate in themselves.
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Both need to be actively pursued to create broader participation that is adapted to local 
conditions.
Values and Benefits: For the most part, these projects’ activities and benefits varied 
between employment, revenue sharing, and alternative income projects. Employment 
provided incentive to participate in certain initiative efforts, particularly reforestation in 
Missahoe (Figure 25), and guides in Agumatsa and Afadjato (Figures 26 and 27). 
However, employment and payment for certain activities directly and indirectly limited 
participation in other activities because of the conflicts it created. Employment directly 
limited participation in non-paid activities by actors previously paid to participate, in 
other words, conflicts over what activities were paid for. Employment also created 
conflicts over who was employed, which indirectly limited participation in other 
activities by those not paid at all, most commonly youth that were expected to work on 
the projects as communal labor. Since some youth were paid, others refused to work 
without the same benefits. The duration of employment was also not guaranteed for the 
long-term and depended on external revenue in all cases. Employment also benefited 
only a relatively small number of villagers and was not empowering in these cases 
because it did not coincide with the livelihood values of the villagers, which meant that 
those employed did not benefit through social capital usually gained fi*om providing 
services to other villagers. Therefore, employment stimulated short-term participation in 
certain conservation activities, but also created many conflicts and did not lead to long­
term, sustained participation.
Revenue sharing occurred in the Agumatsa and Afadjato cases based on tourism 
revenue (Figures 26 and 27). In both cases the distribution of revenue was highly
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contested among village interest groups, as well as the specific uses of revenue 
percentages once they were distributed. In both cases, decisions regarding the percentage 
distribution and use were made by upper level villagers like chiefs and landowners that 
dominated the management committees. In Afadjato, revenues were distributed directly 
to landowners and families for unconditional use. This allowed women to invest in 
produce to sell or transform for sale in the market. However, because it was targeted at 
women, this revenue did not change the livelihood activities o f men, particularly hunting 
for bushmeat. In Agumatsa revenue was distributed according to the village management 
committees made up o f village chiefs. The greatest percentage of revenue in this case 
went to landowners, who continued to degrade the reserved areas. The chiefs made 
decisions to increase the income potential o f the project through ecotourism, but also 
controlled how that additional income was used. Since they did not invest the revenue 
jfrom tourism in the village, villagers were skeptical about supporting the project. 
Villagers in both cases were dissatisfied with their system of revenue distribution and 
use. Therefore, revenue sharing did not change the livelihood activities o f actors that 
were engaged in forest extraction activities, as they were designed, and since revenue 
sharing was inequitable it created conflicts that decreased participation in activities like 
forest monitoring.
Alternative income strategies were initiated in the Missahoe and Afadjato cases. 
Unlike the traditional forms o f village representation that were built upon by the projects, 
enterprise activities were based on new products, expert training, external markets, and 
machines, which created conflicts over what activities were created. These cases also 
required that alternative enterprise activities were developed in groups, which was not a
205
social norm in the study area. This created conflicts among group members that hindered 
the development and profitability o f most activities. Conflicts over the slow development 
o f projects, types o f activities encouraged, and amount of time required for uncertain 
activities also discouraged villagers to invest themselves fully in these activities. Without 
local ownership most o f the alternative income activities did not produce substantial 
benefits. Since these activities and benefits were primarily targeted at youth, this meant 
that they did not change youth’s extractive forest use activities.
In all three types of benefits: employment, revenue sharing, and alternative 
income, the projects failed to provide enough incentive for villagers to achieve the goals 
of their distinct approaches participatory conservation. In Missahoe, both youth and 
landowners were paid for their efforts in reforestation, but based on these benefits; 
neither was willing or capable of monitoring and enforcing the protection goals of the 
project (Figure 25). In Agumatsa the TMT members complained that the distribution of 
revenue across the three management bodies and further between the three villages, did 
not allow them to provide benefits to the villages. The Afadjato project provided 
benefits to landowners through tourism revenue while other funds were used to create 
enterprise activities (Figure 27). In this case neither the youth nor landowners felt 
satisfied by their benefits. Therefore, each o f the projects developed problems with 
creating benefits that satisfied no one. Like the shared shortcomings of the previous 
themes, the conflicts over project benefits are symptoms of unresolved discrepancies 
between the projects and diverse interests o f the local populations. In other words it was 
not necessarily the benefits themselves that were problematic, but the results o f people 
feeling they were not party to the negotiation of benefits.
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Recommendations : Despite all the criticism of the three initiatives that I have
discussed in this thesis, I consider each project to be successful in many ways by raising 
the awareness and interest in the conservation o f forests at the local level. Although local 
participation was limited in each case, I witnessed changes in the actors involved in each 
of the projects due to the forms of participation they experienced, even though those 
forms would be labeled shallow from the perspective o f the framework identified in the 
literature review. Before these projects, technical aspects like sylviculture prescriptions, 
boundary delimitation, regulations, monitoring, and revenue were the primary forest 
management concerns, which rested solely with project managers. Throughout the 
projects factors emerged at the local level such as historical use, organization, 
representation, distribution of benefits, and many others that reflect a shift from a wholly 
technocratic approach to a participatory approach. The projects certainly broadened the 
scope of possibility for forest conservation among the actors at each of the study sites.
Never-the-less, the projects have obviously stumbled out of the gates at achieving 
successful participatory conservation, regardless of their different perspectives.
However, all of the projects are in their initial stages; therefore it is possible that what 
appear to be failures presently could turn into greater success over time. I concluded that 
the problems specific to each of the three projects are all rooted conflicts caused by their 
shared, but different narrow focuses on their initiation o f participation and predetermined 
conservation goals; methods of representing diverse local interests through management 
organization; and the benefits that are provided through project activities focused on 
particular forest values. In other words, it is not any particular element from those 
discussed in the review of participatory conservation (Chapter 2) that impedes or
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facilitates success, but the process o f fitting those elements to ever-changing local 
conditions and conflicts, i.e. adapting. Therefore, my main recommendation is that the 
projects need to resolve conflicts by broadening their scope o f possible participatory 
conservation approaches and negotiating the choice o f techniques that are more adapted 
to their circumstances. As a specific example, I recommended at the end of the Missahoe 
section of the Chapter 6 that this initiative would benefit from a co-management 
framework with more empowerment at the local level and shared power with the 
Ministry of Forests. However, because o f the limited definitions of participation and 
conservation in the design of the initiative by higher authorities in the Ministry, the local 
forestry technicians and local committee members were not aware o f alternative types of 
participation. Although this was undoubtedly the result of an underlying desire to retain 
control by the central Togolese government, it was also due to the limitations of the 
protected area management perspective driving the process. Therefore, I think 
approaching participatory conservation projects such as Missahoe at the local level with 
the continuum of alternative strategies would provide the opportunity for greater decision 
making, negotiation, and adaptation processes. Unfortunately the government is a 
definite limiting factor in this case, but that should not prevent resolving conflicts and 
increasing capacity, even if it is something separate from the initiative, at the local level.
To expand on this recommendation I will discuss what I and previous authors see 
as the necessary ingredients for incorporating the type o f adaptability called for in the 
preceding paragraph. The populations in this case, as well as tropical farmers in general, 
historically base their livelihoods on adaptation to changing environmental and economic 
conditions. Farmers in the study area depend on harvesting diverse cash crops to
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compensate for their volatile global markets, and cultivate diverse food crops to guard 
against disease, drought, and soil fertility loss. More specific to these cases, youth in all 
three initiatives adapted their forest use activities, like hunting, to avoid detection by, but 
continue in resistance to the conservation activities. So how can the ability to adapt such 
as these be incorporated into participatory management initiatives? This is not a question 
I have a specific answer for, however the following discussion describes my attempt at 
creating a foundation for adaptation through dialogue among local actors in the final 
conference I facilitated between members of each o f the three projects.
The Afadjato case demonstrated the clearest example o f adaptation in its small 
scale enterprise projects (Figure 27). These activities were initiated with revolving loans 
from the project to village groups. The consensus among managers and group members 
was that the group work method was a primary cause for these projects failing; members 
simply did not work effectively together. With this experience the project managers 
changed the small scale strategy from groups to individuals, as well as implementing 
other technical changes based on initial results of the activities. As previously discussed, 
this adaptation was completely controlled by the Ghana Wildlife Society managers, but 
never-the-less represents the type of trial and error, incremental development that the 
projects need to apply to all phases of management, not merely alternative income 
strategies, that will gradually adapt the projects to local conditions. For this to happen 
more broadly the projects must have access to what Skutsch (2000) considers the keys to 
adaptation: identify that there is a conflict, have knowledge of alternatives that are 
available, and the pro’s and con’s of alternatives between different interests. In addition 
to this, the actors must have the will and ability to act on decisions that are negotiated.
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The will and ability to participate depends on what Chambers (1994c) describes as 
changes in attitudes and personal behaviors, which he has documented through the use of 
participatory rural appraisal techniques that empower poorer and weaker local actors to 
engage in conservation and development activities.
Creating the conditions for these elements was the impetus for the conference that 
I organized between diverse representatives from the three projects at the end of data 
collection period o f this research project. This conference represents the type o f action 
that I would recommend for project managers, students, or volunteers to foster adaptive 
processes among preexisting participatory conservation projects. During this conference 
small groups of participants from different interest groups in each project (managers, 
landowners, tenants, hunters, tourism guides, women, etc.) worked together to present the 
details o f their project to the conference participants from the other two groups. My 
primary goal was for the participants from each project to realize that there are many 
ways to organize participatory project management and implement different participatory 
activities besides those at work in their project to achieve their goals. Since, according to 
my organization of participatory conservation literature, each of these projects represents 
a different perspective, I created a forum where practical examples from each approach 
could be shared through a dialogue of local project actors. This conference helped each 
project build what Salafsky and Margolois (2002) describe as a “Learning Portfolio”. 
Therefore, this fulfilled the first half of the requirements for adaptation: the need to 
identify conflicts, have knowledge of alternatives, and the pro’s and con’s of them 
between different interest.
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In addition to this objective, the conference also provided the opportunity for the 
practical knowledge of participatory conservation to be generated and shared by the local 
actors themselves. My decision to invite such a diverse group of participants to the 
conference from each group was made based on the other crucial piece of evidence of 
adaptation in the Afadjato case, that non-managers and non-leaders, or common village 
participants, were better at adapting (Figure 27). This is consistent with similar adaptive 
strategies being applied in West African cases, such as the Gestion de Terroir approaches 
in Francophone countries (Painter et al. 1994, Pimbert 2004). Therefore, rather than 
presenting information to project managers, which would have been much easier, the 
conference also targeted villager participants such as youth, tenants, and small enterprise 
group members, to empower them through inclusive methodologies to speak on behalf of 
their conflicts with the project. This coincides with the recommendations of Chambers 
(1994c) and helped to satisfy the second half o f adaptation: the local will and ability to 
act.
This brings up a significant point about this recommendation. Conflict resolution 
and adaptation has the potential to create more effective management because it can 
create projects better fit to local circumstances and facilitate greater participation. At a 
deeper level conflict resolution aims at doing this by creating projects that are more “fair” 
or have goals and activities that are acceptable to more interests (Skutsch 2000). 
Therefore, conflict resolution is a way to create justice in conservation projects. This is 
not merely an idealistic recommendation. It means, for example, that maybe landowners 
in these initiatives should get greater benefits than youth from initiative activities 
because, to follow one possible moral argument, the forests that exist in the project areas
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are there because they did not cut them down. This is obviously too simplistic because I 
have argued previously that it is actually the youth that do or do not cut the forest down. 
However, what this conflict resolution recommendation says is that there needs to be a 
dialogue among local actors about the moral arguments between interests, like 
landowners and youth, a process that is lacking in all three initiatives. Therefore, the type 
of dialogue I am recommending are deliberate discussions o f inclusion of multiple actors 
and interests. In other words, a discussion by local actors concerning the type of 
participatory conservation that is desirable. I do not think that the depth of participation 
is something that should necessarily be shifted completely to the deep end with all power 
and responsibility resting at the local level. In many cases local actors may not be ready 
or willing to take on the responsibilities o f participatory processes and management 
activities. However, these should be conscious decisions made on the basis o f local 
resources and assets, knowledge of alternatives, and discussion including local project 
managers, authorities, and non-authority figures.
In summary, the conclusions o f this study lead me to recommend that these 
initiatives need to be better fit to the characteristics o f their local populations to reduce 
conflict. I believe that for this to happen, the projects need to adapt their current 
strategies. The way I recommend for this to happen is through processes, such as the 
previous conference example, to foster dialogue and agreement among diverse interest 
groups to engage in experimentation with alternative participatory strategies. 
Experimentation among diverse interests requires the situated knowledge of management 
choices among local actors to determine what the best strategies of participatory 
conservation are in their case. Therefore, through this study I recommend the initiation
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of participatory action research among preexisting projects at the site level that focus in 
particular on situating knowledge among non-manager project actors to facilitate broader 
negotiated project activities. Actions such as the conference described could also initiate 
the formation of alliances of participatory conservation projects in regional and national 
settings in countries rich in small-scale conservation efforts that could increase the 
breadth of their collective knowledge, which have also been called for to scale up 
participatory conservation forums (Colchester et al. 2003, Chambers 1994c).
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Appendix A: Interview Guides and Questionnaires 
Project Director Worksheet
(general guide used in all initial manager and some management committee interviews) 
Project Title: Project Headquarters:
What are the boundaries and target populations of the project? Include landmarks, 
surface area, and population characteristics. Draw a map if possible.
Describe the history o f the project. Date started, problems, goals and objectives, project 
initiators, start up binding sources, etc...
What is the leadership and organization of the project? Role o f local, regional, and 
national governments, role o f associations or collaborating organizations, international 
support, etc...
What are the project facilities? What activities do they accommodate? How and when 
were they built?
Who are the stakeholders in the project? Numbers organizations/associations, # of 
employees, # of project beneficiaries, landowners, etc... Include the # of men, women, 
boys and girls if possible.
What are the project’s economic benefits? Include those for the project, village groups, 
and individuals for these three questions.
What are the projects social benefits?
What are the projects environmental benefits?
Estimate the visitation o f the project. Include local, national and international if  possible 
and the purpose of their visits.
What is the future vision for project management? When and how will this occur? What 
changes have taken place already?
Use reverse side to describe project problems and needs.
Village Leader Worksheet
(general guide used in all village leader and some management committee interviews) 
Village: Population:
Describe the history o f the village (founders, settlement, demographic patterns):
What are the village boundaries? Political, traditional, changes in them over time 
etc.. .Draw a village map if possible.
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What are the village ethnic, lingual, or other socially defining groups? Approximately 
what percentages of the population does each make up?
Describe the village government system. Village, traditional area, district, regional, 
national, etc...
What is the village economic situation? Numbers of stores, bars, hotels/guesthouses, 
market, electricity, road condition, housing conditions, etc...
What is the village education situation? Numbers, types, and qualities o f schools, 
teachers, and students.
What are the local village resources? Foods, cash crops, forest products, building 
materials etc... Draw a seasonal calendar if possible.
What are the traditional holidays and celebrations o f the village?
Describe a normal day’s activities for men, women, and children in the village.
Use the reverse side to describe village problems and needs.
Afadjato Community Forest Conservation Worksheet
(More specific guide created for actors in Afadjato case)
Describe how the project was imagined, researched, planned, written, etc...(Explain the 
general ideas as well as who specifically participated in each step of project creation)
How is the role o f Ghana Wildlife Society (NGO) different from government 
conservation agencies like Ghana Wildlife Division and Ghana Tourism Commission that 
work in neighboring villages?
Describe how the Project Management Committee was planned, selected, formally 
written and put into action. What are the member’s regular duties?
Does the Project Management Committee represent all stakeholders in the immediate and 
Accra communities? For example the local youth vs. Accra youth. How does each 
representative (Chiefs, Youth, Women, etc.) inform their interest group of project 
objectives and activities?
What are the project’s conservation objective and activities? Who initiated these, trained 
the staff, and what staff does the work? How are workers hired, managed, and paid?
How does project work relate to communal labour?
Describe how the small-scale enterprise activities began. Why were interested people 
required to form groups? How and what activities were chosen? Who made the
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decisions to fund different activities, budget amounts, and the terms of financing between 
groups and the project?
What is the state of the small-scale enterprises today? What has been accomplished and 
what have been the largest obstacles? Describe the problems o f working in groups, lack 
o f dedication to new activities, and finding markets for various products.
Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary Worksheet
(More specific guide created for actors in Agumatsa case)
Describe how the sanctuary began with the Wildlife Division. (Planning, objectives, 
organization, activities, revenue generation, etc.)
Describe how the Tourism Management Team was imagined, researched, planned, 
formally written and put into action. (Explain the TMT general ideas as well as who 
participated in creating the new management strategy. Explain the role the District 
Assembly plays.)
What are the stakeholder revenue sharing percentages and how were they determined? 
What activities have % been used for by all groups: Wildlife, TMT, landowners, 
chiefs/elders, etc...
Does the TMT represent all stakeholders in the community?
What are the advantages and disadvantages o f working with three levels o f co­
management? Wildlife, TMT, and District Assembly. (Sharing of labour, training 
village guards, road/school improvements, difficulty communicating and sharing 
authority, etc.)
How has tourism been developed in the sanctuary? (Guide organization and trainings, 
trails, bridges, advertising and publicity, etc.)
Describe the problems of hunting, wood collecting, illegal farming and bushfires in the 
sanctuary. Who participates in these activities? What has been done to stop them?
What other activities have been proposed for village development and how have they 
been incorporated into the sanctuary management plan? (Animal husbandry, 
guesthouses, restaurants, reforestation, etc.)
Foret Classes de Missahoe Worksheet
(More specific guide created for actors in Missahoe case)
Describe how the project was imagined, researched, planned, written, etc. (Explain the 
project’s general ideas as well as who specifically participated in each step.)
Why were two separate plans created: Reforestation in the Foret Classee and 
Reforestation in the surrounding rural areas?
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What is the reforestation plan? Plantations, natural forest, or agroforestry? Who will 
benefit and how when the trees are mature?
How has payment o f participants in the reforestation activities been organized? Work in 
nurseries, transportation of saplings, transplanting, weeding, etc...
How have project stakeholders worked in collaboration? (Roles of chiefs, landowners, 
tenant farmers, village committees, women and youth.)
What other activities have been proposed for forest conservation and village development 
and how have they been integrated into the village management strategy? (Tourism 
organization, village work groups, mushroom culture, beekeeping, improved cook stoves, 
prevention of bushfires and forest cutting.)
What is the state o f reforestation today? What other activities have been achieved?
Landowner Questionnaire
(Guide created for landowners in Afadjato project)
What o f your land was given to the project?
How was the ownership or management in you family for lands?
What do you use your remaining % for now?
Has that changed since donating land to the project?
Do you personally farm?
Who else in the family farms?
What type of wood or charcoal is used to cook in your household?
Where does it come from?
Did your family collect wood in your forest before donating to the project?
How often does your family consume meat?
Where does it come from?
Did your family hunt in your forest before donation?
How have you been compensated for lands your family donated?
Has the project made a difference in your daily life?
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Appendix B: Biographical Sketches and Data Excerpts of Interviewees
Missahoe
Efakao, Ministry of Forests Regional Director. Kossi Efakao is situated in the forestry hierarchy,
which simultaneously frustrates and comforts him by restricting his workspace in projects. This 
limited workspace, in turn, affects his definition of problems, methods of engaging them, motivation, 
and perception of success. In his ministry chief opinion, the project was successful because all the 
hierarchical steps of project creation, implementation, and reporting were done by the office. His 
perception of success is not the field results because they depended on village committees, which the 
ministry could not control. He says the failures in the field were due to the lack of participation, 
volunteering in particular, and sustaining die initiative after donor funds ended. He said it was the 
‘taste of money’ they got during the project that spoiled them. He also says they were scared to 
implement and enforce the rules. From his personal opinion, he understands that the initiative did not 
adequately address certain issues like land scarcity and tenants, but he saw these as obstacles to 
overcome through the plan the way it was written rather than changing it.
• About 50 years old. Ewe, works fi’om the Kpalime Ministry of Forests and Waters office. Also 
known as the DECP.
• His job is to manage the office, with 3-4 foresters under him (who mostly hang around outside the 
building talking) and two secretaries. He often rides around the prefecture to different forestry lands 
on his off-road motorcycle. He also collaborates with another office just outside of Kpalime and gives 
tours of managed areas when international reps and Lome Ministry supervisors visit.
• His office is always the same, desk full of papers as if  he was working on a book, yet he is never 
busy doing anything. I met with him a half dozen times, each time unscheduled. He was either there 
or gone. When he was there I was always shown into his office and he was always doing nothing, as if  
the papers are there as props.
• He was disorganized and used this as one of many reasons to withhold information fi'om me. He 
gave me a plan at one point for the Missahoe initiative, but after I asked for it again and other 
documents he said he couldn’t find them and I would have to go to Lome to get copies.
• He was never friendly to me and seemed to use professionalism as a barrier against conversation, 
somewhat like chiefs with interpreters. He didn’t engage in any of the cultural norms of greetings and 
hospitality when I visited him in the office. Instead he was always skeptical, short with responses, and 
often refused to respond for various excuses.
• When he did respond to questions he often contradicted himself. His first response would 
typically be to deny diat there was a problem, or that there was a strategy set up to deal with the 
problem that he could not change. Then after a while he would admit that there is a problem and 
blame it on someone, usually villagers, and again plead that there was nothing he could do so it wasn’t 
worth thinking about. Specifically he said did this about illegal hunting, cutting o f live wood for coal 
or timber, burning, and enforcement.
• He frequently used the hierarchy of the forestry ministry as an excuse that he couldn’t participate 
in alternative management ideas. He would refuse to answer questions that weren’t addressed 
specifically to his position. Overall, he said he would cooperate with my study but didn’t take it 
seriously because it wasn’t one of his orders. He said he couldn’t continue working with the Missahoe 
project forever, and the project had officially ended so he had no means to continue with it.
• He is a good example of how the Missahoe project, being the first participatory attempt at 
management in Togo, was done with staff fi-om wood revenue and enforcement based era.
• He was one o f the 3 technicians fi'om the forestry tech team which included 2 project leaders fi-om 
Lome, 3 technicians for reforestation inside Missahoe, reforestation in the surrounding rural areas, and 
surveillance. He was the Surveillance leader who trained through doing members of the local 
committees. They created, or enhanced the patrol trail by cutting and maintaining a 5 meter fire block 
around the trail, erected the cement monuments, and visited reforestation sites and tenant farms.
• To give the local committees authority, he organized village meetings with the Prefet (regional 
governor) and village traditional authorities. He said the committees were scared to enforce the rules 
and boundaries of Missahoe when not with the foresters.
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• He describes the success in technical term, didn’t know how to respond to questions of 
environmental benefits, or who the village beneficiaries are. However, he said that it was the ‘taste of 
money’ that the local committees got during the project that prevent them from sustaining the project 
now tiiat the funds have ended.
• He is aware of the real threats to Missahoe, bushfires, illegal logging, and tenant farming, and 
general land scarcity. However, because of his place in the hierarchy he had to address these through 
how the plan was written, ie without acknowledging tenant/landowner relations and naively thinking 
that farmers would accept reforestation in the surrounding areas as a better idea tiian moving to more 
fertile forested lands to cultivate. This is part of what frustrates him about the project and his work.
• His old school idea is that these problems should be resolved, period. That there shouldn’t be a 
plan to address them, that they are simply wrong and must be stopped. Like the idea that the 
committees got a taste of money and wouldn’t work without it after the project ended, he doesn’t ftiink 
people should be paid or benefit not to do illegal activities.
Dieu Donne, Tourism Guide. Dieu is very pro-preservation, specifically non-use, no coffee or 
agroforestry, only natural forest. He sees ftiese others as competing with tourism values, although he 
also sees traditional village activity as tourism. His perception of how it should be and how it was is 
different, pro-wildemess. He sees ineffectiveness of Traditional Authorities to regulate resource use as 
the main problem. He would like to be hired as a spy to relay convicting information to Foresters and 
gendarmes to stop all use in Missahoe.
•  Ewe, about 25 years old, from Konda. One of the core members of the youth guide association 
(approximately 8-12 full time members involved in various tourism related activities). This group is 
strongly affiliated with both the NGO ADETOP and the hotel Campement, although there are differing 
alliances between the guides and their destination, like a partitioning of the tourist market.
•  The members of the guide groupement guide hikes, collect insects (butterflies, spiders, scorpions, 
walking sticks...) for making entomology type display cases, carve furniture and drums, host 
parties/traditional fetes. Some o f them plan longer trips with international tourists and expats living in 
Lome around West Africa.
• They have a weak groupement structure that supposedly collects % of revenues from all activities 
for a group savings account. He said these funds mostly get used for throwing parties. But then he 
said that the funds are also given out to individuals as “loans” or split up amongst guides to pay for 
their living expenses. He said most guides do not farm so they have to buy all their food.
• Dieu makes his living from a mixture of these activities. He is especially educated in insect and 
plant identification and traditional use, and interacts with eco-minded tourists regularly.
• He told me the project has failed because of the lack of authority of village chiefs. He said that 
chiefs are not respected by villagers like they once were. He blamed this on democracy, and 
ineffectiveness of chiefs to solve development problems in their villages. He said Konda has this 
problem, but it is a common problem. “Before you couldn’t just talk directly to the chief. It had to be 
a formal ceremony with interpreters. But now people, even kids, walk by the chief and don’t even 
greet, or informally (disrespectfully) greet.”
•  He also said the village committees were not paid adequately to enforce the laws. He gave Ghana 
forest rangers as an example of effective control because they are feared by the public and paid well to 
do their job. He said there need to be spies that are paid well in the villages that report directly to the 
foresters, who then need to do their jobs by fining people rather than being bribed.
• He also said the money paid to the CLGPM were paid in lump sums to traditional authorities or 
committees and disappeared.
•  He said there is a lack of alternative livelihood education and start-up loans. He is against any 
kind of agroforestry that compromises natural forest, but says there need to be things like animal 
husbandly that complement the forest.
Awube, Kossi. Tourism Guide. He supports the old ways of the foresters, strict control, and would like 
to see the Missahoe become a zoological park for tourism only. He doesn’t support the new 
agroforestry plan because he sees that it isn’t being applied by all farmers and not stopping bushfires. 
Kossi was disappointed with my lack of anger about the state o f the Missahoe. He was personally hurt 
by the way the forest has changed since his childhood in the late ‘80s. He lamented, “I can remember
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back to my childhood memories, around 1984, there was darkness here. Some places you couldn’t 
see.” The guides were not officially incorporated into the plan, as guides. Some participated in the 
reforestation labor, but Kossi and others do not know the details of the Missahoe initiative.
• Kossi is the youngest of the Ewe guides, perhaps 20, in the Konda tourism association. He lives in 
an old but well off family compound with cement walls, aluminum roof in the center o f the village.
• Like the other guides they look like tourists themselves in the village because they dress like youth 
in Lome or Kpalime in western clothes, unlike the rest of the village wearing traditional cloth or 
farming attire. The guides also speak more French and frenchier French than anyone else in the 
village.
• He is very active in guiding and working on the side with Lome based expats. Besides guiding for 
them he harvests bromeliads and other plants for their gardens and takes them to Lome. He carries a 
cell phone from one expat in Lome, I guess for emergency garden services.
• He also collects butterflies veiy diligently. He only goes for those that he knows they need for 
collections, and then inspects them for any defects before deciding to kill them. He isn’t as 
knowledgeable about forest plants as Dieu and others. He follows Prosper, the owner of Auberge 
Pappion and entomologist, more closely. He is more into the business sides of tourism and doing well 
with it.
• We met through his entrepreneurial spirit; he distributed coffee for the Café Kuma group in 
Dunyo. However, he proved to be untrustworthy when he didn’t pay the group for their coffee for 
several months. In addition to this, when Café Kuma decided to sell though the hotels directly, not 
through guides, he and some guides tried to boycott the coffee or would take bags from the hotels the 
group sold through without paying them back.
• The guides association operates very unofficially. When a tourist comes to town, most youth will 
offer services as guides and despite their supposed rates for guiding, the prices fluctuate and are 
negotiated individually. To retain this autonomy the guides are not affiliated to any of the hotels or 
guesthouses, rather they all compete with each other. But they also manage to all make enough of a 
profit to continue in that manner.
• Like other guides he is very upset by the current state of the Missahoe with tenants and 
uncontrolled illegal use. While we were hiking he made special efforts to point out the tenant farmers 
fields within the forest, and tell about the illegal cutting during the political crisis that led to the 
savanna areas. He said the deforestation was a combination o f “Eyeryone came, cutting, shooting 
animals, and trapping. Our fathers cutting and Kabiyes cutting to make charcoal. Everyone did there 
part, but it was mostly the Kabiye that came tiie time of the grave and live here (in Missahoe) now.”
• But like guides at Agumatsa in Ghana, he did nothing out of the ordinary on our hikes when we 
saw men and women illegally cutting down trees for firewood and harvesting pepper, or said anything 
to the tenants as we passed through their compounds. He didn’t report them or say anything warning 
them, he was just somewhat curt with them. At one point he was talking to me about the tenants 
cutting, burning, and changing the forest to coffee in front of them as if  they weren’t there.
• He said the people we saw harvesting were from Tsame. He also said the trail we were on was 
maintained by the CLGPM from Konda and Tsame as a fire break, and they also monitor the forest. 
The trail obviously wasn’t stopping the fires from crossing in some places. Kossi pointed out how 
illegal users are aided by the trail that is used for monitoring, pointed out how a trail from Adame used 
by charcoal makers intersects with the one we were on. He said the northern border is split up between 
Tsame and Konda, but the southern border is worse because it is split into many more villages 
committees.
• He described the project as being finished and failing, and so would the Missahoe.
•  He was especially bothered by the burned areas and savanna lands within the Missahoe. On our 
hike we saw many burned areas that had not burned since before the beginning of the participatory 
project in 2000. These were especially on the northern edge (Tsame lands) and along the lower 
Missahoe Route.
•  The guides also don’t seem to know concrete answers about the Missahoe initiative like what their 
rights are and the rights of other users, and responsibilities of the local committees and foresters. It’s 
unclear why this is since committee leaders and foresters talk about village meetings to educate the 
populations about the plans. If these meetings were anything like my ‘meetings’ experiences I can 
imagine why.
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• He did understand the agroforestry method of reforestation in theory, but was quick to point out 
that it was not closely followed by all farmers in Missahoe, especially Kabye tenants.
Paulin, President of Local Management and Protection Committee, Kuma-Adame. Paulin never spoke of 
enforcement and regulation problems o f Missahoe laws, only the benefits of people changing their 
livelihoods through reforestation and alternative livelihoods like him and tourism friends. He 
promotes the project as if  people in the village still haven’t come aboard, need to be convinced o f its 
benefits to them. He also sees problems between villages hurting the project. He wants to continue the 
project with the help of the forestry ministry, but doesn’t feel secure enough to lead the village alone. 
Also doesn’t have die management funds that he sees necessary to work on project ideas. He wants 
the village management team to be under the support of the ministry indefinitely.
• About 40 years old, Ewe, built like a lanky truck driver. Usually wears shirts with their sleeves 
cut off and smokes constantly. Lives in a large, well off, family compound in Kuma-Konda with his 
wife who is nursing their most recent baby girl.
• He is part of a local alliance with Prosper, a villager who owns Hotel Pappion and the leader of 
ADETOP a Konda based NGO. They are the older Konda axis that supports alternative development 
in the village through tourism, aid projects, reforestation and try hard to sell these.
• In that sense they are elitists in the village, since most villagers are average Kuma farmers, 
hunters, charcoal makers, market women etc.. .They are also at somewhat of odds with the younger 
group o f tourism guides, butterfly collectors, and sculptors who want the same basic things but don’t 
group together because they all want autonomy.
• He makes his living in many alternative ways to traditional farming, although he farms as well, we 
never discussed it beyond his forest farms. He manages a large personal tree nursery for producing 
mostly cure-dent and some other income generating tree species like etcho, kola, citrus, and timber for 
sale locally and nationally.
• He farms coffee as well with the most outstanding reforestation results I ever saw with timber, 
nitrogen fixing, and fruit trees flourishing in his coffee like a poster for shade grown coffee 
certification. He also works with a group of mushroom farmers that produce large exotic white 
mushrooms to dry and sell to supermarkets and restaurants in the capital city, Lome.
• He has farms in Missahoe but uses them very differently than tenant farmers. He and other Konda 
farmers use the lands like Dunyo farmers use their forest lands adjacent to Afadjato in Ghana, for fruit 
production like avocado, banana, plantain, taro, cacao, yovozi and others.
• He is the President of Konda’s local management committee (CLGPM) and the Secretary of the 
management union (UCLGPM). His role was to organize the labor to grow seedlings and plant them 
in Missahoe.
• He coordinated the transplanting of trees on Konda farms with the help of village youth. He 
described how they kept track of days worked and everyone was paid in Konda.
• However, he said it was different in Tokpli where they have tenant farmers. The landowners were 
part of the project and paid by the CLGPM for the trees planted on their land. But unlike Konda, 
where the “landowners” are also the farmers, the landowners in Tokpli have tenant farmers who were 
not part of the project benefits.
• Paulin was definitely one of the privileged members of the CLGPM and Union. This is evident by 
the way he feel so close and wants to be with the foresters, the personal aid he received for starting the 
cure-dent and mushroom projects, and how he was present at all the workshops. From the reports 
written by the ministry it is clear that not all committee members were treated equally.
•, He describes the benefits from the project as individual, depending on if people participate in tree 
planting, tourism, and alternative livelihoods. But he admits that not everyone was included (like 
tenants) and that many people were involved in tourism, beekeeping, and other village activities that 
the project didn’t negotiate with before creating the plan.
• It was as if the project thought it could come in and benefit some o f those that were not yet 
benefiting without upsetting others.
Aza, Kodzo, Vice President o f Local Management and Protection Committee, Kuma-Adame. Kodzo sees 
everything as a gradual process, extremely wise and practical, foresighted for the long-term. He sees 
reforestation in this way, something for the next generation not his benefit. He sluggishly plays roles
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in group activities like the nursery, but if there was something actually more beneficial out there he 
would be doing it. All the group endeavors he participates in are behind his private affairs. He seems 
to be involved in them as more of a social obligation to progress that he believes in due to his status as 
a leader in die village than to personally benefit fi-om participating.
• Kodzo is about 45 years old, Ewe, firom the same family as Denis Koffi, but unlike Denis he is 
part of the village upper class. He has plenty of lands, store, coffee farming, and coffee buying 
income. He lives in a large compound in Adame and is building a retirement home on his farm outside 
the village.
• His family owns the lands East of Kuma-Adame as far as the beginning of Kuma-Tsame lands. 
They reach the northern border of Missahoe.
• I met him on my first day in Kuma because he is a fiiend of my Peace Corps counterpart in 
Dunyo. He is also a store owner and coffee buyer in Adame. His family sells mostly sodabi (distilled 
palm wine) and various supplies like eggs, matches, ground nuts, cigarettes, candy, oil and other 
things. Its not the most stocked store in town, but fi-equented for sodabi by most men in that quarter of 
the village.
• As a coffee buyer, like my counterpart Kodzo EGAN, he has a group of coffee farmers that sell 
their coffee to him every year based on the Kpalime market price. When the transporters from 
Kpalime come to the village they stop the truck at Kodzo’s store to load up the bags. He makes a 
commission per kilo on all the coffee he stores. As the local buyer he is seen as the farmer’s Patron 
because he often pays them in advance for their crops, gives them loans throughout the year based on 
their harvest, and in turn they are loyal to selling to him each year and giving him gifts.
• His land use and livelihood are very dynamic, he engages in coffee farming, fruit and spice trees, 
nitrogen fixing tree species, gardening, yams, crop rotation with com, groundnuts, beans, and manioc. 
His farms are like textbook integrated agriculture fields.
• He has definite long-term goals for his land and family including tree planting, animal husbandry, 
and moving from the village to the farm.
• He is also active in many village committees and agrobusiness groups, like fish farming, honey 
production, rents parts of his land. Due to this he is savvy about projects and new activity potentials 
and complexities. Because o f this he focuses on his own farms, tries to be an example, but knows not 
to get involved with wider forced reform strategies that depend on others.
• He was part of the group that started the Adame village tree nursery. The Vice President of the 
village management committee (CLGPM). His reasoning for doing this are mixed between livelihood 
planning and moral reasons to reforest. He has worked before and after the Missahoe initiative that 
paid them for seedling production and talks about it on the basis of restoring some o f what there used 
to be in Kuma in his youth, like the guides, unlike thinking about production potential.
• He said he didn’t think the CLGPM doing the nursery would be interested in having a meeting.
He said they meet on Fridays to work, but even he didn’t take these too seriously because he was 
skipping the meeting this day just to go to another village. The committee only ‘meets’ when there is a 
problem to discuss, only discusses it among the leaders without the laborers. It is only to discuss 
problems, rather than planning.
• He emphasized how Adames role is only participating in the work and getting paid through cash 
or kind to do the work. He said the other villages have “more interesting roles”.
• He is personally depressed about the condition of the environment for and doesn’t believe the 
Missahoe participatory project is the solution. He asked at one point if  I meant when the forest was 
classified (i.e. before the looting) or during the project, to differentiate the two management 
timeframes. He also said that resource collection punting, wood, coal) are ongoing and regular.
• When I asked about benefiting the villages more he said it was a good idea, but would have to be 
done very carefully, unlike the current strategy and not using generic income solutions.
Chiefs and Elders, Kuma-Adame. They gave responses that seemed factual in most cases, but in some 
cases they responded with Development Fantasy responses like the CLGPM to seem like the village is 
more homogeneous than it really is and more needy than in reality. On the needy side they said the 
village needs a health center, running water, electricity, road, and market improvements. However, all 
of these things are present in the village at some state, which is beyond all other Kuma villages besides 
Konda and Tsame. They did not have any strategy for development, or any fi-amework for how
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development would fit in with village management. Instead they were flexible and fishing for 
sponsors rather than solutions.
• I met with the Chiefs of Adame and other villages in the study area and my work areas less 
fi-equently than people I worked with regularly. They were not a target of my work and were only 
consulted when there was a formality of some kind or organizational question I had that I thought they 
could help with.
• I befriended many other elders in the villages that were also helpful with answering these 
questions. Chiefs never went out of their way to try to work with me as a Volunteer. For a long time I 
had a bad opinion of chiefs because they seemed to do nothing progressive, rather were a formal 
hindrance or leach to village development.
• This opinion was largely because the Chief of Dunyo, the village where I lived, was absent for the 
first year and a half I lived there. He worked for a bank in Lome and was never in the village. I 
blamed him for the lack of initiative in the village during that time. However, when he returned I did 
get to know him as one of the least formal, most practical o f all chiefs, and the lack o f initiative in the 
village was just that.
• Kuma was settled by the Ewe at Kumato in approximately 1750 during a migration from Notse, a 
former capital o f the Ewe people. This is the same migration route and time period when Wli and 
Gbledi were settled.
• Frequent traveling and employment outside the village is common for chiefs in the Kuma. Like 
Dunyo, die chief o f Adame is rarely in because of trips to Kpalime and Lome. They are from the 
upper village crust and most educated/fortunate. For this reason I had trouble meeting with him to 
discuss the village history and role in the Missahoe initiative.
• Chiefs main duties in the village are settling disputes and judgments on Thursday mornings.
• Meeting with the Chiefs of Adame was always a formal affair with the chiefs aligned across from 
me in formation with the Chief in the center and his 3 main subchiefs surrounding him: security, 
royalty, and protocols. Below these four are village rep chiefs like the youth chief, queen mother, and 
clan heads. Only after a few minutes the chief would speak to me directly and openly. We always had 
drinks and prayed before and after.
• Adame is one of the original villages to branch off of Kumato, with Tokpli. Lands were acquired 
by hunters exploring different areas on multi-day trips. Over time they started farms in their hunting 
lands and they became the owners.
• Today the chief said there are few lands not owned. The vast original lands have been divided 
among generations of siblings and spouses of extended clan families. Landowners give out lands to 
relatives or tenants based on gentleman’s agreements, which are intentionally vague to allow users and 
owners fi-eedom when times change. Chief said they are obliged to give out lands that are not in use, 
but they then deserve repayment for their generosity.
• For example they said the population is 99.82% Ewe and disregarded any of the Kabye population 
living on and using Adame lands. They said all the Kabye living in Davota are living under Adame 
control and lands. They only listed Kotakoli (a different northern ethnicity) as the other 0.18%.
Comite Locale de Gestion et de Protection de Missahoe (CLGPM), Kuma Adame. This group was loosely 
affiliated with the reforestation in surrounding rural areas goal of the Missahoe project. They are also 
supplied, again for the predetermined goals of reforestation, by another local NGO. Both relationships 
are paternalistic and non-empowering. The way the committees and tree production are set up 
decrease their empowering and revenue generating possibilities, and decrease the use of the trees. The 
group mostly is seeking payment for doing ‘others’ ideas of development and because of this try to say 
what they think they should.
• Trying to get funding, say what the funders want/require as a committee. “We are composed o f 15 
members, including 4 women.” (this number 15 is the ‘key’ to development projects with many 
NGO’s and aid groups that have worked in the project area. When I would visit farmers to discuss 
their agrobusiness strategies and bring up possible group forming, they would automatically have a 
picture of this type of structure in their minds. A ‘groupement’ needed 15 members and female reps, 
but rarely paid attention to eftmic or class diversity)—this number contradicts the 8 member 
management committee and 8 member work committee described by Kodzo AZA.
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• They want to be hired/supported to stop the menacing activities o f villagers and bushfires rather 
than getting resources to support a community based management or sustainable use strategy.
• Everything they said was polished to make it seem like they were a successful, accountable group 
when in reality they were not able to have a meeting with me after several requests and they do not 
commit to their own work schedule. They are aware of this inconsistency, but they avoid it by 
perpetuating their view o f the development fantasy. They thought I wanted them to provide fantasy 
information as conditions for more aid.
• Unclear who actually benefits from the trees produced in their nursery, how they are distributed.
In Adame and Dunyo I had trouble getting farmers not in the nursery work groups to ask for trees from 
the nursery. The CLGPM says their goal is to provide seedlings, education, and support to the whole 
village, but there is a social pressure not to benefit from something the others did not put time and 
effort into. The “Its their project” idea of not working collectively. As if the social capital gained by 
the group doing the work would be compromised if they shared the trees freely with everyone.
•  The Adame group was primarily part of the Missahoe initiatives reforestation in surrounding rural 
areas objective. The group says it need ongoing financial aid for tools and seedbags, things it could 
organize itself, and ongoing education through rural extension. It seems like their involvement with 
the Ministry and APAF (an agroforestry NGO that has since supplied tools and resources like the 
Missahoe initiative) has created a paternalistic dependence within the committee.
Koffi 1 and Adze, Tenant Fanners in Missahoe. They have it good enough with food production, gari, 
charcoal, fruit, trapping, and firewood to not object to the tree planting project. They also seem to 
have a strategy of doing coffee to comply with Missahoe foresters and landowners, but not seriously 
for themselves. Even though they came to Missahoe before the others and are on Tsame lands, they 
are sandwiched the Emanuel family group and their participation in new projects and activities 
depends on him.
• Adzo and Koffi 1 are in their early 30s with 3 kids around the house and a few more going to 
middle school in Adame. They were the first farm in the Missahoe when they began in ’91. They are 
on the western border of Tsame lands, where they meet Tokpli lands used by Emanuel’s family.
• Their home is two houses with old aluminum sheets, a large patio for coffee drying, a long kitchen 
with grass roof, two gari cookstoves, and a large three burner improved cookstove. Behind the two 
room main house is a small pigpen in construction with two rooms. They have three sickly dogs and a 
small number of sickly chickens.
•  They farm mostly coffee with a mixture of palms and avocados. There is other land around the 
house in fallow and mostly forest between them and the border otherwise. They farm other lands 
further away, outside Missahoe for yams, manioc, and com.
• Koffi 1 spends most of the days roaming to the other farms to work. Adzo is always around the 
house, except on market days, usually making gari or charcoal and taking care of the young ones.
• They want to do other husbandry activities, expand chickens and pigs because o f the forest being a 
good location (far from thieves, keep snakes away from the house, trees protect the chicks from 
hawks). But they don’t have tiie resources to do this very fast and also do not want to work with 
Emanuel or others to share start-up costs.
• Koffi 1 immediately asked me if Emanuel was interested in a project meeting, before asking what 
the meeting was about. He acted like he was interested if  Emanuel wasn’t, but when I said he was 
Koffi 1 said he would participate, but it was not what he wanted.
• They are more closely related to the 6  ̂farm that branches off the trail past theirs, which is the 
farm closest to the forest edge. Like Koffi 2, this farm has extensive com and manioc, but no coffee.
• They are on Tsame lands that border Tokpli lands, but they are surrounded by Emanuel’s family 
by Koffi 2 and his brother, a strong family affair since Koffi 2 is married to Emanuel’s daughter. So 
the difference in landowners is not significant in activities, labor sharing, decision making...
•  They comply with the Missahoe project and planted coffee aroimd the stream “to please the 
foresters” as well as their landowners. TTtiey said the project only worked on their fields one year, 
transplanting and now they don’t bum those fields. Instead they weed everything by hand.
•  Adzo is very confident, and like most Kabye they have boundless energy to do work as long as 
they feel they are benefiting. They seem to feel this way because of their need for lands and good deal 
with their food crops, hunting, forest products...
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Koffi 2, Tenant Farmer in Missahoe. Kofïi 2 is knowledgeable in more advanced husbandry and
agriculture techniques, but cannot apply them because of his lack of funds and power. He supports the 
Missahoe plan and believes it will succeed in reforesting soon. He is also making the most of his 
opportunity to cultivate without division, although it is unclear if  he is investing his profits anywhere.
• Kabye tenant, in late 20s, originally from Blifu area. Grew up in a typical sounding large Kabye 
family learning coffee farming on his father’s farms.
• Educated through his BAG from Kpalime, wanted to be a teacher but declined a position available 
at the Blifii elementary school because it paid too little to support his family.
• Sought lands on a recommendation in Tsame and began planting his coffee farm in ’98, in areas 
cut during the early ‘90s. During the project the bulk of his lands were reforested with primarily 
Khaya and Terminalia, timber trees. He maintains the coffee fields well and survival of the project 
trees is high.
• He also cultivates yams and manioc in other areas with project trees. Besides these he has two 
large com fields that have no trees or the trees have been burned and died. Therefore, his participation 
in the project varies from excellent to failure.
• His tenant-landowner negotiations are different from those outside the boundaries. Outside all 
crops and land use activities are divided between the two parties (usually 2/3 tenant, 1/3 landowner). 
These vary somewhat depending on the value of the crop and the friendliness of the relations. Some 
landowners are more generous because tenants gift them meat and produce that they don’t require.
• Tenants inside, however, only divide their coffee harvests. The remaining cereal crops and tubers 
are for their complete profit. Reasons given for this is the distances of the farms from the village are 
too far for older landowners to visit and farm themselves. So the coffee profits are seen by landowners 
as better than nothing rather than less than possible exploitation. This explanation seems to contradict 
the idea that land is very scarce in Kuma today and that preference would seem to go to members of 
the landowner clan before tenants.
• Another reason for this is that the food cultivation is technically illegal. From the tenant 
perspective, growing coffee to share is a means to have non-divided profits in other crops. In Koffi’s 
case the other crops are where the project is failing, while in the coffee they are excellent.
• He is heavily under Emanuel’s influence because he is married to Emanuel’s daughter who is 
linked through women’s activities strongly to her family at Emanuel’s compound. Emanuel’s presence 
restricts Koffi 2 getting involved or starting any other group work, because he doesn’t want to work 
with him and, like Emanuel’s son, he would have to.
• The success of the project trees in his coffee, and Koffi 2s obvious interest in coffee farming and 
reforestation show that he is also loyal to his Tsame landowner and wants to see the reforestation 
succeed, or his landowner was more dedicated to the project. This is unlike the other tenant farms that 
have very few visible reforestation trees.
Emanuel. Oldest Tenant Farmer in Missahoe. Emanuel is an old school land exploiter, shady dealer in 
general. He has made his fortune by employing his family army and continues the methods of 
deforestation, burning, and cultivation despite having the finances to invest in other activities. He has 
influence over all other tenants in Missahoe despite their different landowners. He has not complied or 
participated in the reforestation project.
• 65 year old Kabye migrant from Kara area. Originally settled in Davota but created a compound 
in Missahoe on Tokpli lands in early ‘90s.
• He is a cross between a tenant and a patron (landowner) because o f his wealth and power.
• He travels quite often between his lands in Kara, Davota, Missahoe, and even Ghana. He has 3-4 
wives and countless children spread around. He owns at least 2 vehicles, which his son’s drive, that 
run the Blifu/Kpalime route.
• His compound in Missahoe is by far the biggest, 4 large buildings with 2-3 rooms each, all with 
aluminum roofs, indoor kitchen, elevated racks for drying coffee and storing yam heads, water barrels, 
chicken coup with guinea fowl.
• His wife and several daughters dominate the Adame tchouk market. His family in general is his 
farming workhorse for growing coffee, yams, com, and manioc. His coffee is mostly quite old and has 
no project trees planted in its understory, mostly palms and avocados. His other lands are in fallow or
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being cultivated for manioc, com, and yams without project trees. The few project trees are located 
along the trail leading to his compound, sort of like token trees.
•  Seen by his family/public as difficult to work with because of his dishonesty and greed.
•  Emanuel was only interested in finding out what I had to offer, he wasn’t serious about increasing 
his participation or effort in anything. When it came down to our meeting, he had better things to do 
and left his farm in charge of his familial army. However good at controlling and communicating he is 
with the tenants, he had not told any of them about the meeting I asked him to help me organize. I 
think he didn’t want the meeting to take place without him there.
Emanuel’s Son. Tenant Farmer in Missahoe. Views the land he cultivates in Missahoe as
belonging to his father and is plaiming to use them for the long-term. Prefers Missahoe lands to tenant 
agreements in Adame. He would like to pursue alternative income projects, especially chicken raising 
that he was trained to do, but even more tiian the others, he is under his father’s influence. Any project 
or profit he makes will have to go through Emanuel. He grows coffee and few project trees.
• Mid 30s Kabye tenant working on his house and fields in Emanuel’s lands from Tokpli. He is 
probably the most educated son of Emanuel and more independent than his other sons that drive his 
taxis.
• He is married and has been living near Adame on another landowner’s property, but has decided 
to come back to the Missahoe lands to finish his house and move there to live with his family because 
of problems with the Adame landowner. He described similar problems as Koffi Bassan like his 
landowner demanding more than a fair amount, stolen animals and crops, threats, etc...
•  His home in Missahoe is two buildlings, one is an older, small, two room house while the other is 
a large two room house still in construction, both with grass roofs. There is no kitchen, perhaps 
because of its proximity to Emanuel’s compound, but there is an abandoned gari making shelter.
• He has a large com field around the house with no project trees. He said this was not considered 
part of the project because he had not decided yet how he was going to construct his compound when 
they staked out the planting areas. So he had quite a bit of influence.
• His other main field is the steep slope leading to the stream at the edge of Tokpli lands. He has 
about half the slope from the bottom planted in coffee. The closest to the river is the oldest, and 
producing well, while the trees get younger further up the slope. There are very few if more than a 
handful of project trees in the whole field.
Bassan, Koffi. Hunter and Interview Aid, Kuma-Adame.
•  31 year old Kabye tenant farmer living outside Missahoe border on Adame lands. Originally from 
Davota, from a large Kabye family.
•  His father migrated from Kara but still has lands to tend and makes seasonal trips back and forth. 
He has 2-3 wives in Kara and Davota. Koffi is closest to his siblings with the same mother. The 
extended family works together, approximately 12 men, on farming and house building projects when 
needed. They call each other to work on individual farms for individual profit, but use group labor. 
The beneficiary who calls the family group together provides food for the group as payment.
• Koffi is a jack of all trades. Mostly a tenant/laborer. He typically works for a landowner other 
than the landowner where he lives in exchange for a portion of their lands to use for himself. He 
works until the farmer’s lands are cleared/planted/harvested and his own portion. When he isn’t doing 
this he does a combination of hunting, metal work, and animal husbandry.
• He also farms for himself and his landowner around his house, but differently than when he is 
seriously working for someone. His house area is mainly used for his own food, like manioc, sweet 
potatoes, small amounts of yams, and a garden along the river. This upsets his landowner who wants 
him to extract as much as possible to divide with him. Koffi has tried other crops like beans as a cash 
crop. He says the land is not fertile to produce much, and the landowner’s sons regularly come and 
steal his harvests.
• He is very resourceful and collects most of his food and supplies from the forest near his house.
He collects firewood and spices for cooking; bamboo, vines, and thatch for building materials; palm 
nuts, wine, kola, cacao, and honey for income; and hunts or collects crabs, snakes, crocodiles, 
porcupines, field rats, agoutis, partridge, antelope, lizards, squirrels, bats, owls, snails, beetles, fish, 
frogs, and anything he can catch for food and sale.
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• He does not sell meat from hunting. He eats the majority himself and gifts portions to friends, 
family, and his landowner. He also invites friends and family to work with him and repays them with 
a meal of meat.
• He has traveled extensively in the Kara Region, Ghana, and Benin during his youth and while he 
was doing technical training in Kpalime for blacksmithing.
• Koffi has a reputation in the village as being untrustworthy because he is single, Kabye, and lives 
by himself outside the village. He is known to be a hunter and assumed to be a thief as well, assumed 
because hunters go through other peoples’ lands and fields at night.
• He doesn’t have the resources to support a family, but neither do many family men. He is looked 
down upon by some for being self centered because of this. This is partially true; he is able to work 
only as hard as he needs to get by, whereas if he had a family to support he would probably be bound 
more strictly to landowner labor.
• His single status also upsets his landlord, who has told him if he was married and had a family to 
provide for he would not demand as much, but since it is Koffi by himself he doesn’t want him to 
profit.
•  Koffi’s dream is to live in a man-made forest. During his first cultivation of his homestead he 
planted several varieties of trees, kola, mandarin oranges, etcho, for long-term income. However, his 
landowner didn’t agree with his plan for these products because they would not be as profitable to him 
and implied long-term land use rights,
Fiabenu, Hunter and Farmer in Kuma-Dunyo. He has seen hunting decline along with forest
habitats to the point where people like him no longer have choices over livelihood activities, they must 
farm. They also have fewer choices over what to farm because of the economy for tree crops. He 
laments this and still tries to get by doing his mixed bag because he doesn’t like farming or its results. 
He says there is no longer any value in hunting because animals are too rare, so he just catches and eats 
or gifts what he gets when he can. He blames the loss of his livelihood to over hunting and cutting 
during the ‘90s political crisis.
• A Dunyo youth, early 30’s, Ewe farmer on family/clan lands, but he personally engages in more 
transitory activities like palm wine tapping, fruit collecting, himting, and has inherited large mandarin 
orange and other fruit farms near Bala from his father.
• He is loyal to the village Chief, regularly organizing and working in the Chief’s projects. In the 
Chiefs absence, he is one of the men in charge of Dunyo.
• Also loyal to RPT, organized the village ally during the elections despite the vast majority of 
Dunyo and Kuma region being opposition grounds.
Denis, Koffi, Hunter and Farmer in Kuma-Adame.
•  Ewe farmer and hunter in late 40s. Generally speaking, he is from an upper class family of 
Adame, but every family/clan has wealthy members and less well off. Koffi is from the same family 
as Kodzo Aza as an example of the two levels within one land rich family. Their family owns the 
lands that are adjacent to Missahoe and extend north to Kpime. Koffi’s farm is near this border in the 
NE comer of the Kuma Traditional Area.
• His position, which he describes as being an ‘Outsider’ is because he left the village as a youth to 
find work in Kpalime. He became the head of the Kpalime/Lome taxi station and married a woman 
from Aflao (the border city on Ghana side of Lome). They had several children and he bought a taxi 
that took e i^ t years to pay off His life changed dramatically in the early ‘90s when his taxi was 
burned by the military police who accused him (from the Kpalime-opposition city-station as being 
against the president).
• When this happened he fled to Adame, and his wife returned to Aflao.
• He was given lands by his family and began re-leaming farming and hunting techniques of his 
youth.
• Koffi was an avid hunter during the ‘90s, using a shotgun and jaw traps, but has now reduced the 
amount of time spent hunting mainly using snares. He used to spend most nights out with his 
headlamp and shotgun, frequently killing antelope, agoutis, and once a large forest bongo.
• He used his connections with the taxi drivers to export his bushmeat to Kpalime.
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• His hunting declined because of the laws becoming reinforced in the later ‘90s. Like many others 
he said the gendarmes were heavily involved in the bushmeat trade in the beginning, but then started 
enforcing the laws again. He also said the price of ammunition and repairing his gun and equipment 
became unprofitable. He got rid of his gun, being repaired, but still has the bigger traps.
• Like others, his livelihood has changed to primarily farming of subsistence crops, which he 
dislikes. He has a system now of farming his manioc, yams, and com inside an enclosure lined with 
snares. His crops are used as bait for rats, snakes, antelope, and agouti. He checks them less 
frequently, about every three days. Success depends on the season and if he is lucky to find his prey 
before another hunter passes by.
• Despite, or perhaps because of, his lack of interest in farming, he is very knowledgeable about 
different species of yams that grow above ground. Normally a vine grows above ground while the 
main tuber of yams grows below. Koffi plants below ground yams in concert with other species of 
yam that produce small ‘air potatoes’ in the same area of ground. He uses these in small amounts to 
improve fufu.
• He also has planted many finit trees around his farmhouse, mangos, citrus, etcho, paw-paw and 
others.
• He tried other projects besides farming as well, like raising dogs and chickens. He said these 
failed because of thieves stealing his chickens that he kept at the farm while he and the dogs were back 
in the village.
• He is also a village omelet man, sells egg sandwiches, tea, and coffee especially during funerals 
and other celebrations when people spend money. He is a cleaver businessman, always doing little 
things to make a little cash, unlike most that rely on their farms.
Charcoal Makers
• This represents a group of Kabye women living along and within the Missahoe border, adjacent to 
Adame lands. Most are married, many are sisters or daughters of the same father who are based on his 
farm, like Emanuel the tenant farmer with extended family.
• They all grew up in Davota and live in the Adame/Davota market cycle: Adame markets on 
Tuesday and Saturday mornings, Davota market Saturday afternoons. They typically sell charcoal or 
other farm produce at the Saturday morning Adame market before going to Davota to trade other 
goods.
• They are all involved in a wide variety of farm and transformation income sources such as 
charcoal making, firewood gathering, yam, com, and manioc farming, gardening, gari (manioc) 
processing, amo (manioc processing), and small scale animal husbandry (chickens, guinea pigs, 
ducks).
•  Typically it is the woman who provides the sauce ingredients (vegetables, spices, meat...) to 
prepare with the tubers or grains provided by the man of the household. This is breaking down 
somewhat because women now do all male farming activities as well (Kabye more than Ewe), but the 
women’s fields are usually done for sale to buy sauce ingredients or essential goods, where the man’s 
is consumed first and then sold.
•  These women are involved in group activities together, especially processing manioc. To do this 
they contribute group funds and labor to cultivate or buy manioc fields and process as a group for sale. 
This is another use of their income as an investment.
•  The tradeoff between different income generating activities depends on the season, market 
abundance/price, activity knowledge or preference, available labor and tools, group consensus, and 
start-up funds among other things.
Agumatsa
Steven. TMT President. An upper class businessman (teacher/lawyer), wants the project to succeed in the 
long-term. Only a vocal leader when playing the go-between role for the Chiefs and Elders and TMT.
• In the beginning, each village gave 3 people, including 1 chief, to form the TMT. Steven was 
elected Chairman from this groiq) of appointees. There is also a usual executive bureau with a 
Secretary, Treasurer and Advisors as well. They meet regularly and whenever something comes up as 
a TMT issue (thus reactive). (Steven)
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• He said eventually the DA should pull out as well, after the building is paid off, but that they are a 
large stakeholder because of that initial investment. He said it is good to have the DA as a relevant 
stakeholder because they will bring justice to their “hardened ones” who will be arrested for continuing 
use violations. He said they have been given authority to apprehend people and punish them for 
hunting and cutting. This is usually done through the chief system, but at the DA level if  necessary. 
(Steven)
•  He said the villages would volunteer their young bright ones to be trained in forest preservation, 
and they would organize the others (laborers). This speaks to who participates, in what ways, and how 
do they benefit. This could create conflict like that seen between the “bright ones” who are the guides 
and get a TMT salary, vs. the other youth who are asked to do communal labor. (Steven)
• He broke down the 57% TMT portion of the revenues. It is split up 10,10, 10% to each of the 
three villages, then 40% landowners, and 30% for development projects that directly involve all three 
villages. That leaves only 10% for individual villages to fund projects, however most projects like 
schools, tourism, latrines etc would benefit all three since they share many common resources. He said 
both the 10% for each village and 30% development funds are very heavily chief influenced. (Steven)
• TMT has thought about doing economic workshops like the Gbledi small-scale enterprise. He 
said they are leaving that up to the village members to use their portion of the $. But then he said the 
profits per village are so thin that they can’t give out money to everyone. (This seems untrue since the 
project makes probably around 15,000,000 cedis monthly. That would make about 885,000 per village 
at 10%, plus the 30% group development) (Steven)
• Steven is also the Secretary of the PMT—project management team—a joint body between the 
DA, GWD, and TMT. When project wide activities take place, building bridges was the only example 
I heard of, the three bodies have to decide how to contribute from their revenues to share the cost.
Since none of them think their % is enough, its very difficult to agree on cost sharing. It also seems 
problematic to define what a shared activity is. (Steven)
• Steven is the main go-between for the Chiefs and the TMT. When the Chiefs/Elders decided to 
stop using the Wildlife Division books to keep track of visitors, and to exclude the DA, it was Steven 
who delivered these messages to the guides for them to begin doing the Officer’s jobs. I overheard this 
meeting and was surprised by how vocal Steven was since he usually played an insignificant 
leadership role in TMT/Elders wide meetings. (Steven)
TMT Chiefs and Elders
•  Many of the high ranking Elders and TMT members travel frequently or live outside the village. 
The paramount chief and secretary both share time between Lome and Accra the capitals of Togo and 
Ghana. William and Steven both work in Hohoe and commute on a daily basis.
• The TMT, Chiefs and Elders usually met with the elders under the gazebo behind the tourism 
center. There was never any distinction made between who was who, like chiefs in the TMT and 
elders. They all sat together, dressed the same, talked the same contributed or just sat there. They 
always sat on plastic chairs with armrests and backs. The Youth Association always sat on benches, 
one behind another, rather than spread out.
• Attendance at the TMT meetings varied, the smallest meeting 8 up to 40. The number of chiefs 
and TMT members changed between each meeting, as well as which TMT members were there and 
who facilitated the meetings. The Easter Monday meeting was the biggest and run by the chiefs, with 
the youth association participating. Others were very short with William speaking to the chiefs with 
little response. Usually it was the ‘outsiders’ like the Youth from Accra, or Paramount Chief or Robert 
that came to the village for special occasions that were the most vocal at meetings.
• Its worth noting that every elders/TMT meeting I have seen has been dominated by the formalities 
of introductions, translations, and posturing which quickly fades into massive alcohol consumption.
By the lack of participation by most chiefs at these meetings, it seems clear that that is their motivation 
for attending the meetings. Once the chiefs begin drinking at the early morning meetings they are 
usually nodding off. This is quite different from the Ghana Wildlife Society meetings in Gbledi.
When in the small group doing the village leaders worksheet, the Gbledi chiefs also drank but lightly 
with respect to me. I never saw the Gbledi chiefs hanging out together getting trashed like the 
“meetings” in Wli. At some meetings it was a struggle for the chiefs to finish all the sodabi among 
them, often having bottles go around 3 or 4 rounds, (observations of meetings)
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• Robert, the TMT Secretary represents the village women on the TMT. This is because the Queen 
Mother, whose duty it is to organize and represent them traditionally, is too old.
• Robert was also the most skeptical member of the TMT or Elders about my research. On several 
occasions during meetings he asked me repeated questions about the jurisdiction, purpose, use, and 
benefits of my research. He suggested that I was working for the government, and tried to create 
suspicion with the others about my motives by saying I was unclear.
• The system in Wli, with the TMT apparently being accountable to the chiefs for all decisions, 
seems to be hindering TMT progress. It keeps them caught in a traditional system that is not 
expanding, or does not do anything rapidly. Rather than being strong leaders with authority over their 
villages, the chiefs seem more like they are hanging on to a system of the past and trying to get as 
much out of it as possible, (observations of chiefs)
• Originating from the early Ewe settlement in Notse around 1720. The Wli area was settled by 
hunters exploring the forests of present day Kuma near Wli-Todzi. A Dovo Fetish and shrine was 
erected at the top of the upper falls as a spiritual protector. The boundaries of the village is made up by 
rivers and certain species of boundary marking trees planted by their founding ancestors. The entire 
village is Ewe. There are Kabiye farm laborer, but they are not seen as village members, and definitely 
not stakeholders in the project.
• They replied to my questions that it was too late to answer that question and that I should do more 
next time. They were worried that I was understanding what they said in Ewe when they discussed 
their responses before formalizing their response in English. They could tell I understood some things 
by the expressions on my face. They said they had other matters to discuss so they would “discharge 
me”. In other words, the group that was there that night, refused to discuss their role in village 
development or relation to the TMT, and were suspicious of my questions.
• The elders and TMT are all very paranoid about being part of a project that requires partnership 
with anyone that would share their revenues. But tiiey are always half interested because they think 
there is a chance I will have some kind of aid package to offer them.
• Steven was still remarkably unspoken. I wonder why he is the Chairman. How does he fulfill that 
role by hardly doing anytiiing. Steven kept looking at me and sighing, occasionally yelling “Its
350,000 cedis, its nothing!
• Once this was decided, there was a huge debate over what to do with the left over 350,000 cedis. 
This caused the most problems, everyone having an idea and constantly being cut off by someone else. 
Eventually the elders went into the center’s back room and shut the windows to make a final private 
decision on the money matter. Unlike the decision to invest in chairs as a TMT business, where there 
was a large group discussion, the extra cash decision was made in private.
• After the counting and drinking had finished the meeting turned to “the future of the project”.
This consisted of discussing how to spend the profits. The group decided to buy a number of plastic 
chairs like the chiefs were sitting in. These are the customary ‘respectable’ chairs for important people 
to sit in during events like funerals. They would use these as in income generating project by renting 
the chairs to locals when they had festivals, rather than having to rent them in Hohoe. It would be less 
expensive than paying the transport fee, and they would be investing in the project. This was an idea 
of the Youth group, as well as the ideas of printing t-shirts and calendars that sold well during the 
Easter holiday.
• The talk bounced back and forth from group to group. The chiefs would make a prayer or 
statement, everyone would give thanks, then either the Secretary, Chairman, or a Youth spokesman 
would reply. TTie Youth would usually cause a stir, and one of the other groups would interrupt. Once 
again it was as if  the Youth were making their statements to the Chiefs, or defending themselves, 
rather than being part of a discussion. Every 5 minutes the whole crowd would devolve into chatter, 
yelling and the Tchame would have to stand up and “Ago!” everyone to be quiet again. The whole 
meeting was very aggressive and intimidating, not good grounds to negotiate or compromise on 
anything.
William. District Assemblyman. Strong willed politician, representing the village and trying to do the best 
for the long term of the project. His objectives are to reform the TMT so it represents the village and 
avoids the spending and lack of development issues it currently has. He has many problems with the
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current co-management system, such as non-efficiency, lack of spending, lack of support, delinquent in 
fulfilling management duties, and overall goals. He wants things to happen his way
• William, an Ewe from Wli-Todzi, about 50 years old. A founding member of the TMT, also the 
District Assemblyman, he fills many roles and holds substantial power in the village. His power is the 
distinct from the TMT and elders power because of being a politician. (William)
• In a similar way to Kodzo Aza in Kuma-Adame, William is involved in many groups of village 
development, but more as a representative than a stakeholder. That is he fights for more equitable 
benefits because he doesn’t need to benefit himself or isn’t benefiting himself like others in the TMT. 
He criticizes other educated members of the village for not doing enough, like he is to make changes.
• He criticizes most all three management bodies: TMT, DA, and Wildlife Division as not helping 
the project develop. He makes many suggestions for the TMT to revise, the DA to fund development 
projects, and Wildlife to leave. Ultimately he thinks the village should have control of 100% of the 
project, but to do this they will need to follow “his” reform steps. (William)
• During meetings and when interacting with other mant^ers, like the officers, William is 
controlling. He often dominates all the speaking and in meetings, and did not share information with 
others openly, like my interview guides and research goals.
• He has appointed a committee to review and reform the TMT by-laws. He did this with his DA 
power because the DA is the policing body of the 3 that makes sure revenue is distributed and actors 
remain consistent with their constitutions and by-laws. The committee is made up of non-TMT 
members of the community as a way to increase participation and representation. But it seems like 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater by asking non-members to change the TMT without the 
TMT member’s input. (William)
• He wants there to be new elections and clear goals, % money use and budgeting, term of office, 
role of TMT members etc.. .(William)
• He wants to revise the landowner % by doing a precise calculation of land use value. (William)
• He has clear objectives about using project money for development and upkeep of the project
facilities to increase their value before trying to directly benefit the village. He sees the project as a 
long-term income source, but fears it is crumbling because of the internal disputes over the short-term. 
He is trying to do the right thing for the village, but is focused on doing it himself through the reform 
of the TMT. (William)
• He critiques the chief’s positions on the TMT because of their misuse and blockage of using
project revenues. But also says “there is the problem of people hiding behind the chiefs and elders”.
He praises the chiefs for fighting with the Yikpa community during a boundary dispute over use of the 
falls. The DA and Wildlife Division were not willing to risk getting involved like the chiefs did. 
(William)
• He says the Wildlife Division “is always like a butterfly in the back. A butterfly looks big but has 
no strength, but always likes to suck the sweetness” (William)
• He also said that if local villagers were hired as public servants rather than the Wildlife Officers 
that they would “appreciate their salary and do the work.. .the wildlife officer just sit there”. This 
conflicts with his opinion that there are many in the village hiding behind the chiefs and elders. 
(William)
• He sees the project as a tourism opportunity, not Wildlife Sanctuaiy. He says one reason the 
Wildlife Division should draw out of the project is “because we are actually too close to the village to 
preserve wild animals. It wont be possible this close to people living.” (William)
• Besides being a member of the DA and using the power of his position to influence the project 
heavily, he has harsh criticism of their lack of funding to develop the project and gamer support in the 
community. He says “The DA is getting fat from the project.. .poisoning the community... “, by not 
reinvesting their percentage in infrastmcture and facilities. “The district was also there (during tiie 
Yikpa conflict), but only as window dressing. Their leader, the district executive did not act strong 
enough.” (William)
• He says that if the TMT was the sole body, rather than 3, things would be done faster because they 
currently require the three to agree to share revenues. Since none of the three think they are currently 
getting a fair share of the revenues it is difficult for them to share for anything. (William)
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Cleophas. Private Consultant and Wli Elder. Educated and experienced in international development, but 
not interested in the village strife over the waterfall project. He would rather engage in the project as a 
business owner by putting up a bar/club for tourists to spend money on. A strong asset to the 
community with ideas of reform and management, but hesitant to get involved with something he has 
seen in his work as difficult to accomplish.
• Guy is one of the most educated residents in Wli. He has worked for NGO’s nationally and across 
Africa for the past 20 years. He is in his 50’s. He is one of the clan heads in the village.
• Despite his intimate knowledge of development work, budgeting, projects o f all kinds, he is not 
part of the TMT because of his absence to work elsewhere. He was commissioned by the Ghana 
Wildlife Society, as part of their Gbledi project assessment, to write a document about possibly 
incorporating the Wli community and waterfall with them. This document provided valuable 
background information on the community as well as his critiques of both the waterfall and Ghana 
Wildlife Society project ideas.
• Unlike William and Kodzo Aza, Cleophas doesn’t feel the pressure to act on his critiques of the 
project. He is candid to talk about them but doesn’t feel it is in his interest or responsibility to change 
them. He was appointed by William as a member of the TMT review committee.
• He says the environment the project operate in is difficult because of how secretive and non­
transparent it is. The TMT was absolutely against the Gbledi/Ghana Wildlife Society expansion 
project. They feared $ sharing, and didn’t want anything to share with Gbledi. Ghana Wildlife Society 
also didn’t show them the overall budget which made them as well as Gbledi landowners very 
skeptical of Ghana Wildlife Society motives.
• He thinks the TMT has too much unchecked power and says they do not represent the community 
well. “They formed themselves and then wrote their own laws. It should be like that. The must be 
appointed to do a task and given guidelines. Now they can say ‘we are going to hire 4 more guides and 
pay them 400,000’. Who is going to approve that, to assure its not just making a job for someone?”
• He recommends having a board of elders above the TMT, not to take part in regular management, 
but as something for the TMT to be accountable to. “The board will not have an overbearing control 
over the TMT, but they will have to be approved annually according to their activities.” He thinks an 
advisoiy board would be more representative of the village than the TMT, however he said he realizes 
that there are no neutral parties in Wli since the project has become so contested.
• He is concerned about the exclusion of youth in the TMT and project. “In the case of jobs and 
benefits offered to youth, there are only a few guide positions. When tourists come they 
(TMT/Wildlife) didn’t want them to be disturbed by youth wanting to guide them to the falls and 
harass them. So they ban that. But the youth argue tiiat if tiiey cannot have that source of income they 
will not do communal labor. And, in fact, they will choose to hunt to get a source of revenue from the 
project area instead. However, they have been taught that when tourists are not coming because of the 
gunshots or cut and burned areas it hurts everyone in the community.”
• He thinks the project needs to be more forthcoming with budget details, but also more focused on 
sub-budgets for individual activities. He approaches things from his background of project plans, 
budgets, and reports. He says a lot of the problems arise when the elders see the total budget, or 
billions of cedis and think “billions of cedis and you pay us this (%)!”
Lodge Owner. Built their lodge based on the waterfall tourism. Feel the TMT is corrupt but the Wildlife 
Officers are also ineffective managers. The village is unwilling to change to address the TMT 
problems or wider problems in the village in general for development. She thinks a lot of it is due to 
money and bribes, and village rivalries and jealousy. She hopes their lodge can be an example to 
villagers to do something for themselves.
• German couple owning the Wli Waterfall Logde that is only a few years old. They came and 
bought land to construct their 3 room guesthouse. When expats come from Accra they often stay 
there.
• She sees the problems as conflicts within the village due to differences in power, like youth vs. 
chiefs, TMT vs. Wildlife, or as simply corruption.
• She says there were elections after the four year probationary period, but the old TMT refused to 
step down arguing that they would not change their status until the Wildlife Division withdrew. The
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wildlife said it would be there to train and help the TMT transition into management. The DA was 
supposed to uphold this co-management.
• She feels the revenues are not being shared, that they are embezzled by a few of the top leaders, 
the same ones that refuse to change the TMT.
• She blames the village elders and chiefs for not being progressive with village development. She 
describes them as being unwilling to change and incorporate ideas from the village youth. She 
described them as corrupt as well, using an experience with being hired to prepare food for a village 
festival only to have the chiefs back out of the plan because she wasn’t willing to bribe them for their 
business.
•  She has had several conflicts with villagers over working for her, selling her fruit, helping with 
construction etc...She now goes to Hohoe to buy fruit just to avoid local disputes and jealousy.
•  She agrees with trying to force out the Wildlife Officers. She says they are ineffective at 
controlling poaching. She says the village denies responsibility for these as well, always blaming fires, 
hunting, and boundary disputes on the Togolese.
• She also disagrees with the prices and restrictions put on tourists who come to the falls. She 
would like it to be less expensive and let tourists go by themselves to the falls and hike in other places. 
They tried to put up markers for a hiking trail around their lodge, but she said guides from the TMT 
pulled them up.
• She is not interested in helping the situation change because she sees it as a hopelessly corrupt 
group, but she wishes their guesthouse would be an example to villagers that they can start private 
businesses also and profit from the waterfall.
Anthony. Head Wildlife Officer. He is more happily part of the Wildlife Division hierarchy, frustrated by 
the post he currently fills, and wants to be reassigned to somewhere he can manage according to the 
books. He is frustrated with the TMT/Elders, especially what he see’s as personal threats to him. His 
reaction to this is also negative and uncooperative. He has taken many proactive management steps in 
the past (guides, bridges, borders), and sees the TMT as not being capable of managing, rather they 
just want the money.
• Anthony is the only member of any bodies of management that is not Ewe. He is from the Costal 
Region near Cape Coast. He is about 45 years old and almost always speaks in English even though he 
speaks Ewe fine.
• He seems to be overcompensating for the lack of respect he gets from the TMT and village by the 
way he acts. He also usually wears the official military style officer uniform. The other officers never 
wore these, and besides the chiefs dressing in kente cloth for the meetings, everyone (elders, TMT, 
guides, officers) always dressed like average villagers. Besides his dress, he diligently does all of his 
office duties (never acting informal like everyone else), writing receipts and keeping log book records. 
He also listens to the radio rather than socializing and seems pretty sharp on political news. He takes 
his position more seriously than the 2 others, possibly anyone period.
•  He said that when “gazetted” in the 70’s it wasn’t quite real because they “didn’t have the judicial 
powers” (they didn’t buy the land for the sanctuaiy). He says I’ll have to go through his supervisor in 
Ho to get any of the Wildlife management plans.
• He came to Wli just before the 2000 management changes began. He started working in Wli in 
1999. He was new but part of a 3 man team. Back in the begirming there were as many as 12 officers 
at Agumatsa WS. In 2000 the newly formed TMT “gave them and ultimatum” that the TMT would 
take over everything by May 2000. This prompted a DA meeting between TMT and Wildlife Division 
superiors where the percentages were worked out.
• In the 2000 meeting with TMT, DA and Wildlife, they decided that locals would get 57% and start 
training to take over positions, draft a wildlife plan (to manage the lands inheld, like what crops and 
trees to plant) for in and outside of the sanctuary.
• He said since then “we had been going along for the past 2 years handing over, preparing the TMT 
to take over. Now this decision comes through and we don’t know. I got my orders from my superior, 
but haven’t heard what they will do with us. Its about taking control of the $ now. Not using the 
books, not going through the DA, then getting our shares.”
• The elders informed him that they made the decision not to use the books to collect revenues, and 
not to partition them. Thus taking away one of the 2 jobs of the officers, but also hiding any data on $
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and no longer sharing. So now he hasn’t even been going to the office anymore to work, “only to 
check up. Its like I should be here, but I can’t.”
• At that time anyone who brought tourists to the village could be a guide. Anthony Their only 
compensation was from tips. He decided to change that to stop begging problems, or guides refusing 
small tips. He decided to start training village guides and giving them a fixed fee as an attempt to 
improve the tourism experience, decrease competition over tourists. After that youth from the village 
were discouraged from approaching tourists if they were not one of the guides. Anthony said “they are 
not special guides. They are just guys that lead people there.” He said this in front of Emanuel the 
guide. Tony was very bitter by this point in his work in Wli and was commonly mean to everyone but 
the other officers.
• He told me, “I haven’t been myself (to the falls) for some time, some days or even weeks. I had 
my official moto stolen, from my house. They broke the window and opened the door. They (thieves) 
did not come from Accra to steal it. They are from here, to go sell it. Now I am working with the 
Chiefs (on the TMT) to find the ones. I am working in this community for these people. If they don’t 
want me they should give me some signals.” “I just don’t want to be here.. .if Felix is here I’d just as 
soon not come to service.”
•  To do repairs they all have to agree and discuss before getting any funds and doing the work.
From the wildlife % he said they used to be sending most to a central government account, but now 
they don’t. Once the revenues are divided, the remaining percentage pays for officer salaries only.
• Also said he doesn’t know if it will continue to be a protected area since there is no picture of the 
falls in this years Forestry Commission Calendar. He lamented that it usually is because it is one of 
Ghana’s best attractions. This seemed like another blow to his ego, no longer working at one of the 
top wildlife sanctuaries.
• He says the farmers continue to farm inside the boundaries because they have no other land, but 
that doesn’t make a forest possible. So he has been trying to maintain just the front border because 
people don’t farm on the uphill side.
Felix. Assistant Wildlife Officer. Felix is working in his second assigned post as a Wildlife Officer. He is 
frustrated by most aspects of his work including: not being trained and promoted by the Wildlife 
Division, the negative tactics of the TMT to push the officers out, the lack of respect and authority by 
villagers for the rules, and having to be in the office.
• Felix and I began talking about his history as a Wildlife Officer. He started in 1994 in his 
hometown where the Kalakpa Resource Reserve. He worked there for 4 years without being promoted 
or trained, and was transferred to Agumatsa Sanctuaiy here in Wli. Officers have no formal training 
and he doesn’t know of any documents other than the map of Ghana’s protected areas that is on the 
wall.
• He was and is still frustrated with his work. He says, “some people work 10 years without being 
promoted. For very little. Someone can work their whole career in the same position. Its not 
satisfying, (local) people don’t like you in this job. We have to stop them from doing what they like to 
do (cutting and hunting). So they (Wildlife Division) have to make us happy too (promote us). But 
only those in Accra get appointed.”
• Wildlife Department began the project in 1975 with no revenue sharing. It was started because of 
the waterfall and bats. “Gradually the people started coming, money started coming, and the 
community saw we were making money from under them.” Now the revenue sharing is 57% TMT, 
23% Wildlife, 20% DA and they want to push Wildlife out.
• He is also frustrated with the position the TMT puts the officers in. “Today, like that letter you 
brought in. If not for you telling him I should read it, he, the DA said T’ll file it’. But there it will 
never be available for anyone who comes here to see.” He says the community is “taking everything 
into their own hands” and “pushing the wildlife out of everything.”
• He even noted the new signs the TMT painted to put along the trail. “Look, they all have rules: no 
weapons, no cutting, no litter, bats are part of the ecosystem... These are all Wildlife (division) laws. 
But on the sign they even just wrote ‘Agumatsa Sanctuary’ rather than ‘Wildlife Sanctuary’.”
• As for field work, the Officers keep the boundary cut and patrol to stop trapping, cutting, and 
hunters. He said, “we normally work all week. Only when the revenue collector is not here, we have
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to be here.” (In all my visits I only recall seeing the officers go into the field once. The boundary was 
always well maintained, but nine times out of ten Felix was at home when I passed by his house.)
• No locals are allowed to go to the falls on Easter Monday itself because it is such a popular tourist 
destination for Ghanaians fi*om other parts of the country. Easter Monday works differently than 
usual. Tickets are pre-printed and sold all over the village by guides and members of the Accra Youth 
Association, who are home for the holidays and assist/take precedence over the usual guides. This 
group also runs the half way checkpoint gates. They sell tickets there as well. The prices are uniform 
(5000 adult, 2000 child) to make things smoother. They estimated 2000 visitors yesterday
( 10,000,000cedis)! The Youth also sold Tshirts and calendars. These profits go only to the TMT, not 
shared like other general revenues.
• He says Ghanaian’s idea of tourism is not compatible with the goals of a wildlife sanctuary, “but 
realize that is very rare. It only happens one or two days a year.”
• Today, is the local’s day, but non-locals can go by buying a ticket as usual. While sitting at the 
office for an hour with Felix at least 150 people passed without paying, many had to be strangers. The 
obvious strangers that arrived by taxi’s came to die office and begged with excuses like they couldn’t 
come yesterday. Felix eventually let all of them go fi-ee, but you could see him getting more and more 
depressed each time.
Alfonse. Agumatsa Guide. One of the original guides, sees the TMT as an improvement in management 
and benefits for the Sanctuary. He doesn’t discuss things as problems, or tiiink too critically about 
developing the project. He is generally easy going and does what he has to, farming, charcoal, 
gardening, guiding to get by but doesn’t worry about others. He thinks hunting should stop, but 
doesn’t take personal responsibility to stop it because they are his friends. He would like the guides to 
be paid more but knows he has a good job as well. Alfonse was an excellent research aid with helping 
me integrate and introducing me to the right informants.
• About 30, Ewe, yoimger son of one of the village chiefs. Unmarried and opportunist. Besides 
guiding, he farms and makes charcoal. We discussed other income generating ideas and with my help 
he started a gardening project for lettuce, cabbage, and green peppers.
• One of the original guides trained by the project. Like TMT members, guides were also appointed 
through the clan system. Each clan nominated someone, from each o f the three villages, and the TMT 
chose them based primarily on their English speaking abilities. Three guides were originally trained, 
followed by two newer guides.
• The guides work 6 days a week. Alfonse said they make only 80,000cedis per month unlike 
Emanuel’s 200,000 and Lawrence’s 50,000. He said the revenues from guide fees (5,000cedis per 
visitor) alone go into the millions most months, but this doesn’t go only to guides. They are on a 
probationary period, even though it’s been many years since they started. They are petitioning the 
TMT to get a salary increase to 300,000cedis per month.
• He doesn’t know why the receipts are divided up into entrance, guide, and bridge fees when they 
are all lumped back together as revenue.
• The Wildlife Division has labeled some of the largest trees along the trail to the falls. Alfonse 
pointed these out to me to tell me something about their value or history in village use. Some of them 
were native and others planted by the NCRC tree nursery project.
• Alfonse said the falls play a large role in village history. They were discovered by Kuma hunters 
and considered a spiritual place. He said “because at that time the area was very wild, you couldn’t 
just go in and hunt. People who did were very strong spiritually.” Later people from Wli settled at the 
second falls and used the falls for ceremonies. He said they have only one ceremony annually now, the 
rest have been replaced by tourism.
• He said that before the TMT was created the Wildlife Division started giving the villages 25% of 
revenues, but they demanded more, and now get 57%. He said “It is much better now. Before, 
whenever anything was to be one we had to contribute. Now we have the 57% to use.” He wants the 
project to continue to separate more or completely from the Wildlife Division.
• He said originally they just guided people on walks along the trail, through the stream. Then the 
TMT built bridges but the washed out during the rains. Then there was frmding through the Wildlife 
Commission, or DA from the World Bank to build the current bridges.
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• We happened to pass two hunters coming back from the falls with bats. He said that guides don’t 
tell or confront the hunters because of fear, since the hunters have guns. People who are caught 
sneaking in are made to pay double, and firewood is not normally cut, although there are accidental 
fires from Togo and cigarettes. But poaching is blatant, no control.
• Bats have an excellent market in Wli, 3000 cedis, “You can take 100 (bats) and finish selling in 30 
minutes.” I asked if they couldn’t have a regular hunting time and permit system. He said, “Hunters 
here are not like you in Europe, if  you say go do this, pay, and stop at some point, they v/ill never 
respect it.” He said the hunters should not get compensated because there are plenty of hunting areas 
outside of AWS and the sanctuary should be respected.
Emanuel. Agumatsa Guide. Supports the TMT concept, but thinks there is a lack of education,
openness, and planning. He thinks the chiefs have too much control and are not receptive to village 
needs and taking action. He also thinks the village demands too much from the sanctuary. He thinks 
the Wildlife officer’s role has changed and they should leave because they are no longer effective or 
respected locally. He wants the villagers to do everything, but wants help to organize and train.
• Ewe, about 45, extremely optimistic. Thinks everything is achievable through education and 
planning.
• The village counterpart of three Peace Corps Volunteers in Wli during 1996-99. Worked with 
volunteers on reforestation NCRS that was the original instigation for entering the waterfall project. 
NCRS/Japanese embassy funded the building of a tree nursery and research area at the base of the 
sanctuary.
• His younger sister recently died of AIDS and he wanted to know iff  could do any formations in 
the village on aids, or somehow get a volunteer or someone assigned to the village for health 
education.
• Now he works as a guide for the TMT. He is paid 200,000 per month. First the revenues go to 
Hohoe where the DA, Wildlife, and TMT divide them. Then he and the wildlife officers go to Hohoe 
to get paid. He says the money system is unusual. Usually the DA asks for the revenue total and then 
demands a % tax. But in the AWS they take the money and then pay the TMT and Wildlife their 
shares. For this role in controlling money sharing they take 20%. He and others think this is too much 
without other benefits from DA.
• Feels the lack of Wildlife Officers assigned to AWS limits their effectiveness and their respect by 
the village. Originally there were 12 officers when the area was created in 1973, but that has gradually 
decreased. He says “if you’re going to take most away (so they aren’t effective), why don’t you take 
them all?”
• He says the village attitude towards the sanctuary has changed over time. Its not about 
conservation anymore, its about the role of the government, money, and how the Wildlife Officers 
have changed their duties over time. Ironically, it is the bookwork that keeps the wildlife officers the 
most busy. Whenever the revenue collector isn’t there, which is often, the officers man the desk. 
Emanuel said “People, we don’t like to see them working like that, behind a desk. Its not there job, 
that’s not why they’re here. They should be patrolling. But then they say we cannot control our own 
people to stop poaching. They give us examples, stories about their old projects in their home towns, 
how they would stop hunters and bring them to justice.”
• He said that the volunteer who organized the TMT to take on project management ended her 
service just as the TMT was getting started. Then her replacements both ended up leaving after just 9 
months. So he feels the TMT didn’t have enough training and guidance, which has led to problems.
• He sees the need for other small business projects like a restaurant, guesthouse, and others, but 
sees a lack of education to accomplish these. He said they need training to manage these activities and 
need a volunteer to organize them because they are not used to that kind of work.
• The problem is who will be on the TMT. He said the current group was appointed by the elders, 
each clan gave 2 representatives. Now their time has expired according to their constitution, but their 
replacement is contested.
• Village and Accra youth formed a separate Youtii Development Group to replace the current 
TMT, but the chiefs and elders (current TMT) will not grant them power. He said “they want to 
replace the TMT and overturn the chiefs. If the chiefs say ‘ok you replace the TMT’ it’s like 
overturning the chiefs also because it’s their system. The TMT is heavily influenced by the elders for
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decision making, especially spending money. He said the TMT makes a decision, but then their 
decision goes to the elders for a decision, and then it comes back to the TMT. The chiefs demand 
money from the TMT to do something.
• He feels the TMT members are distant and non-actionaiy. He hears ideas from the tourists he 
guides, but when he offers them to the TMT nothing happens. They are also non-receptive when he 
says there is too much trash and over-use. After Easter Monday he told them about trash and how trees 
they planted got broken off, but “they (TMT) don’t want to hear that story”. He say’s the TMT is 
about power and money, rather than developing the project.
• He said the village is “too used to the money. Before, if  there was something, we would beat the 
gongolier and everyone would contribute. Now everyone points to the waterfall for financing.”
• Also said there is a lack of information exchange and plarming. For the village to be more 
effective than the wildlife officers they need to plan and use the money for something. He wants all 
the work to be done by trained villagers. He said “if the wildlife isn’t going to do anything, the small 
effort the village government makes should get their 23%. It depends on if they spend the money on 
new guards. We need to have a plan.”
• He said the holiday tourism was bad for the sanctuary wildlife. Said there used to be baboons in 
the sanctuary that now live further away on the range, towards Afadjato. He said “With all this sound 
they won’t come back here.”
• The way Ghanaians celebrate is at odds with conservation. They drink heavily, play music at the 
falls, transport food and cook at the falls, leave garbage everywhere, and want quicker transport by 
moto or car to the falls.
Alfred. Agumatsa Guide. One of the original guides. Complains that the guide salary is not enough to 
support a family, but keeps them away from their farms too long. He sees hunting, revenue sharing, 
and lack of spending by the TMT as other big issues. He thinks hunting should stop, and blames most 
of it on Togolese. He wants strict enforcement and more severe penalties for violators. He doesn’t 
think the DA benefits the project, and thinks the TMT don’t spend money wisely or enough on project 
development.
• He said the guide’s wages (200,000 cedis/month) was too low. He cannot work 6 days a week 
without going to his farm on that salary, plus their uniform expenses are theirs.
• Alfred doesn’t think there should be any hunting, “why should we be hassling animals, nobody is 
chasing us. Lets leave the wildlife.”
• Blames hunting and throwing rocks on the Togolese from Yikpa. He said, “They mostly Togolese 
come from the other side and roll rocks down to scare the bats. Then the bats fly around and land in 
trees near them and they shoot them. But sometimes they throw rocks down like last week when there 
are guides and tourists here. They threw big rocks and hit one guide and broke a section of the bridge. 
We called the police and they came, but did not catch them.” Alfonse and other echoed this, and said it 
is the Togolese who do the burning as well.
• He had said that some villages in Togo get small cuts of revenue—the chief’s anyway—to try to 
stop their encroachment on the sanctuary. He said it would be better to take all the guns away in Togo, 
like they are doing in Ghana.
• He said gradually, with tough examples. When people are arrested and taken to court they will be 
fined or put in prison. After 2 or 3 cases there will be an example. He said the chiefs need to collect 
people’s guns also and give harder punishment to hunters. He said it was because of the chiefs that 
people are not sent to court.
• He complains that the TMT doesn’t spend their $ either, because the elders will speak badly about 
getting money and immediately spending it. He sees lots of things that need to be done including 
facilities, food/drinks, guide uniforms, safety communication to tiie falls, lodging etc.. .but the $ is not 
being spent. I asked what the 10% village $ was used for. He said schools at first, but then said a lot 
of the coffers are used for unrelated things by the chiefs, like their transportation to Hohoe and 
ceremonies.
• He wants the DA to back out as well as GWD because they are not contributing. “They (DA) tried 
to have the road to Hohoe redone, but it has sat for several years still unfinished. They have not given 
anything for the facility or guides. They only take $ out.”
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• He thinks everyone should pull out and leave the TMT, but keep it as a sanctuary for education, 
but that the TMT has to decide to spend better.
Moses, Agumatsa bat hunter.
• He usually hunts in small groups. Hunts both in the sanctuary for bats, and outside for 
grasscutters, monkeys, and bushfowl.
• He hunts once a week usually, sometime he doesn’t at all if  it is during a heavy crop season or he 
doesn’t have the money to buy cartridges which cost 3,500 cedis in Hohoe. But today he shot 5 bats 
with one cartridge, and said he often gets 8 depending really on how many they can recover once they 
fall in the forest. Their strategy is to scare the bats off the cliff by throwing rocks. When the bats 
scatter and land in trees they get up close shots.
• He sells some and prepares others when they have no meat in the house. He says people come to 
his house regularly to buy, but it is all secretive. Even the TMT members buy from him.
•  How he benefits fi*om the waterfall. He said “No, only the landowners and Chiefs.” I brought up 
the idea of time and day hunting restrictions like hunting hours from 5-8am. He said it could work. I 
also brought up the idea of having license fees and bag limits, but he was not interested in this.
• He learned to hunt 5 years ago form his father. People go whenever they can and always come 
back with something. But they don’t always go to the Sanctuary. They know when the TMT is there 
and what days it is gone, they go those days.
• When they see their fiiends, like Alfonse, he won’t turn them in because they know each other. 
But he said “If the TMT catches you with bats you will be in trouble.”
• How he thought the project could help him. He said there should be a better road to bring more 
tourists. Then he said he would like to grow cabbages so “when the whites come to see the falls, 
they’ll see the cabbage and buy them.”
• He said a bat sells for 3,000 cedis, in comparison to 50,000 for a grasscutter. He said this is 
because “a bat is not a meat, not like an animal, like a bird.” “But you can have them at the house and 
eat them 1 by 1 to make sauce, light sauce for fufii.”
Wli Charcoal Makers.
• Young man, 25-30, sells charcoal in Wli in small quantities daily for household use. He charges
2,000 for a tomato can worth, and gets 20,000 for the larger bags he sells in Hohoe.
• He makes the coal from mostly mango trees on his distant farm. He cuts only part of the tree at a 
time, enough to make one batch, but not kill the tree. He makes the coal at the farm, then transports 
the coal. He uses the same method as is common in Togo.
• 1 asked why he makes charcoal when he and most people use dry wood in the village. He said, 
“because charcoal is cash.” He also said many women in die village make it for the same reason.
• John, Charcoal Maker in Cocoa forest on the trail to Agumatsa Falls. John has cut down a I meter 
diameter Odum tree into charcoal making chunks. He paid the sawyer a fee of 50,000cedis and intends 
to use the entire tree to make about 30 bags of charcoal.
• He is doing this to maximize profit, so he will sell all the bags in Hohoe where the market price is 
higher, 15-18,000 per bag. So he should make roughly 500,000 cedis before the sawyer and 
transportation fees are deducted. He is from the family that owns all the land up to the 2"** bridge.
• He said his plan is to plant bananas and taro in the gap created by cutting down the tree, and use 
the profits to buy cocoa seedlings to start a new farm on other land.
• Mary, guide of Agumatsa on charcoal making on the trail. “Well they aren’t actually doing 
charcoal in the sanctuary, just at the beginning of the trail. They have farms up to the 4* bridge. The 
border is far from the falls isn’t it?”
• This goes along with the general concern of managing for tourism rather than for the environment. 
When 1 asked about charcoal, she immediately thought that 1 meant it would detract from the visitors 
experience of the falls, and if it was far enou^ from that it and farming were okay.
Village Youth, Wli.
• A group of about 20-25 young men filtered in throughout the meeting. 1 began by saying 1 have 
been meeting all the interest groups in the village to get their views on the project.They replied, “what
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project?” When I said the Sanctuary they grumbled and said, “Those questions are for the TMT. We 
are under them (we can’t speak about them as a group). We only see what plans they draw.”
• What activities do village youth do? communal labor, building projects, school and church 
projects, cleaning projects. Emanuel, the guide and PCV counterpart, was helping with Ewe 
interpretation. He said, “for these things they are all coming quickly.” But he said, “We do not do 
communal labor for the sanctuary project because there are enough people employed who earn their 
daily bread from it. If we go there is no direct benefit (like there is for those people).”
• How are Youth represented by TMT? “We are not”. .. “The meetings with youth are for the 
security council, to protect the forest or for some problem. Normally the TMT does not meet like 
that.”
• How are Youth in Wli connected to the Youth Assoc, in Accra? “We are the same. Our brothers 
there are interested in seeing our project go as well as it can.”
• How do youth raise ideas to the TMT if there are problems? “We talk to the youth chief. We used 
to have meetings. He presents the ideas to the elders, who present to the TMT. Anything must go 
through the chiefs to preserve harmony.”
• So how did the Accra Youth consult with you? “They actually went directly to the elders without 
touching us. That was not how it should be, but they felt so strongly they went directly.”
• What are village income generating activities other than small farming surplus? “Nothing right in 
the village. When people learn trades they go to work in Hohoe.”
• How would they like to benefit from the project, “Pork husbandry, chickens, tree plantations. We 
would like these projects to employ the village; pay our carpenters and masons to get jobs and then 
afterwards the projects will create income as well, by themselves.”
Afadiato
Rubin, Ghana Wildlife Society project manager o f Small Scale Enterprise development.
• The small-scale enterprise part of the project began in 2001 with 20 groups: 5 farming, oil, gari, 
mise soap making and carving, animal husbandry.
• The concept of small-scale enterprise component of the project was developed prior to doing any 
village studies o f project possibilities, as well as the concept that small-scale enterprise’s had to be 
done in groups. He said, “the reason to group was to share resources. Things like sprayers and push 
carts couldn’t be bought for individuals. And there are successes of group work in Northern Ghana, 
especially women.”
• 20 groups formed and submitted budgets and a analysis worksheet/questionnaire to assess their 
experience, group history, and bank account. From the original 20, 12 were selected as good. 8 were 
decided to not be fimded yet, but the Project Management Committee didn’t want there to be conflicts 
between groups so they were all funded. “They split the funds between the groups, but not equally. It 
depended on tiie activity.”
• All groups were given a check to cash and some materials. Cutlasses and hoes to farming groups, 
and machines to other groups. The materials were all purchased directly by the project and a few 
community reps, rather than the groups using their checks to purchase diem.
• The groups were given training on bookkeeping and some on technical aspects, “But most of the 
activities were not new, people have been doing them since infancy.”
• None of the farming groups have succeeded. “The amount of lands used as group lands didn’t 
increase proportionally. Previously 1 person was cultivating 14 an acre. We could have helped to 
increase each person to 1 acre, but instead 23 people grouped together to farm 5 acres. The possibility 
of increasing production isn’t being met. Plus the 5 acres want not even maintained to produce.”
• Rice and yams all failed supposedly due to a lack o f rain. “But the reason they failed was lack of 
labor and commitment. When tiiey got the $ they decided to divide it up as individuals and work 
alone. One man said his whole field of cassava went rotten. The problem is working with groups, 
people don’t work together and apply themselves the same.”
• “We failed on our part also. We were not set up to monitor at that point (June 2001). Since then 
we have given group fUnds to farmers in Fodome-Ahor and done the payment in phases. Phase one to 
clear (the land) and purchase inputs, 2 to plant. Like that, we are seeing results. But still it is always
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few doing the work for all, even the time o f harvest.” “We are less interested in farming projects. We 
know all over Ghana that farmers don’t pay loans.”
• The soap, oil, and gari groups are all having trouble with markets for their finished products. Oil 
making has not worked as groups either. “They are more concerned over sharing the running of the 
machine and paying back the group than developing or increasing their production. The families not in 
the groups have increased their production more, so we are looking to make the machine community 
owned (rather than group owned).”
• Ghana Wildlife Society tried to find an export market for gari, but the buyers wanted the yellow 
gari, versus the white that ûie village makes, and they demanded a diyer product. The soap making 
group learned how to make long bar soap, comparable to that sold in the markets, but because of the 
large soap companies keeping prices down “the women are less serious.”
• Ghana Wildlife Society has been trying to seek out which members of most groups are really 
serious and then make those people individuals with their own loan to pay back and own materials. 
Such as the beekeeping projects that are now 5 hives per person, rather than group hives.
• “We see that people view the 1̂  loans as a gift to the community for their initiating the project and 
donating their lands, like a payment.” “The community has worked on the conservation part very well, 
but they don’t want to see just rainforest. They also want to see village development.”
• “The project is waiting for approval of its 2"** stage of fimding. Has been operating with very low 
budget.
• Rubin sees the snail raising as a great example of individual responsibility and commitment. The 
way they have constructed the tanks and do all the day to day without any financing, just the starter 
seed snails. “We have told them we can take them back if they are not doing a good job, we have with 
one lady. And we are trying to buy the adults when they are grown.”
• “We have tried two aspects, the group work didn’t succeed but neither did the individuals in the 
groups when they separated. We are now trying to dissolve the groups to find those that are serious.”
Edem, Ghana Wildlife Society Project Director.
• The project oversees 12km  ̂of reserve area surrounded by a buffer zone. The three villages 
involved are Gbledi-Gbogame, Gbledi-Chebi, and Ahor (also in order of amounts of land donated to 
make up the 12km). He drew me a map sketch of the land in protection stretching from Afadjato (the 
border between Gbledi and Liati traditional areas) North to the border between Ahor and Wli-Todzi. 
The buffer extends East from the core boundary into No Mans land and Togo.
• He described the long standing boundary dispute on the south end of the reserve between Liati and 
Gbledi, both claiming ownership to parts of Afadjato mountain and both having ecotourism projects. 
Gbledi separated itself into a separate traditional area in the 1980’s. Since 1999 the villages have had a 
gentlemans agreement not to disturb tourists that come from either side, ie if they come from Liati and 
hike down the Ghana Wildlife Society trail. You can easily see the fire scars on the hillside where the 
boundary is. He says this is because of persistent burning on the Liati side that developed more fire 
resistant species.
• He regretted the “big mistake” Ghana Wildlife Society made early on in the project by bringing in 
a TV crew to shoot publicity video for Afadjato without consulting Liati. The video was partially shot 
on Liati lands, but promoted the attraction as being solely Gbledi and Ghana Wildlife Society.
• The project breaks down tourism revenues as such: 50% landowners, 5% district assembly, 20% 
project management committee, 10% traditional authorities, and 15% community. All landowners 
share a similar amount of revenue, not dependant on the acres donated, but Gbledi gets a larger 
proportion because their village donated the most. Community percentages are broken down further 
into villages and then families.
• The Project Management Committee (Project Management Committee) is made up of 
representatives from the following: Ghana Wildlife Society, liaison, project manager, 3 chiefs of the 
three villages, youth rep, women’s rep, district assembly rep, Accra youA rep, Ahor steering 
committee rep, and health and sanitation rep. This committee makes all project decisions together.
• I asked Edem about how Youth and Women are represented in the Project Management 
Committee. He said “There are women’s reps on the Project Management Committee, but they are not 
vocal. The youth (rep) participates well in meetings, but doesn’t get the word spread.. .There are
246
internal problems, something between him (youth rep) and Togbega and other things. He needs to beat 
the gong-gong and call them, but because of (intemaJ problems) he can’t.”
• The elders of Gbledi approached Ghana Wildlife Society in 1996. They wrote the plan that was 
accepted in 1998 by the Dutch Embassy. He says landowners bought into the project mostly for the 
tourism and small business development aspects, and to a lesser extent conservation benefits. At first 
the project acceptance was dependant on the area of the reserve. When Gbledi and Chebi alone wasn’t 
big enough they went to Ahor and Wli. Ahor was interested, but Wli was interested one day and not 
the next. Eventually Ghana Wildlife Society decided not to waste their time. Edem did lots of the 
original interviews with landowners because the project manager, Isaac, didn’t speak fluent Ewe. He 
said, “they (landowners) would say ‘yes’ to the conservation benefits, but they say, ‘but what am I 
going to eat today?”’
• The project progressed to include 8 guides from Gbledi and Chebi. These began working with the 
project during the initial surveys. They were nominated by village clan heads/ sub chiefs and 
interviewed by the project managers. The three officers are contract employees of Ghana Wildlife 
Society, rather than the community, so they will only be there as long as there is funding for the project 
from external sources. There is also a secretary from Gbledi and the liaison.
• The guides do all of the field monitoring and trap sweeping. Surveys are done for birds, 
mammals, insects, plants, and to collect traps. The project managers assist with the technical aspects 
of the surveys. He joked about the guides interchanging the word guide with guards often, “the guides 
who are also the guards!”
• He described several benefits of the project including: harvesting of fruits fix)m the forest that can 
only grown in places that don’t bum (therefore protecting from bushfires as well), social benefits of 
changing hunters into guides, creating a forum to discuss conservation and increase consciousness 
(they did many brainstorming activities in the beginning to discuss resources), experiences in group 
projects and $ managing. He also mentioned increased rainfall and animal populations.
• He still sees problems with bushfires, hunting and trapping, and disputes between traditional areas. 
He thinks the small scale enterprise activities developed too fast, without having enough emphasis on $ 
managing skills. The groups dissolved and have not repayed loans, and machines have broken.
• The friture of the project is somewhat secure for the short term. The Dutch embassy has agreed to 
fund a second phase of the project for 2 additional years. He sees a few things as key to this 
succeeding: increasing the number of liaisons to 3, one for each village, to increase representation, and 
replication of the Ahor steering committee. This committee is unique to Ahor and is formed from the 
village committees they had from working with the Ghana Fire Service.
• He said he doesn’t think the village is ready to take over yet, someone from the outside needs to 
stay at least one more year. Specifically someone to help with $ management for some time after 
Ghana Wildlife Society pulls out. He doesn’t think the Project Management Committee is functional 
yet.He also says there will need to be more external funding. Tourism revenue was 12,000,000 since 
1998, but that was nowhere near their expenses. He was dejected at times about the loans from the 
small scale enterprise groups.
• He emphasized over and over that to him it was a conservation project, not economic or tourism 
even though he said the reason landowners agreed to join and came to Ghana Wildlife Society was for 
$. He mentioned other soft benefits, like “the experience” and increased environmental awareness and 
communication about conservation.
Mancredo, Afadjato Village Project Liaison.
• Togbe introduced himself to me as Chief. That is what Togbe means, but most sub-chiefs 
generally do not use that title in conversation. His wife and children are from Kuma-Konda and now 
work and live in Lome (at Ecobank and another $ firm).
• Ghana Wildlife Society managers only work at the Gbledi site Wed-Friday, usually arriving from 
Accra late in the night Tuesday. This requires them to have a Ghana Wildlife Society vehicle and put 
on lots of miles between the office and project site each week.
• The District Assembly is in charge of distributing $ and development projects to the most worthy 
villages. They had financing from EU microprojects to build a Junior Sec school. Other villages 
applied but DA chose Gbledi. I brought up that DA is one of the 3 partners in the WLI project. He 
said they collect a share of the revenue because they chose to invest in a visitor center there. Also a
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guest house in Wote, but not in Gbledi, so the Afadjato project doesn’t share any authority with the 
DA, They still collect a tax from the project however.
• As for the Chiefs and elders of the village. Each village has a paramount chief (in principle). The 
PC has a right wing, left wing, and back chiefs. Each chief has 2 ‘fathers’-a stool father and father 
father, neither of which are parental. After the paramount chief, each clan has a chief, ser several 
subclan chiefs. A subclan is created anytime a group of a clan disputes being properly represented by 
the clan chief. Subclans can also go extinct when the families continue to many outside Âe clan.
• Today Gbledi has 4 clans. Within Togbe’s clan there are 3 subclans (2 active and 1 extinct). As 
for action, the chiefs represent their groups and report to the government higher up. “The government 
promises many things and lies.”He described the subclans and chief system as problematic. Like when 
the DA has to decide where $ or projects go, they have so many competing chiefs. If they were less in 
number but more organized and prioritized they could be more successful.
•  I described my walk around the village, seeing the JSS, SST, Health Center with nurses from all 
over the countiy coming to work. I said things in the village were looking pretty good (especially in 
comparison to Togo) He agreed and said there priorities now are a library, and gravity fed water 
system(like Chebi) that can give water pressure tin the homes. And maybe a vehicle for the village.
He said in April they have a village development council.
• He mentioned all the equipment from the project. How important the project management was to 
protect it. He said they have had trouble working with groups, so they are going to manage them in the 
community interest with a community fund.
• In the 80’s he came back to Gbledi and was already decided upon to be chief by his family when 
his grandfather died. He arranged for 3 PCV’s in the village, as well as 6 Japanese volunteers and 
some British crews to come for month long work vacations.
• He desribed the whole project as his brain child. He was the one who the guide William described 
as the village ‘well-off from Accra telling the village what a good thing it had to conserve.
• Originally the IBA birders had been coming and he said, “Shouldn’t here be a project here to 
protect this and help the community?” So the Ghana Wildlife Society asked whose land it was and he 
lied saying it was his. That was in the beginning. Now he seems to be getting it straight with all the 
stakeholders, represented.
• He also said the chiefs and elders normally have no legal judicial power, but sometimes when it is 
a 1®* offense, or the person knows they are guilty, they are lenient and give them a local penance, 
usually drinks.
• When talking about he and I meeting with the Chiefs to discuss my research Togbe said, “We are 
not going there to ask for permission. We are going to introduce you and inform him of your 
activities. The only permission needed has already been granted by the office (Ghana Wildlife 
Society). If you ask them for permission the will go into a meeting and put you through all that again. 
We will just go to inform.” Like in Wli, the Chiefs played a veto role in Gbledi and were ‘informed’ 
of Ghana Wildlife Society plans and decisions.
Togbega (Paramount Chief) and Gbledi Village Elders
• The chiefs sat in formation in front of me and Togbe. I gave them a copy of the worksheet and 
they read the questions, deliberated and discussed, and usually Togbega responded. If he didn’t the 
chiefs looked to him for permission and then he would sort of nod with approval after they responded.
• Approximate village populations in Afadjato project area: Gbogame 800, Chebi 565, Gbodti 75, 
Toglo/Agomatsa 400.
• They started tiie project to “get something from the mountain range”, to improve rainfall and 
climate, and stop bushfires.
• The boimdaries of the project are Fodome, Liati, Kuma, and Wli. They played down the boundary 
dispute between Gbogame and Wote by saying the Wote People came from Kuma very late in the 
settlement of the area and do not have the right to use the top of Afadjato. They have, however, over 
time tried to increase their use rights by burning successively higher on the hillside for cultivation and 
thus pseudo use/access rights.
• The history of the Gbledi people was described not differently from all the villages in the study 
area: originally the Ewe people came from Katu (present day Nigeria) migrating to Notse (Togo) then 
on to Kpele-Tutu then to Akabadji (present Akata) to Wormukpene to Afedome, and finally Gbledi
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around 1800. They described a different legend about the Chief in Notse being a wicked drunk, which 
forced the people to escape his high walled prison like village. They splashed water on the mud wall 
repetedly over a period of time until it was weak enough to break through and sneak away. They said 
the escapees walked away from the village backward so they could always see if they were being 
chased, and to confuse the wicked Chief.
• The village was settled at the base of the mountains because of its rich farmland. They separated 
legally from the Liati Traditional Area in 1952. They said the original clumping of the 2 together was 
because of the colonial capital, at that time under the German Togoland, the capitol was in Kpalime for 
their region.
• Ethnicities present in the project area include Ewe, Kabiye, and migrant farmers from southern 
parts of the Volta Region. All the non-Ewe live in the settlements on top of the mountains 
(Toglo/Agomatsa) rather than in the village.
• The village government hierarchy is as such: Paramount Chief, Divisional Chiefs, Subchiefs, 
Opinion leaders, and community. There is also the Queen Mother who exists separate from the 
hierarchy, whose job it is to translate all of the decisions made by the Paramount Chief to the women.
• The chiefs consider their village to be average for rural poverty all over Ghana. Their entire 
population is made up of peasant farmers. The village consists of 7 stores, 4 bars, 1 guesthouse, 6 
homestay houses, electricity, motorable road, small market on Fridays, and average housing. The 
village also has a area health unit that serves the project area plus Wote for vaccinations, visits, and 
maternity.
• They consider the education level in the village to be high, with many highly educated managers, 
doctors, and engineers. Togbega teaches at the Senior Secondary (high school) technical school. The 
village has a primary school, new junior secondary school, and SST, however they desire a library and 
more space in the JSS and Primary schools.
• Wed is communal labor day and Friday market day when merchants come from Hohoe to sell. 
There are no village taboo’s controlling activities. They see their roll in the Community conservation 
project as “tasking the village youth to participate in conservation activities.”
• Village problems include poverty, mainly due to a great bushfire in 1983 that burned all their 
cocoa and coffee cash crops. They have no collateral to get credit to restart these farms and prices for 
goods in the national economy continue to rise. They also named road erosion, lack of transport as a 
problem. As well as sanitation problems due to a lack of latrines in the village.
• The village has a bore-hole pump water system, which the current population exceeds causing 
breakdowns. They have a project written by a village engineer to tap a stream on the mountain and 
have a gravity fed pressurized water system. They are waiting for an aid agency to “buy the project” 
so they can begin its construction.
Project Management Committee Meeting
• This morning it seemed most of the village came to hear the Ghana Wildlife Society present the 
Chiefs and elders with project revenues/payments. Edem, Rubin, and Togbe were set up in a line of 
plastic chairs on one side of the side street, while the Chiefs were aligned in formation on the other 
side; Togbega center with the sub-chiefs (minus Togbe) all around. The rest of the Project 
Management Committee members were not part of this exchange, but were just part of the general 
village population spread around.
• Edem did most of the speaking on the Ghana Wildlife Society behalf, in Ewe. He described the 
amount of money and percentages to be shared by “community”, “village leaders”, “women”
etc.. This sum was not part of the economic projects, but something to help individuals with household 
living costs and family businesses like farming and women’s commerce. The amounts per family 
sounded substantial, like 400,000 cedis for a woman to buy and sell products.
• Several people from the village spoke out. They were all gathered around in the streets behind the 
Chiefs and Ghana Wildlife Society forming a mass with only the space of the street open. There were 
probably 150 people there. While Edem addressed the elders he walked from the side of the street he 
was seated on into the middle of the circle and spoke to both the chiefs and community, favoring the 
community by turning about to speak in all directions as the village was gathered everywhere and there 
were of course no microphones.
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• The chiefs sat in the chairs to speak, although they were often very animated. Especially Togbega, 
who obviously was the final word on things, often waving his arms and pointing, or waving off topics 
as undisputable for discussion. Other chiefs occasionally stood and stepped forward to quell certain 
questions fi’om the villagers.
• About 6 people total spoke from the village. One man yelled out from a bar very actively. I think 
he was questioning the amount of money per family or the duration of payment because it sparked one 
of the chiefs to respond that he had given up his lands and could be making more that 400,000 by 
farming them, but he accepted the loss for tiie good of the project.
• Next a man stormed into the center of the street shouting at the chiefs about communal labor, and 
the delinquents that skip out. He was very upset, perhaps drunk already, but the chiefs quickly said 
they would call the skippers out and assess them fines. It was obvious that labor wasn’t a large issue 
of the meeting because of how it was quickly passed over. Communal labor is every Wed in Gbledi, 
Tue in Chebi.
• A lady spoke up to restate the problem of certain people still poaching. She made it sound like it 
is still a very significant number of people. She said it isn’t good/honest that the women are given 
money to help the family pay for food/meat and their husbands still go poach. She said it would take 
more personal demands from wives to ask their husbands not to go hunt. She said, “We know when 
they leave, where they are going.” She stated that they are benefiting fi-om the project. “You don’t 
hear people pounding palm nuts anymore, we are benefiting.” From the woman’s comments about 
husbands hunting in the village that it seems the project activities are working to benefit and make oil 
making more efficient, but people are still doing the hunting and charcoal making because they are 
“cash” activities, or extra activities that they can do in addition to the project, partially due to division 
of labor, ie just because the project is helping women doesn’t mean the men will change. It seems to 
also be a matter of the project not making enough of an impact/benefit. The benefits are not enough to 
make them change their activities fi'om say hunting to husbandry.
• A second lady spoke up to mention that I had arrived in the night before and paid her to cook me 
amokple, and that I spoke Ewe. This got a real rouse out of the village. She used it as another 
example of benefit.
• Then Edem and Togbe presented the cash to the chief next to Togbega, who immediately began 
counting it. They also gave Togbega several papers to sign and Rubin took their picture together.
Marseilles, Side Support Representative for Afadjato project.
•  Approximately 40 years old, more well off farmer in the village.
• “At least 80% of youths are in one of the (Afadjato project) groups.” The problem is when they 
(Ghana Wildlife Society) did the feasibility studies for the small scale enterprise projects, they said we 
would find the greatest markets to sell things automatically, ie they overestimated possible profit 
margins, but now the prices of the products are all down, (gari, soap, oil)
• The problem is the groups cant meet together on project ideas or show up on time. Interests don’t 
align. “You (aid agencies/NGO’s) should come and say Took Sasa what do you want to do? (rather 
than demanding groups be formed)”
• “the question of funds being insufficient is something different.” People expect to work for a year 
and get something right away rather than pay back loans and slowly develop something, so now they 
are falling back instead of the original 18 at a meeting you get 6.
• The problem is a lack of values, you whites and us Africans. People here want to do something 
that benefits today, not the future. When I was a kid I went to Senior Secondary after Hohoe. Now 
because of our work our kids can go here. But if projects don’t benefit today people are going to say 
they aren’t good.
• He says that many people are very confused by the project, but says it is greatly because of old 
rich people from Gbledi misleading them about Ghana Wildlife Society, saying Ghana Wildlife 
Society has mismanaged the project, to bet back at Ghana Wildlife Society for not giving them a cut 
off the top of the project, (ie they know how the development system can be corrupted, and want a cut 
for getting the Ghana Wildlife Society into the village in the first place and thus getting their NGO 
salaries and admin fees written into the project)
• When I asked him what he would like from the project he went on a tangent about slavery. He 
said he would like to be a slave, “I would like to have the chance to be like that (a slave), have a job to
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go to everyday, come home to a house kept up for my family, if we have a health problem they (project 
owners) will look after us. . He would like it without the bad treatment. Said it was bad for colonies 
to leave without Ghanaians being fi’ee of mind. “Black people are more wicked to other blacks today.” 
He gave the example of ministers and “big men” that don’t give anything back to the rural 
communities.
Sasa, Project Management Committee Youth Representative.
•  He said the more significant impact on their lives had been the fire of 1983 that burned their cocoa 
fields. “Before then the economy was balanced (between cash and subsistence crops).. .didn’t cultivate 
to sell.”
• He defined youth as usually anyone under 50, but that there are actually no age restrictions. He 
sees his role in the village as encouraging the youth to revitalize cultural activities as benefits of 
organization, not to necessarily come together just to make money right away. He spoke of creating a 
youth center as a place to educate youth groups to start more dynamic projects, by working as groups.
• He described briefly four group project ideas he has been trying to encourage, based with his 
family group and branching outward including modem music traveling around as a band in his bus, 
making clones with several sewing machines the have acquired, farming, and animal husbandry.
• He said he was ^pointed as the village youth representative because he was a real outgoing young 
man; sporting, musical etc.. He was on the district board back in the 80’s when there was a PCV in the 
village. He said it was his brother, a past District Assemblyman, and his idea to originally open the 
village to tourism.
• He says the village youth supply all the labor for the project like patrolling, fire control, building, 
road maintenance, communal labor etc.. .but unlike landowners and elders they don’t get any % of the 
profits. He says “the Project Management Committee is too bureaucratic. They only listen to the ‘big 
cars’ that come from Accra (the business men from Gbledi that initiated the chiefs). I might have a 
better idea, but because they come dressed fine they get listened to.”
• He doesn’t really have any solid ideas. He kept changing what he would call his “really serious 
idea” from fish ponds, community center, or anything that could attract my attention enough to work 
with him.
Agima IV (Asafo), Gbledi landowner.
• His clan includes 3 families. He is the head of the family Zwe, the representative of all lands. But 
he said from the outside the chief is responsible.
• He is not interested in farming the mountain, but says strangers and some members of the clan are. 
His coffee and cocoa were destroyed in the ’83 fire and now the Kabiye dominate the cash crops. He 
concentrates on lower food crop farming and cash making trees, like palms, mangos, and cashews. He 
is not interested in the top also due to fire pressures from Togo. (Agima IV)
• “The young men not advanced in education need the land. The land is not growing; population is. 
The land is there.” He complains about only being able to farm with tenant farmers now because “all 
the youth have left.” (Agima IV)
• They also use wood and coal depending on the women. He says they are “sometimes late or need 
fast heat.” They make and fetch both, or buy coal.
• They eat fish daily, meat from time to time. With his pension his wife buys when people in the 
village slaughter. He says 10-15 years ago he and his brother consumed a lot o f game from the bush, 
but that has reduced now that his brother left and the conservation project arrived. “Times ago wood 
was more plenty. Now some small in forest.” (Agima IV)
Honoue, Gbledi landowner
•  Mr. Honoue is an elder from his family. Spent most of his life out of the village working abroad 
or for the Ghana Police Department. He is widowed by his wife and he now lives alone and cooks for 
himelf. His family gave a portion of their forested lands on the uphill side of the road to the project 
reserve.
• He gave a large area of forested land to his nephew to manage. The area was cleared and burned, 
the suitable trees were used to make charcoal, while many others lay around the fields drying and are 
being farmed around. Their negotiation is for his nephew to use the lands for com and cassava while
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planting oil palms. When the palms grow Mr. Honoue will take over the farm again and live off the 
palm nuts and palm wine as he gets old.
•  He said all his firewood comes from the farm where his nephew works. He said “you will be 
caught at once if you went to the forest”.
• I observed that most landowners who donated their lands and are the recipients of the 
compensation % are too old to actively farm. Traditionally they would do what Honoue is doing with 
his nephew as a way to continue to provide for their family. This also benefits the youth who works 
their land. However, if now the elders are being compensated, aren’t the youth opportunities 
decreasing?
Aprepsu, Gbledi Landowner
•  His clan donated about 1/6* of their land. Their sub-clans are divided by their father’s lands. 
There is no clan head in this case to make decisions, so they were made at the sub-clan/family level.
• His family uses both charcoal and wood. The wood is still harvested in their forest areas, but only 
by the headpan, not for sale.
•  He does the usual com, cassava, and plantains on the lower lands, and palms on the upper side. 
Some of this is sharecropping and some paid labor. His sharecropping is 50/50 for cassava, and 75/25 
for com. He described the importance of plantains as being a quick source of cash in the economy. He 
would like to do more, and other cash crops on the downside, but says then he would have no food. To 
compensate for this he says ‘they’ (Ghana Wildlife Society) needs to give them a %.
• They eat fish everyday, meat only once a month. Previously his brother hunted, but has stopped. 
He sets some traps, but only on the lowland side, and is trying to start husbandry as a substitute. 
“Thankfully there is a cold store to provide meat.”
• To continue the project he says, “the key is obeying their (Ghana Wildlife Society) bylaws or they 
will pack up and leave us, and we won’t get anything.” He sees an obvious cormection between 
benefit and Ghana Wildlife Society being there.
• He would like to see the Ghana Wildlife Society build a community center. “Some construction, 
(there’s) not much to see. Other projects build school blocks, pay school fees for primary school.” 
Obviously doesn’t have confidence in the sustainability of the small enterprise projects.
Mortty, Gbledi Landowner.
•  Mortty elders said they don’t know what portions of the approximately 11.9km  ̂is donated by each 
landowner or clan, because they all share the profits of the reserve equally. They donated 25% of their 
family lands. Decisions of land use/farm decisions are made by family heads, who then ask clan heads 
for permission to grant lands to users.
• On their lands above the road they produce coffee, kola, peya, and cocoa, but also do these on the 
lowlands. In the lowlands they concentrate on cereals, like rice, yams, com, and wood. The clan head 
uses his farm himself, but pays laborers to do certain jobs like weeding. He does not share crop or 
tenant farm. They use charcoal and wood in their house for cooking. The wood is collected in the 
lowlands because it is easier to get than climbing the hills, but he said they still allow wood collecting 
on the slopes donated. They buy meat and fish from the cold store to replace the “meat shortage from 
the bush”.
• Group work problems: “Everything is hard to start but we are hoping for the future. If only 
donors and funders can help. We don’t work well together, must be individuals like with an irrigation 
system. Cannot profit, even in groups, doing manpower farming. We have plenty of land and 
workforce, but no capital to purchase machines to do the irrigation.”
• He said he wants to conserve for intrinsic future desires like stopping extinction, education , and 
ecosystem services. Doesn’t want to use lands in the forest as “working forest” because they do not 
want to farm the difficult areas. “Even digging there to plant trees is difficult. We don’t want to climb 
to the top. We would rather market it to have people coming to see what Gbledi people have done.”
• He said he has a feeling of laziness, “Your (white peoples) groups work fine. People are lazy and 
they still chop. Here we say ‘no work, no chop’. You have to work very hard to get anything.” He 
said he has a feeling of laziness, “Your (white peoples) groups work fine. People are lazy and they 
still chop. Here we say ‘no work, no chop’. You have to work very hard to get anything.”
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• Sharecropping occurs in many was here, like in Togo. When land is given to plant palms, cocoa, 
or coffee usually the cultivator benefits for 3 years growing com, cassava, and harvesting the wood 
they clear. They give small, token amounts to the landowner, but then the landowner gets the benefit 
of the cash crops solely when they are mature. On the other hand, if the use is only for the com and 
cassava, the owners get a significant cut or donation in kind. Besides these, deals are often cut for 
doing only specific parts of the toughest labor, like weeding or making charcoal.
William, Afadjato Guide
• We discussed the differences between the Ghana Wildlife Society and GWC. He restated that 
there are ongoing control issues between the community project team and Wildlife Department in Wli, 
but ended saying that there are 2 guards assigned to the sanctuary government Wildlife Commission to 
stop hunting and sawing. He said, “At times if they were not there you would hear shooting all the 
time. People would sometimes enter and fell trees and be sawing.” When I brought up the possibility 
of the Wli project being separate from the government like Afadjato he said the government has to take 
a % because of the 2 employees they have there.
• He described the roll of the District Assembly in both projects. The DA controls all business 
activities in the region, everyone pays a tax. He said it was the DA that paid for the bridges at the 
waterfall.
• We passed by the grasscutter house made of cement, expensive screen, double doors, funky 2 tier 
metal roof, etc.. .project park/recreation area that he described had been leveled off with bulldozers and 
then partially reforested with cassia siamea. He showed me the butterfly houses and screened in area 
used to enclose captured butterflies until they laid eggs that tumed into crycalis, which would then be 
exported. But that part of the project had not been working for a while due to a lack of market. As we 
passed some snail raising pits he briefly named off all the different small enterprise projects developed 
by the project, 9 total: beekeeping, snails, gari, soap, grasscutter, palm oil, yam, rice, etc...
• Why do guides talk about 9 small-scale enterprise groups, Ruben talk about 20, others talk about 
10. . . ?
• I asked about what types of animals lived in the forest, but he didn’t give any specific animals, just 
said wildlife. Once at the top he showed me a trail that cuts NE and meets the trail to Kuma-Davota. 
He showed me Kuma-Bala, which you could see on the horizon straight East. Then he pointed out the 
valleys where the Gbledi traditional area meets Liati and Kuma. From the Davota trail highpoint you 
look West to see Liati-Wote. He pointed out a Kabiye farm and homestead near it where we could see 
obvious bananas planted all around that valley. It was obvious that the history of the area, traditional 
use rights, geography were more significant to him than wildlife. He pointed out the taditional 
boundaries, not the forest reserve boundary.
• He said it was well off villagers that now live in Accra who originated the idea, proposed it to the 
village elders to preserve the highest mountain and make $ for the village via aid. The village elders 
then went to Ghana Wildlife Society to suggest they protect Mt. Afadjato. He said they approached 
Ghana Wildlife Society because they knew the government had no $ to give to communities without 
coimections. The Ghana Wildlife Society wrote the plan and sought the Netherlands Embassy’s aid. 
The project began once the plan was accepted, the equipment for projects was bought, park was 
bulldozed, and guides were trained.
• He said there are 8 guides, 9 small-scale enterprise groups, and 3 project managers. Whenever he 
described the project, it was always “they” either referring to Ghana Wildlife Society or to the village 
elites who initiated it, “they knew this”, “they decided this”, “we ask them”, “we do this”. ..He said the 
project helps directly through income generation, less of a demand on farming, and indirectly by 
attracting tourists that buy goods and services.
Isaac, Gbledi Guide
• Each of the guides has their special interests in the project. Patrick is the grasscutter and snail 
husbandry leader, often checking up on members in the village. William was very knowledgeable 
about the butterfly project. Isaac knew more about the beekeeping groups and methods. They are all 
open with information and know much more than other villagers I talked to. They are usually outside 
the office waiting for tourists or orders to do manual labor.
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• It seems like they could be doing more in the way of education, bridging the gap between the 
project managers and villagers than the one liaison.
•  He showed me the hives they use that are different from those used commonly in Togo. They 
don’t use frames or centrifuge extractors either, which cuts down on the costs of harvesting. Their 
hives are about 4 feet long and one foot tall, only one level unlike the double hives in Togo. The hive 
has about 20 top-bars. Once full of honey, they harvest all but the middle three bars and cut the wax 
and honey off die others to press out. They press them in a wooden frame with holes drilled in the 
sides.
•  Their honey sells for 15,000 per bottle. They also sell the wax and use it to bait other hives. We 
compared the prices of constructing the different hives and found it to be similar for wood, but the 
intricate work in Togo made the carpentry price higher. The wood prices per hive in Ghana was about
180,000 at the high end. For 300 hives that would cost the project 52,000,000.
• He said there are 3 groups in Gbledi and 3 in Chebi. Each group has about 15 members and each 
member has 3-4 hives. This totals approximately 270-300 hives. Each group has a president, VP, 
secretary type structure. All the hives and bee suits, press, etc... were paid for by the project. With the 
harvest $ die groups will start to repay the money given to build the hives for the revolving fund 
system.
• The bee groups are having problems with “lazy” members not working, or giving iqi on their 
hives. These hives are then taken back and given to other members.
• He also described the oil groups: 1 in Gbledi, 1 in Chebi, both with 18 members. They go all over 
to buy palm nuts at different markets and bring them back to their village to process. The project 
bought “many machines” to make both types of palm nut and palm kernel oils.
• The groups then stock the prepared oil and wait for the season to pass when the price of the oils 
increases before selling.
• During our conversation about how they became guides I left an extra long pause and Isaac asked 
if  I had any difficulties in my Peace Corps projects. I said that the hunting and cutting was not viewed 
as a problem by villagers because everyone does it and it’s never been managed.
• He immediately fired back, “don’t you have by-laws?” I explained that the projects I worked on 
were mostly development work, not under any whole ‘Conservation and Development’ theme like 
Afadjato. I said that including conservation activities indirectly in the projects doesn’t seem relevant. 
Also I said that the people in the projects probably wouldn’t write in conservation or anti-hunting by­
laws since they would only be sanctioning themselves, and they want to keep using those resources.
• This triggered Patrick to say the by-laws of Afadjato were not implanted by Ghana Wildlife 
Society. They were the desires of the community, or individuals within the community. These by­
laws were formed based on their ideas, supported and enforced by the village traditional system.
• They are also on a probationary period (like Wli guides) for payment as guides. Ghana Wildlife 
Society gives them an allowance, but when the project is finally handed over, it will be up to the 
community to decide on their wages. The community will also hire and train other guides then to 
replace tired guides from the original group. Patrick, for instance, is very busy with the grasscutter and 
snail raising and I don’t think he wants to continue guiding. They see it as very difficult work to wait 
around for tourists under the cashew tree and then hike up to the top with them.
Palm Oil Goup Chairwoman
• She said the group consists of 38 women and 2 men. The reason for having the men is for 
someone to run the mills! They formed in 2003, by having the village gong-gong announce that 
anyone interested in joining the group to come to a meeting. This was different than other smaller 
groups, which formed mostly by family groups. The Ghana Wildlife Society made it mandatory for 
them to form as a group, and made some kind of selection process to cap the group number at 40.
• Like other small business groups, the palm oil group members had to elect a chair or president, 
secretary, and treasurer. They were all trained by Ghana Wildlife Society in bookkeeping techniques 
and they opened a group bank account.
• She said fliey do not hold large group meetings, but all decisions are made by the group as a 
whole. I observed that the women often work on their individual portions of nuts in a common area, 
share the rakes used to mix the flesh with water, and socialize at that time.
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• For their actual work the 40 members is split up into 4, 10 person small groups. She said these 
groups delegate someone to go buy ripe palm nuts in Hohoe which the members divide amongst 
themselves to process separately using the mill but doing the rest of the work at their individual homes. 
Then they stock the oil together again as a large group and wait to sell it until the palm season ends and 
the price for oil increases.
• She said they buy the ripe nuts in Hohoe because it is a group business. The nuts they collect from 
their own farms in the village are used for making personal oil for family use and sale for family profit.
• So far the group profits have mostly gone towards paying the electricity bill for running the mills, 
and a small amount used to start repaying their loan to Ghana Wildlife Society. She says the group 
will be able to pay back most of the loan this year and all of it within two seasons. Until then the 
members are not profiting personally. She said the group decided to pay back the loans first, rather 
than profiting some and paying back some gradually because “we were being chased to pay it back by 
Ghana Wildlife Society.”
• She said the mills are open to use for anyone in the village, not just group members, but they have 
to pay a fee just like the village flour mill. Even members of the group have to pay the fee when they 
are not doing group work. She said in this way the whole village is benefiting from the mills, but the 
members are benefiting more because when the loan is paid off they will be making profits from their 
group oil production and profits from running the mill. When they use the mill for personal oil making 
they are investing it in themselves.
• Unlike the other projects, there have been no quitting the oil group so far. She said “its always 
difficult to work in groups, all over Ghana. Some people try hard, others are lazy.”
• She said there is an unwritten rule on production within the group. If a woman shows poor 
production on their portion of the palm nuts, i.e. each woman from the group of 10 should produce 
approximately the same amount, then she has to make up the difference with their personal oil 
production. She also said if it happens regularly they will not be asked to contribute in the future.
•  She says the oil making business is good because it doesn’t conflict vrith other farming activities. 
The peak nut fruiting season is in between the planting and harvest for most crops. The red oil is made 
at this time and the kernels can be saved to make the clear oil during the dry season when there are 
fewer activities.
• She said the mills make the work much easier. “It takes only 2 minutes per headpan, instead of 
pounding.” She said this is even more important for the kernels, which is traditionally done by 
cracking them open one at a time between stones by hand. This oil is less commonly made because of 
this and is where the real profit lies. Not all members of the group are willing to maJce the kernel oil, 
so it is voluntary for personal profit.
Gari Processing Group
• They said the Ghana Wildlife Society bought the machines, 1 new motor and 1 new cassava 
grinding mill. The mill was under a new building, put up with newer timbers, walls, and sheeting roof.
• The group worked under a long grass roofed paillote with six clay stoves and roasting pans on 
each side. The women had their children with them, laying around the stoves! Normally gari making 
is done at the home and there is some younger sister or neighbor who can look after a woman’s kids.
• But because the mill has broken a few welds they now grind at die regular village mill. One of the 
members said, “because the mill broke, the group also broke. Now we just do it for ourselves (use the 
group stoves and materials to make individual family gari supplies).”
• So now the hardly broken mill and brand new motor with aluminum roof etc... just sit idle. The 
group is waiting for Ghana Wildlife Society to fix ‘their’ machine, while Ghana Wildlife Society is 
waiting for the group to contribute money to have ‘their’ machine repaired.
Mancredo, Beekeeping group members
• We were talking about the status of loan repayment for small enterprise groups, he said, “I don’t 
know what the plan will be. That all depends on die office. Ask Rubin, he’s the director of small 
enterprise.”
• Togbe first got into beekeeping in the late 70s through a Gbledi PCV. When Ghana Wildlife 
Society asked for small business ideas, Togbe and Accra youth offered the idea of beekeeping.
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“Ghana Wildlife Society said they wanted small enterprise groups, at least 10 but less than 30. The 
idea was to give us them revolving loans.”
• Togbe’s group was 9 women, 11 men. He said the bee groins were loosely formed on family 
groups. They chose their own leaders, treasurers, and secretaries, opened bank accounts and were 
trained in bookkeeping. The project hired a technical trainer from Accra to come and guide the 
groups.
• The money for the groups was deposited in the bank in Hohoe. Their group was given 7,000,000 
cedis to build 40 hives, buy boots, cutlasses, and other materials. “We bought things to be used 
individually, cutlasses 20,000, Boots 50,000, and other things through the bee group. No matter what 
(the outcome), people have benefited.”
• The groups had poor success capturing bees in their hives. They switched to a local technical 
trainer who suggested changing their hive locations and constructing new hive roofs and top-bars.
• Ruben (Ghana Wildlife Society) recalled the hives to make repairs, but at the same time decided to 
give out fewer hives per group (15) and only to group members that were still serious with the project. 
In Togbe’s group only 5 remained out of the initial 20, who each now have 3 hives. Some members 
resisted returning their hives, because they had bees in them, and the old hive design tumed out better 
at keeping out water and pests.
• Togbe said group members lost interest due to laziness and not being serious. They were 
discouraged by the slow start «and low capture rate. Now that they harvested Togbe’s 3 hives this year, 
yielding 6 gallons of honey, he says people are getting interested again. Some have even built their 
own hives apart from the project groups.
• Togbe has high hopes for the beekeeping project. He described it as lucrative, but not as a 
livelihood in it self, as part of a larger plan of fiuit harvesting, tourism, and other alternatives to 
farming.
Private Businesses in Gbledi.
•  The people I observed in small business activities throughout the village, separate from the 
project, were all family groups of small numbers with one person obviously leading them. For 
example, an two old couples engaged in farming and husbandry, an older woman and 3 daughters 
making palm oil, a woman and 2 young daughters smoking fish, and a young family engaged in palm 
growing, gardening, and finit sales, (observations of businesses)
• Three of these groups said that they were not present when Ghana Wildlife Society started the 
small scale enterprise projects, but they wanted to join. Some said they can’t join now until the next 
round of project fimding.
•  One man was originally part of a farming group given a loan by the project for growing yams and 
cassava. He said the purpose was to use the project loans to pay laborers to work more land for them, 
and consolidate their yam harvests to sell them in a better market. All he could say was the projects 
didn’t work out and the group no longer exists. He cannot work anymore himself as well.
• Three families said they were not interested in the small-scale enterprise projects because they did 
not sound like ideas they would like to do. They said the projects would not work because “groups 
don’t work, they are not woricing hard.” Another said that she was proud of her fish smoking 
business because “I used my own money for this.”
• One woman said the small-scale enterprise work was too hard and they would not be paid to do it, 
saying that if you are called to work for someone you should be paid not given a loan. They also 
expected that the landowners would be paid for their lands, not just a percentage of the profits.
• The private group of women making oil say they are forced to sell it in the Gbledi village market 
for 3,500cedis, rather than 4,000 per bottle in Hohoe, because the cost of each of them traveling to 
Hohoe for a day would not be profitable. This supports the small-scale enterprise oil group plan of 
selling in bulk as a group.
• An older woman in the oil making and snail husbandry small-scale enterprise groups says they are 
not working enough. This is because they don’t have enough money to invest in buying palm nuts to 
process. She made oil 10 times this season, but says “we should be making everyday because we have 
the machine.” However, this seems to be a lack of their investment strategy as well. She said, “When 
you make 10-12 bottles (of oil), that only pays for school fees, fish, sauce, and it is finished. Not 
enough to buy more palms.”
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